Journal of Political Affairs

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Concordia's Undergraduate Political Review

Acknowledgements

After four years of studies and two years of working with *Political Affairs*, I am finally able to step back and reflect on my time at Concordia. I'm writing these reflections while listening to music – specifically the somewhat garish sounds of a mariachi band that is circling around the block below me. I'm sitting on a café patio in Austin, Texas, incredulously wondering at the fact that I've graduated and that we've successfully completed another edition of the JPA.

The festive albeit slightly excessive sounds of the band are an apt soundtrack for celebrating the 2015 edition, which in my humble opinion is the best yet. After working as an associate editor in 2014, I was thrilled and honoured to take a larger leadership role this year. After a year of seeing how the process unfolded, I had some new ideas and was keen to realize them – and accordingly, essentially jostled my way into a management role. Isaac and I created a joint chiefdom of sorts, and though our ideas may differ at times, the collaborative process has worked seamlessly to generate a product that we are both proud of. Of course, the majority of the credit belongs to our hardworking editing team, our eloquent writers, as well as new creative input from our artistic team. Though boasting a more diverse range of subjects, this year's edition built on the foundations of last year's efforts – a process that I sincerely hope continues in the years to come.

In addition to learning more about the framework of creating an academic journal, I was also excited to realize just how much excellent writing and in-depth scholarship was being generated by my peers in the Political Science Department. Like Isaac, I noticed that Concordia was lacking in opportunities for political science students to publish and share their work, and I am delighted that the JPA has been established to fill this void. I sincerely believe that publishing undergraduate work is a valuable enterprise, not only in terms of giving individual students some degree of professional recognition for their efforts and

scholastic ability but also in the interest of creating a collaborative academic space for the sharing of work and ideas. As such, I would lastly like to thank our supporters and especially our readers; thank you for maintaining a culture that encourages the production and relevance of projects like *Political Affairs*. Please enjoy!

<div align="right">

Sarah
April 27, 2015
Austin, TX

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Last August, I received a text message from one of the associate editors, Sarah, about taking on a greater role at the Journal. It came at the right time because I had been thinking about whom I could approach to give more responsibility because I wasn't keen on shouldering the same volume of editing work two years in a row. I had in mind for Sarah something like a managing editor role, but she had other plans. I still smile when I remember how the word "chief" in the potential list of titles appealed to her more than others. At first I was skeptical about how well the two-chief arrangement would pan out. But she converted me, especially during the past two months when Sarah was instrumental in meeting deadlines and when she single-handedly launched the Web site.

The first thing readers will notice about this edition is the new look. The design is the product of a different team with its own set of aesthetic predilections. When new people are given responsibility, they need to be allowed to make big decisions that will leave their mark on the project; otherwise they'll have little incentive to stick with the enterprise. The 2015 edition also contains a wider variety of categories represented. It offers essays in international political economy, strategic studies theory, interpretations of politics through art, and a description of how issues become political in the music scene.

But not all has changed. Naturally, the cruel practice of torturing writers has continued unabated. And I still believe the core of JPA remains the same – a forum for the contestation of ideas and an opportunity to refine the crafts of writing and editing. It was envisioned to be a production where text and art converged to create something that contributors and the Department would look back upon with pride. Readers can be the judges of whether that has been achieved. So I leave it to you now.

Isaac
April 27, 2015
Montreal, QC

On the Path to Development? A study of Neo-Marxism, Liberalism and Latin American Political Economy

From the viewpoints of liberal and neo-Marxist economic theory, Peter Koucholeris inquires into the disparate economic development occurring in Costa Rica and El Salvador. He examines several factors -- crime rates, mortality rates, and per capita income -- to argue that economic output is affected by these variables, but is it not limited to them. In the end, Koucholeris argues that non-economic variables also significantly hold back a nation's development.

An Expression of Political Identity and Allegiances: The Political Function of Native Americans in Benjamin West's Art

In his thoroughly researched article, Steve Santerre provides a clear and acute analysis of the work of American artist Benjamin West, the aim of which is to shed light on the artist's depiction of Native Americans. Ultimately, the author argues that while Aboriginals in West's works were, at least comparatively speaking, represented in a positive way, that is to say, with dignity and respect - the artist was still ultimately motivated by colonial intentions.

Free Trade and Protectionism in Canada: To What Extent Can Free Trade Hinder a Nation's Industry?

Hugo Bozicas shows how the rules of the World Trade Organization can ironically hamper the development of a particular industry in a member state. By analyzing the WTO dispute between Japan and Canada, he shows how the Ontarian solar panel industry would have benefited without rules that are established for the promotion of free trade between member states. The pros and cons of opening up an economy to global competition are brought strikingly close to home in this article, especially when successful domestic programs must be rolled back because of treaty obligations.

Revolution Girl-Style Now: Feminized Protest in the Riot Grrrl Movement

Through the lens of social movements theories, Bryn Jennings thoroughly examines the feminist grassroots movement Riot Grrl as a political space for women to resist gender-based oppression and inequality, and to reclaim their rights to femininity and female sexuality. Originating the 1990s, Riot Grrl exploded into Western cultural consciousness, using networks of publications, meetings, and the punk music scene to organize safe and creative political spaces for women. Using collective behavior theory and resource mobilization theory, Jennings addresses questions of the movement's successes and its continued relevance to contemporary feminism and other forms of political resistance.

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
The Role of Guanxi (关系) in Singaporean Foreign Direct Investment in China

Zach Su examines the commonalities and linkages in Chinese and Singaporean business practices as a result of guanxi -- the network of patronage that informally serves as an institutional and cultural norm in China. Su examines how this affects foreign direct investment from Singapore to China, noting that Singapore's culture is conducive to cultivating guanxi. Additionally, each country is affected by weak, decentralized formal institutional frameworks that allow for networking and patronage to be leveraged in investment deals. As such, Su adeptly analyzes the critical role that norms play in influencing financial decisions, particularly in instances where cultural ties are shared between nations.

Chechen Roulette: Subnational Authoritarianism in the North Caucasus

In his deeply analytical piece, Mike Taylor explores the complex relationship between political institutions and security forces in Chechnya. Controlled by a strong-armed president, the security forces currently foster stability and help to preserve the president's rule, albeit potentially at the cost of social liberties and long-term security. Through rigorous research and analysis, Taylor ultimately questions the sustainability of the current relationship.

Mahan and Corbett Go To War: Strategy and the Imperial Japanese Navy

Given China's continued rise in world stature, attention has turned to the geopolitical implications for South East Asia, especially concerning its arch-neighbour Japan. In a theoretical analysis of naval strategy and its potential impact on a nation's proneness to belligerence, Levon Petrossian creatively offers a method of analyzing Japan's past naval adventures, partially in light of Mahan and Corbet's theories and partially in light of his own work. Taking the reader through Imperial Japan's naval development from the Meiji restoration through World War II, the central question of his paper is whether a nation's particular choice of naval policy would increase the likelihood of it sparking a war.

The Sino-Danish Relationship: An Unusual Bilateral Connection

Daniel Rhodes examines an intriguing albeit little known bilateral relationship in international relations between China and Denmark. He posits that Denmark, despite its small size and comparatively modest political clout, serves as an important bridge between China and Europe through its position as an amicable and less economically committed member of the European Union. Rhodes explores the complexities of this relationship, including Denmark's recognition of the CCP, human rights concerns, and increasing bilateral investment -- ultimately speaking to to the intricacy and nuance of the international arena in the modern era of increased economic and diplomatic interdependence.

Peter Koucholeris

On the Path to Development? A study of Neo-Marxism, Liberalism and Latin American Political Economy

Introduction

   The concept of development has been widely discussed and debated through various academic spheres. For many, development can be defined as sustained economic growth in real gross domestic product (GDP). The idea behind this is that while a country's economy begins to grow because of an increase in overall output, the standard of living in that given country will begin increasing as well. In the case of Central and South America, many countries have begun seeing an overall growth in GDP, and an increase in per capita income. But have these countries really developed? Critics offer the perspective that overall growth in GDP and per capita income only scratches the surface, and different initiatives have to be taken into consideration to better the development in these countries. This paper will offer and define two theoretical schools of thought that take two contending perspectives

towards the idea of development, and then apply them to two case studies in Central and South America. Can the adoption of competing sets of economic principles explain the existence or absence of economic advancement in developing countries? I will argue that while there has been an overall growth in economic output and per capita income, development has occurred disproportionately between the countries because of increasing income inequalities, increasing poverty rates, and increasing crime rates.

The first part of the paper will define both Liberalism and neo-Marxism, taking into account their different perspectives towards the concept of economic development. Specifically, when explaining Neo-Marxist theory and economic development, the paper will look at both Dependency Theory, and World Systems Theory. Furthermore, the identification of Liberal economic conventions, such as, structural adjustment loans (SAL) will be interpreted while considering both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Banks attitudes towards developing countries. The second part of the paper will look at two empirical case studies, and examine them through the lens of the two theoretical schools of thought. Precisely, the paper will examine the concept of development in both El Salvador and Costa Rica during the periods of 1992 and 2012. The data analysis will be examined on a four-year basis, using two indicators (annual GDP growth in percentage, and Infant Mortality Rates) that will aid in defining the concept of economic development. Also, a brief analysis of both countries and an explanation of the findings will be explained thoroughly. Furthermore, the two theories will be applied to the case studies in order to examine which one best explains the findings.

1. Theories in Action: Neo-Marxism & Liberalism
I. Neo-Marxism

Marxism offers a critique of mainstream theorizing when it comes to the political economy. These critics have anti-Imperialist tendencies and have become present in many developing countries. The rise of leftist guerrilla groups through the last century shows that many of these ideas have been popularized

as class struggles within Latin American society. In the following section, two Marxist ideas will be thoroughly examined. First, World-System theory will be explained. Second, dependency theory will be defined thoroughly. These theories will then be applied to the case studies in the following section of the paper.

World-System theory differs from the traditional modernization theory. It offers a theoretical dimension to the idea of new economic order, and a global redistribution of wealth (Chirot and Hall 1982, 81). The theory offers us a depiction of a historical transition of multiple world economies that have been produced over time. Around the end of the sixteenth century is when Wallerstein acknowledges the emergence of a capitalist system. In this new capitalist world system, the state became less centric in economic activity, and monopolies would be able to secure their rights to private property (1982, 84). New transportation technologies and military advancement in the West ensured the success of this new system by enforcing the terms of trade (1982, 85). Thus, the world economies began to develop in what we might consider core and periphery states.

Industrial core states began modernizing their technology, progressing in agriculture, and developing a skilled labor force; periphery states, on the other hand, were the source of exploitation. In periphery states, labour was cheap, and core states were able to challenge and coerce them into domination. This was due to the importance of primary goods in these societies. The development of a skilled labour force in industrialized countries led them to have an increased need in primary goods and unskilled labour, which could be found in periphery states. Wallerstein also stressed the importance of the semi periphery states: "without semi peripheries, the capitalist world-system cannot function" (Chirot and Hall 1982, 85). The purpose of the semi periphery is to "deflect the anger and revolutionary activity of peripheries" (1982, 85). An example of this is Brazil, and Iran in the 1980s (1982, 85). With this conception of World-System theory came the advancement of the Latin American focus on dependency theory.

Dependency theory has been a relevant field of study in many Latin American academic works. The core principles of

dependency theory revolve around the relationship between what is considered less developed states and developed states. The less developed states are considered to be on the periphery, and the developed industrialized states are at the center, or core (Tansey and Hyman 1994, 28). Latin American dependency theory offers four basic assumptions: (1) The relationship between the core and the periphery is unequal, (2) the core gains from that disproportion much more than the periphery, (3) comparative advantage and other forms of classical economics do not lead to the advancement of the periphery, and (4) "consumption by the affluent minority impedes economic development in the periphery by diverting critically needed investment capital" (1994, 28). The first assumption brings up the setting of economic exchanges among periphery and core states. Dependency theory states that these economic exchanges occur under unequal circumstances that benefit the more powerful state. This theory argues that U.S. investment and trade policy are aimed towards its benefit, such as protecting American jobs. For example, in 1992 a report from the U.N. Development Program stated that twenty-four core countries of the GATT began adopting more protectionist policies, while influencing their population not to buy goods from periphery states (Tansey and Hyman 1994, 29).

The second assumption that Dependency Theory brings forth is that economic exchange is inherently unequal. This idea claims that the terms of trade will always be in the benefit of the core states. For example, firms in the United States have the advantage when it comes to advertising capabilities in comparison to their Latin American competitors (1994, 32). The third assumption of Dependency theory dismisses classical liberal economic theory. By rejecting the free market assumptions of classical economics, Dependency Theory argues that states should take a more interventionist approach to their economies. They claim that governments should aspire to overcome social inequalities created by these free market principles (1994, 29). The last part focuses on the strategies of core states to reach into the market of periphery states and create a consumption class within the privileged groups in Latin American society (1994, 32). The consumption class within these coun-

tries develops into the economic elites and dominates the lower classes, which is a significant portion of the population. Dependency theory offers a critical outlook towards less developed countries.

II. Liberalism

The classical liberal approach to economics is that of free markets and privatization. Many conflicts in Latin America have been established because of the conflicting debate surrounding this subject. When it comes to economic development, developing countries rely heavily on foreign finances, such as loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. The modern day Liberal economic assumptions of economic growth and development can be clearly seen in the foundation of these two international organizations. These organizations are agents of trade liberalization and market privatization and follow classical free market liberal conventions. For example, in order to receive financing, developing countries must implement various economic and social reforms that are tied to the financing.

In the modern day liberal economic international sphere, many countries have moved away from authoritarian, repressive regimes to the adoption of common norms and democratization. This transition has increased the number of countries joining international organizations. Such organizations help foster liberal economic reforms in the domestic arena by helping them develop with the financial support given by these institutions. If a developing country goes forward with the reforms offered by these organizations then they will receive financial support. If they fail to do so, the governments of these developing countries receive a bad reputation that imperils their likelihood of obtaining financing in the future. This would lead to instability in the domestic realm of politics within that country. If countries become democratic and create a business friendly environment, then liberal's claim that the financing of that country would move forward (Mansfield and Pevehouse 2008, 271). By adopting democratic principles and joining IOs, states tend to promote different standards such as human

rights, and environmental protection (2008, 289). But the money only arrives if they commit to keeping their proverbial house in order.

Consider the structural adjustment loans (SAL) that the World Bank offers to developing countries. In March 1993, the World Bank proposed a SAL with a package of reforms necessary in order to meet the requirements necessary to reach its program objectives in Costa Rica. A requirement was to reform the country's public sector by attempting to "(i) privatize government services and enterprises, (ii) reduce public sector employment, (iii) improve the budget process" and "(iv) rationalize and expand tax base" (World Bank 1993, 4). Also, there was an implementation of trade reforms. This was necessary for the structural adjustment loan, an example of this was for the chosen country to become less protective of their domestic economy and adopt a privatization model (1993, 4). In the financial sector, one reform policy was to "reduce discrimination against private financial institutions" (1993, 4). Furthermore social changes and pension reforms were another aspect of the political, social and economic reforms needed to attain the program objective of the SAL.

The IMF is another international organization that provides some of the same liberal reforms mentioned above. Its purpose is to provide international monetary cooperation through its global financial institution (IMF 2014, 2). Also, the organization seeks to ease economic growth and expansion and promote stability, maintaining "orderly exchange arrangements among member" (2014, 2). Unlike the World Bank, the IMF is not considered a lending institution; it is "a repository for its members' currencies and a portion of their foreign exchange reserves" (2014, 6). They pool these currencies and use them when a member state is realizing financial difficulties. One can understand why some developing countries would want to enter into these international organizations. These liberal institutions are at the forefront of our contemporary economic financial system. These ideals, however, are at odds with neo-Marxist thinkers that insist these institutions are there for the sole purpose of exploitation, which can be seen in both the World-System and Dependency theories.

2. Case Studies: El Salvador & Costa Rica

In the following section of the paper, two case studies will be explained in connection with the previously defined theories. Costa Rica and El Salvador have similar economies, geographies, and demographics. Has one seen more economic growth in one over the other? If so, what has one country done that the other has not? These are questions that the paper will seek to answer in the following section. First, I will provide a brief summary of each country, and some statistics will be carefully examined. Second, ross domestic product growth in percentage terms and infant mortality rates will be looked at through the years 1992 to 2012, on a four-year basis. This data will be studied and interpreted for the purposes of acknowledging if growth has been present or lacking in the two countries. Last, the link between the two theories of neo-Marxism and liberalism to the two empirical case studies will be explained.

I. El Salvador
1. Description

Prior to 1992, El Salvador had been fighting a decade long civil war. The Conflict saw casualties of war amount to approximately 75,000 people. The conflict included government forces supported by the United States and a left-wing Marxist insurgency. By the end of the conflict in the late 1980s, the country began moving towards a centralized approach towards peace and the adoption of democratic principles. The country adopted various structural reforms that resulted in a strong economic performance (World Bank 2014). Some of these reforms included structural adjustment loans (SALs) from the World Bank, which were adopted in 1991 (1995, 1). Property prices in the country declined, and there were also decreased infant and maternal mortality rates, and school enrolment increased (World Bank 2014). El Salvador's current GDP in U.S. dollars sits at $23.8 billion with a population of approximately 6.3 million.

Crime and violence are main factors in threatening social development and economic growth, it also affects the quality of life of its citizenry. There is a high gang membership rate among youths and adults, which has aided in increasing the overall crime rates (World Bank 2014). Furthermore, environmental factors, such as extreme climate variability, affect long-term economic growth and development in the country (World Bank 2014). By adopting many of the principles seen in part 1 on liberalism, El Salvador is a country worth examining.

2. Analysis

The indicators used to assess economic development are (1) gross domestic product growth in percentage terms, and (2) infant mortality rates, using the measurement per 1000 live births (World Bank 2014). The timeline begins in 1992, roughly when the structural adjustment loans were being implemented in El Salvador, and it ends in 2012. GDP growth by an annual percentage allows us to consider the economic output in the country on a yearly basis, based on the percentage the economy has increased. Moreover, infant mortality rates can help us understand the social developments in El Salvador.

The data shows that there has been a significant decrease in infant mortality rates between 1992 and 2012. Growth in GDP has been increasing; but the increase is not stable. In 1992 there was the highest increase in GDP growth measuring up to 7.5%. Since then, 2.2% has been the highest growth the country saw. Overall, the data provided offers us a look at a significant decrease in infant mortality rates and a gradual growing of overall output. Does this mean the liberal policies adopted by the country had a positive effect on the developing country?

TABLE *1.1 Statistics from World Bank, Databank (2014).*

El Salvador	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)	41.9	33.8	26.8	21.3	16.7	14

El Salvador	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
GDP Growth (Annual %)	7.5	1.7	2.2	1.9	1.3	1.9
Key Events & Data	1992: End of the Salvadorian Civil War. Beginning of structural reforms		Growth in GDP remained static at around 2%		Poverty increases from 34.6% to 40%. GDP contraction of 3.1%	

3. Linking Theories to Case Study

In the case of El Salvador, it is clear that the government took the liberal approach in pursuing an increase in economic development. The data shows an increase in overall GDP growth, and a decrease in infant mortality rates. Thus liberals can argue that that the northern hemisphere is accelerating rather than ceasing the industrialization of the southern hemisphere (Smith 1979, 285). By joining international organizations, and receiving international financing, economic growth becomes present. Furthermore, in Latin America, the struggle for political and economic freedom has been associated with the liberal, free market oriented principles that guide it.

These principles include much of what we have seen above, from privatization of the public sector, deregulation and little or no state intervention in economic affairs (Veltmeyer 1997, 208). The increasing income inequalities are an example of a contemporary issue in many liberal oriented societies. The wealthier classes of society are benefitting from the economic growth and prosperity, while the lower classes continue to struggle. Therefore, the liberal reforms seem to be working on the surface because it is clear that infant mortality has decreased and annual GDP in % has increased. But the Marxist critic would offer a different perspective to the modern day issues developing within El Salvador. Increase in income inequalities and an increase in crime rates can be seen as the negative effects of adopting liberal reforms. Also, development can be seen as uneven: wealthier individuals and regions have benefitted more from the liberal reforms than the less fortunate. These issues can be seen in both World Systems theory as well as

dependency theory. A similar situation can be seen when look-ing at the next case study of Costa Rica.

II. Costa Rica

1. Description

In contrast to El Salvador, Costa Rica is considered to be an upper middle-income country. It has had steady econom-ic growth since 1980 and has produced "export-led growth, openness to foreign investment; and gradual trade liberaliza-tion" (World Bank 2014). The economic growth for the country was above the regional average. Its GDP stands at $45.4 billion U.S., with a population of 4.8 million (World Bank 2014). Pov-erty levels in the country dropped during the 1990s and early 2000s, but have recently begun to increase. In effect, this is due to an increase in economic growth only benefitting the skilled labour force of Costa Rica. The issue concerning the country in contemporary society is the increase in income inequality, which has emerged post-financial crisis of 2008 (World Bank 2014). As a consequence, rising levels of crime have led the government to take initiatives to fight organized crime, such as drug traffickers, in order to maintain domestic stability.

2. Analysis

Costa Rica like El Salvador followed the same path in re-structuring their economy post-1990 in order to encourage growth and prosperity. I used the same indicators of GDP growth, and infant mortality rates in the analysis. The data shows that infant mortality rates have gone down significantly, and GDP growth is once again unstable, but growing. Costa Rica, like El Salvador, began with high economic growth in 1992, but growth steadily went down four years after that. But different from El Salvador, Costa Rica had some significant periods of growth in 2004 and in 2012. Overall, both countries saw a boost in their respective GDPs, but Costa Rica seems to have had the overall advantage. Lower infant mortality rates and higher GDP growth and overall GDP offer leverage to the argument that Costa Rica is doing better than El Salvador.

The two countries share similar populations and land mass, but have different economic output. Both of them adopted liberal economic policies in financing and expanding their economies.

TABLE *2.1 Statistics from World Bank, Databank (2014).*

Costa Rica	1992	1996	2000	2004	2008	2012
Infant Mortality Rate (per 1,000 live births)	13.8	12.9	11.3	9.2	8.9	8.6
GDP Growth (Annual %)	9.2	0.9	1.8	4.3	2.7	5.1
Key Events & Data	The economy grew at a aver-age rate of 5%; led by exports and trade liberal-ization		Poverty saw significant decreases in Costa Rica during this period. Inequalities began to rise as of 2010. Gini coefficient went from 0.439 in 2009 to 0.434 in 2010.			

3. Linking Theories to the Case Study

Once again, it is clear that the adoption of liberal economic principles is present in the case of Costa Rica. The country, like El Salvador, has seen a drastic decrease in infant mortality rates, as well as an overall increase in GDP growth. Moreover, liberals can argue "that dependency theory in general substan-tially overestimates the power of the international system-or imperialism-in the southern affairs today" (Smith 1979, 249). The increase of GDP growth and decrease of infant mortality rates are an example economic development in the country. Using this, liberals would argue that the adoption of their economic principles leads to an increase in the standard of living for the whole society. On the other hand, Marxists would argue, "Neoliberalism is the project of a particular class, a set of ideas and policies designed to advance the interests of this transnational capitalist class (Veltmeyer 1997, 209). The over-arching effects of capitalism and liberal economic principles towards the global south are still a reality, even though it does not look like it on the surface. Although the proletariats of the working class have faded in industrialized societies, they are

now present in the southern hemisphere, in periphery states (Wallerstein 1974, 406). Wageworkers can be found in certain areas of the globe, such as in the countries south of the equator. The world economy requires individuals to serve their own economic interests for their own benefit (1974, 407). Wallerstein also emphasizes the modern day importance of semi-peripheral states in controlling and continuing to reproduce the current, dominant order. Therefore, inequalities and the exploitive nature of the industrial core's trade policy is always a factor that can have influence in the global capitalist realm. Furthermore, Marxism offers a critique to the modern day reforms being implemented in developing countries. Like El Salvador, Costa Rica is facing an increase in income inequalities, as well as an increase in overall crime rate. These issues are a modern day phenomena that Marxism argues is a product of global capitalism.

Conclusion

Can the adoption of liberalism or neo-Marxism explain the existence or absence of economic growth and development in Latin America? I have argued that while there has been an overall growth in economic output and per capita income, development remains uneven between them because of increasing income inequalities, increasing poverty rates, and increasing crime rates. The paper first described two theoretical schools of thought (Liberalism and Neo-Marxism), followed by an analysis and interpretation of data obtained from two Latin American case studies. El Salvador and Costa Rica were studied through the lens of the two contending theories. The empirical evidence showed significant decrease in infant mortality between the years of 1992 and 2012. Also, during those years both El Salvador and Costa Rica saw periods of GDP annual percentage growth. At the same time there were considerations to increasing inequalities, as well as increase in criminal activities in both countries. Therefore these findings show us the bigger picture of economic growth and development, but do not offer us a clear picture of the positive aspects of market liberalization.

Furthermore, output was increasing and infant mortality was decreasing in both case studies. Both cases had adopted liberal economic reform policies in order to have access to the foreign financing needed for sustained economic development. Although the policies seem to be working on the surface, the paper raised various issues that arise with market privatization. Issues of income inequalities, increasing crime rates, as well as poverty rates seems to be a contemporary and future issue that these two countries will have to deal with. These issues can be seen as a product of global capitalism according to neo-Marxism. I have argued that while overall economic output seems to be growing, because of market liberalization, issues of wealth distribution and social inequalities are present. Skilled labour and wealthier classes seem to have benefitted extremely from market privatization, while lower unskilled labour classes have not. This shows that development is also disproportionate within the countries studied. With the development of the Washington Consensus and the modern day reforms implemented in various countries around the world, Marxism has become an ever more relevant criticism to the capitalist economy. From the structural adjustment loans in developing countries in Latin America to the modern day austerity measures implemented in developed countries, liberalism continues to dominate international political economy. It is important to understand the consequences of liberal economic reforms, and, in order to do so, Marxism's critique of the political economy will become increasingly important in the academic sphere.

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Peter Koucholeris

Born and raised in Montreal, Peter is currently finishing his second year at Concordia, majoring in Political Science. He is interested in Canadian politics, international relations, and political economy. He presently works at the Pierre Eliot Trudeau Airport at the International Currency Exchange and volunteers at Batshaw Youth and Family Services as a Big Brother and mentor for adolescents.

After investigating specific events that occurred in Latin America and the price many people paid for standing up to their authoritative governments, Peter expanded his interests in analyzing how these societies resist neoliberal ideals, particularly when faced with brutal authoritarian regimes and left-wing guerrilla insurgencies.

Steve Santerre

An Expression of Political Identity and Allegiances: The Political Function of Native Americans in Benjamin West's Art

The Death of General Wolfe (1770) by Benjamin West, depicting the British conquest of New France at the Plains of Abraham near Quebec City, continues to stir both artistic and political debate (Fig. 1).[1] Though West's biographer John Galt remarks that the artist did not like to take part "in political cabals, in the petty enmities of partisans, or the factious intrigues of party leaders," it will be demonstrated that the politics of identity and allegiance are not only key to understanding the enigmatic figure of the Indian in the *Death of Wolfe* but also the function of Indians in several of West's works (1960, II.71-2). As an American-born artist who succeeded Sir Joshua Reynolds as president of the Royal Academy in 1792, West incurred suspicion as being a democrat and a supporter of the Ameri-

Editors' Note: Due to space and intellectual property constraints, not all images of West's paintings are not re-printed here. Readers are directed to Web versions of his cited artwork.

can and French Revolutions (Farington 1922, ix). In this paper, the debate on West's national loyalties is addressed through an analysis of how he depicts aboriginals in his artwork. The question is: what does the function of the Indian warrior figure in West's *Death of Wolfe* reveal about West's views about aboriginals and their identity in the latter half of the 18th century, a time characterized by violent conflict in North America?

This paper has the goal of establishing how West's Indian figure in *Death of Wolfe* and in his other works serves to artistically represent the amicable alliance between the Aboriginal nations and the British Empire. I will argue that beyond a purely aesthetic appreciation of West's works, his art is interpreted as a statement of political identity and allegiance, not only as it relates to Aboriginals but to West as an artist. While rendering a generally positive portrayal of Aboriginals, I contend that West uses them for an explicitly political reason: to support Britain's colonial efforts. In the latter half of the 18th century, a time marked by unremitting warfare and the shifting loyalties of Aboriginal nations in relation to French and British colonial powers, Britain saw it as crucial to solidify its power over North America by using art to 'win over' the Natives. Prior to delving into this argument, it is useful to survey how scholars have approached the issue of Aboriginals in West's art. Stephanie Pratt's and Vivien G. Fryd's research deserve particular mention because they succeed in revealing the incredibly close relationship between art and politics (Pratt 2005, 72-85).

Stephanie Pratt, in her book *American Indians in British Art,* 1700-1840, argues that the Indian in the *Death of Wolfe* exemplifies West's desire for accuracy and "becomes a screen onto which is projected West's declaration of truth," which is essentially a mixture of documentation, narrative, and allegory (2005, 72-3). She claims that the Indian's iconographic function is primarily symbolic and allegorical, serving as a "vehicle for West's larger intentions concerning the representation of colonial events" (2005, 73). The Indian's inclusion also makes it "impossible for any of the other figures to be clothed in classicizing dress" (Pratt 2005, 72). Her analysis is supported by what West says about his painting: "the event intended to be commemorated took place on the 13th of September, 1759, in

a region of the world unknown to the Greeks and Romans, and at a period of time when no such nations, nor heroes in their costume, any longer existed" (Galt 1960, II. 48). Though his painting contains numerous factual inaccuracies, West's pursuit of 'realism' is confirmed by his emphatic statement that "the same truth that guides the pen of the historian should govern the pencil of the artist" (Galt 1960, II. 48).

Fryd affirms that the Indian serves an allegorical function by acting as the personification of America. Both art historians demonstrate this by referring to Robert Anthony Bromley's *A Philosophical and Critical History of the Fine Arts* (1793):

> No sooner does the eye fix on the collateral circumstances, but we know that the scene of action was foreign from Britain [...]and that this scene must be North America for the savage warrior shews us that the country was his. In allegory, can any thing speak more correctly than these? [...]Without [the Indian] no imagination would have found it easy to acquaint us by any other symbol what was the country, at least no symbol that could speak with so much precision, and so much in tone with the subject, as that which has been chosen. (Quoted in Pratt 2005, 73)

Fryd also notes that the Aboriginals in West's *The Indian Family* (c.1761) were meant to represent America for a patron who sought an ethnographic record of the four quarters of the world (1995, 78-9). The subjects in this artwork are given an identity by the artist. Such an identity may be fashioned by the artist in any way that suits their liking, but how they depict their subjects is arguably a reflection of their own worldview, political ideology, and cultural upbringing. As will become clear, the artist engages with narrative and we would be misguided in assuming that the identity of the artist and the context in which they develop their art has no bearing or influence on the art itself. Approaching the matter from the lens of political allegiance not only helps shine light on the politics of West's art but also on his own political identity.

The conflict of allegiances figures not only as an important aspect of West's art, but also of West's political identity. The question of his national loyalties can in part be answered by referring to his *Signing of the Preliminary Treaty of Peace in*

1782 (1783-4), an unfinished canvas depicting the American but not the British participants involved in the singing of a peace treaty between Britain and America (Gould 1997, 107; Erffa and Staley 1986, 218).[2] In "American Independence and Britain's Counter-Revolution," Eliga H. Gould posits that West likely developed second thoughts about completing this work because "the American Revolution was hardly an appropriate subject for the king's official history-painter, nor was it likely to garner favour with a public still smarting from one of the most humiliating defeats in British history" (1997, 107-8). It is clear that West discontinued this work to avoid political backlash that could have potentially tarnished his reputation in Britain. Arthur S. Marks points out that West maintained a strong sentimental attachment for the land of his birth and its people but "he had been prudent in expressing any sympathies, particularly because of his intimate connection with George III"(1974, 16). The ambiguity and inconclusive nature of this unfinished work by West not only mirrors the ambiguous aspects of his own double identity as an American and as an Englishman, but suggests a relationship to the ambiguous identity of the Indian in his *Death of Wolfe.*

The image of the Indian on the title page of the *American Magazine and Monthly Chronicle*, published in 1758, illustrates the conflict of allegiances experienced by Native Americans during the French and Indian War between France and Britain. The illustration emphasizes the pivotal role of Aboriginals in North American colonial politics. Several art historians have noted how this image and its motto allude to the subject of Hercules who stands between two women, Pleasure and Virtue. Just as Hercules ends up choosing Virtue, it was believed that if the British acted righteously towards the Aboriginals, they would prevail in the conquering of North America (Lacey 2007, 111). Even if the authorship of this illustration is still in question, West's own depiction of the *Choice of Hercules* (1764) suggests that he was fully aware of the subject matter.

[2] The figures appearing from left to right are the American representatives John Jay, John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Henry Laurens and the delegation's secretary, William Temple Franklin. The empty space occupying the right-hand portion of the work was intended to be filled by the British commissioner Richard Oswald and his secretary Caleb Whitefoord.

The equating of an Indian to Hercules "further underlines the power and importance of the Indian people" (2007, 111). Consequently, this illustration would have affected West, whose own positive views of Aboriginals and his dignified portrayal of them in his works are key to understanding him as an artist.

West expresses his admiration of Native Americans upon visiting the classical Greek marble sculpture of the Apollo Belvedere with a group of Italian connoisseurs. West is reported by John Galt to have boldly exclaimed, "My God, how like it is to a young Mohawk warrior!" (1960, I. 105). Though the Italians "were excessively mortified to find that the god of their idolatry was compared to a savage," they soon enough came to appreciate West's remark after hearing his reasons for making this comparison. Galt records this event in his biography on West:

> [West] described [...] their education; their dexterity with the bow and arrow; the admirable elasticity of their limbs; and how much their active life expands the chest, while the quick breathing of their speed in the [chase], dilates the nostrils with that apparent consciousness of vigour which is so nobly depicted in the Apollo. "I have seen them often," added he, "standing in that very attitude, and pursuing, with an intense eye, the arrow which they had just discharged from the bow." [...] The Italians were delighted, and allowed that a better criticism had rarely been pronounced on the merits of the statue. (1960, I.105-6)

West uses the pose of the Apollo Belvedere in his depiction of a male Native American in his *Indian Family* (Fig. 3) as well as in his first life-size full-length portrait, *Lieutenant General the Honorable Robert Monckton* (1764). Monckton, who was second in command to General Wolfe at Quebec, is also seen in West's *Death of Wolfe* attending to a chest wound. West's decision to apply the pose of the Apollo Belvedere both to an Indian figure and to a high-ranking British military official could suggest that West did not believe that Native Americans were in any way inferior to the British. The symbolic linking of Indians to the British colonial elite in North America is also demonstrated in West's painting *Colonel Guy Johnson and Karonghyontye* (1776), which will be discussed in more detail later (Rienhardt 1998, 283-305).

Among several positive declarations made by West about Indians was his statement that it would be absurd "to deny [Indians] the same sense of dignity, the same feeling of dishonour, the same love of renown, or ascribe to [their] actions in war, and [their] recreations in peace, baser motives than to the luxurious warriors and statesmen of Europe" (Galt 1960, I. 136-7). In West's drawing *The Indian Giving a Talk to Colonel Bouquet in a Conference at a Council Fire* (1766), a Native American man confidently stands upright to deliver a speech – in the same manner an ancient Roman statesman would – in front of a group of five attentive colonial officials. It is therefore not unreasonable to claim, considering the numerous examples in West's works where Aboriginals are depicted in a powerful and dignified way, that the Native American in West's *Death of Wolfe* possesses "the same sense of dignity" as the General himself. Fryd demonstrates how the formal qualities of the work link the Indian to Wolfe:

> The contours along the Indian's back complement the curve of Wolfe's left arm, suggesting a relationship underscored by their position low on the ground. A line extends from the native's bent legs to those of Wolfe, leading to the dying man's face with its heavenward gaze. The Indian's left hand, touching Wolfe's boots, further connects the two figures, as does the tomahawk that points directly to Wolfe's knees. (Fryd 1995, 73-4)

Though naked and not clothed in a military uniform like Wolfe, the Indian's muscular body, relaxed pose, and contemplative gaze subtly evoke a sense of heroism. What is the function of this Indian warrior figure? While many scholars have pointed out how Indians have served as representations of America in art, Derrick R. Cartwright goes further by claiming that the Indian is meant to act as a rhetorical substitution for West as he sits "pondering the nature of European cultural and political authorities" (2004, 7). West could have sympathized with Indians, who, like him, were caught in a conflict of allegiances. As such, his inclusion of an Indian in the painting could be interpreted as West recognizing the loyalty of Indians – and by extension, himself – to Britain.

While his positive views of Indians are important, it must be emphasized that he, like Johnson, was also guided by colonial motivations. For Galt, the *Death of Wolfe* is West's attempt at representing "the conquest of a great province of America by British troops" in a manner that "history will proudly record" (1960, II. 48). In 1805, West revealed how his painting *Penn's Treaty with the Indians* (1771-2) (Fig. 2), completed not too long after the *Death of Wolfe*, represented the conquest made over Indians without the use of violence: "The great object I had in forming that composition was to express savages brought into harmony and peace by justice and benevolence, by not withholding from them what was their [right], and giving to them what they were in want of, as a wish to give by that art a conquest made over native people without [sword or dagger]" (The Baltimore Museum of Art 1989, 59). While West's art could be interpreted as propaganda for British conquest, what is important is that he sees the alliance between the Native Americans and the British to be beneficial for both sides.

Thus, West represents Britain as a humane and civilizing conquering power whose principal interest is the maintenance of a peaceful alliance with North American Indians. In his drawing *Allegorical Composition with Britannia and a Native American Indian, Holding Fasces Between Them* (1788), an Indian receives the fasces, a bound up bundle of wooden rods accompanied by an axe, symbolizing strength through unity (Fig. 3). Notable features of West's depictions of Britannia usually include the presence of a Union Jack shield and/or a lion in the scene, Britannia wearing a Roman helmet (with or without plumes), and Britannia wielding a spear, a sceptre,or a laurel branch. These elements serve to emphasize Britannia's power and authority. In *The Reception of the American Loyalists by Great Britain*, two female figures representing Religion and Justice hold Britannia's mantle as she extends her arm and shield to receive British Loyalists and a Native American chief (Atlantic Canada Virtual Archives 2008). The Indian's eye contact with Britannia as well as his arms outstretched to welcome her suggests the acceptance by Indians to British rule. The two winged cherubs in the top left corner of the work, one

holding the *fasces* and the other wearing a feathered headdress, further supports the interpretation that West sought to unite the British Empire and the Indian Nations of America in his art. It is also worth noting that several figures in this drawing are wearing Phrygian caps. Also known as the liberty cap, this is a symbol used widely by French and American artists in the latter half of the 18th century. While seen everywhere as a symbol for freedom, it did not in the American context necessarily refer to independence from Britain (Korshak 1987, 57). In order to better understand the relationship between Indian tribes and Britain, it is useful to refer to a double portrait completed by West at the onset of the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783).

West's *Colonel Guy Johnson and Karonghyontye* (1776) illustrates the political alliance forged between the Mohawk and the British. This can be demonstrated with reference to the clothing and other iconographic details of the two main figures in this painting, who are Guy Johnson, the British superintendent of America's six Indian nations and beside him the Mohawk chief Karonghyontye (also known as David Hill). Johnson, the figure on the right dressed in a red-coated uniform, is equipped with several articles of clothing associated with Native American warriors: in his left hand he holds a feathered hat or *gustoweh*, he has a fur mantle, he wears moccasins decorated with quill-work, and deerskin leggings cover his legs, held in place by beaded garters below his knee. This contrasts with the clothing worn by the Mohawk, who is equipped with wristbands and a choker made of wampum, while a knife hangs from his neck. In addition, he has a shaved scalp with a tuft of hair adorned with beads and feathers (Muller 2005, 65). Despite some differences in clothing, it is clear that Johnson adopted elements of Aborigianl clothing to appear as a friendly ally of the Mohawk. Another important element is the relationship between Hill's peace pipe or calumet and Johnson's musket. While Johnson's left hand is wrapped around his musket, Hill points to the calumet in his right hand. Calumets were widely used during the eighteenth century as a symbol "of a Native American smoking ritual that bonded two or more parties together in a solemn and peaceful agreement" (Muller 2005, 73).

Thus, it can be inferred that though both figures seek peaceful relations, they will be ready to fight together if war breaks out. Clearly, the calumet is used by West to illustrate the alliance of the Natives to the British Empire. Also noteworthy is the settlement of Indians gathered in the background beside a tent, one of whom is positioned very similarly to West's Indian in the *Death of Wolfe*. Moreover, Hill's shaved scalp and red-feathered headdress also directly borrows from West's Indian in the *Death of Wolfe*.

The 18th century English painter Sir Joshua Reynolds had predicted that the *Death of Wolfe* would occasion a revolution in the art of painting. The *Thinker*-like pose of West's Indian had such a great influence in its own time that Heinrich Fuseli adopted it only five years after West's painting was first exhibited. In the lower-left corner of Fuseli's *Vue du Cataract de Niagara, au Pais des Iroquois* (c. 1776), a Native sits with his chin in one hand and a weapon in the other (Revie 2003, 41). Fuseli's Indian is "an identical twin to West's Indian" (Stacey 1966, 2). It is significant to note that whereas West's Indian in the *Death of Wolfe* was painted during a critical moment in the Seven Years' War, Fuseli's Niagara Indian was created at a time when another battle between competing nations was taking place, the American Revolutionary War. The fact that Britain had the support of the Iroquois and Mohawks in fighting the United States at this moment in history leads Revieto to posit that "Fuseli's painting symbolizes all the qualities associated with certain Native tribes at this time – strength, bravery, and loyalty" (2003, 42).

In a similar fashion, West depicts Aboriginals as dignified, powerful, and necessary for ensuring Britain's success in North America. The evidence provided shows how his admiration for the rather stoic, noble simplicity of Native Americans, and his equating them to figures of authority — both classical and contemporary — reflects his own genuine sympathy for them. Nevertheless, the Natives in his art act not only as subjects but as objects through which he can advance his own — or even the King's own — political agenda in North America. The promise of an amicable relationship between Britain and Native Americans is fostered by benevolent statements and images immor-

talizing the fraternal alliance. While West's art had political messages, it is impossible for him to have predicted how Anglo-Native relations would evolve. The appropriation of Native lands, the discriminatory practices and laws affecting them, and the lower living conditions they have experienced vis-à-vis white settlers are but a few examples of how West's Utopian vision of a fair and respectful alliance between nations has not been realized.

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Figure 2. Benjamin West, *Penn's Treaty with the Indians*, 1771-1772.

Figure 3. Benjamin West, *Allegorical Composition with Britannia and a Native American Indian, holding Fasces Between Them*, 1788.

Steve Santerre

Originally from Saint-Hubert, Quebec, Steve is currently studying his third year at Concordia, majoring in Political Science and in Western Culture and Society. He is particular interested in the notion of sight and vision in relation to art and politics, revolutionary politics and mass mobilization, and ancient Greek philosophy.

Steve's interest in sight and vision inspired this essay on political identity and narrative in visual art. That is, how a narrative is depicted by both the artist who paints it and the viewer who interprets the piece. For Steve, artists are not completely divorced from the political realm. Art is never made in a vacuum; it is always contextually influenced.

Hugo Bozicas

Free Trade versus Protectionism in Canada and Japan: To What Extent Can Free Trade Hinder a Nation's Industry?

Introduction

The end of WWII saw the establishment of several international organizations, some aiming to increase development, such as the World Bank, and some trying to improve overall international trade. A part of the organizational framework became a multilateral international agreement, the General Agreement in Tariffs and Trade (GATT). From 1947 to 1995, the GATT was the main global agreement in international trade. In 1995, the GATT was integrated into the World Trade Organization (WTO) framework. Until today, the WTO remains the ruling organization in matters of international trade. The main purpose of those institutions has been to promote free trade. That is why the WTO's main objectives are to reduce tariffs and other barriers to trade and to eliminate discriminatory treatment in international commerce (GATT 1994, 1). Both the GATT and the WTO find their roots in free

trade principles from the liberal paradigm. However, some countries find that they have an interest in disregarding WTO rules, especially when protecting certain domestic industries. This behaviour is commonly called protectionism, which finds its roots in mercantilist theories of political economy. But if some countries try to protect their domestic industry, it must mean that there are some benefits for them. Free trade does not improve every country's situation to the same degree, but arguably, neither does it actually improve every industry to the same degree within the same country.

To what extent, then, can free trade hinder a nation's industry? This essay will argue that free trade can hinder a specific sector or industry within a country. The reason behind this is that by having regulations supposedly enhancing harmonious economic relations, free trade can effectively improve a nation's economic standing. However, because of the two main principles of the WTO, namely the "most-favoured nation treatment" rule and the "national treatment" rule, free trade can also impede certain sectors from fully developing. The "most-favoured nation treatment" rule requires countries to treat other countries equally in terms of economic trade concessions, while the "national treatment" rule prevents countries from discriminating against foreign goods and services. In order to answer this question, this essay will be divided in two sections. The first will look at the theoretical paradigms and the causal mechanisms behind both free trade and protectionism. The second part of the essay will link the theories to an empirical case, namely a WTO dispute between Canada and Japan. The case study focuses on a recent disagreement regarding energy production in Ontario in which Canada had an interest in protecting its own production in this region. A proposition will be introduced at the end of the paper, possibly leading towards future research on the general issue of free trade. The timeline will start in November 2006 and end in August 2014.

Research Design

The WTO currently has 160 members (WTO (b) 2014). Since its creation, there have been 486 disputes in which complain-

ants have requested consultations to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) in charge of settling conflicts between countries or groups of countries (WTO (e) 2014). Therefore, there were a great amount of possibilities in choosing countries and disputes. However, it would not be appropriate to compare two countries that have very little in common, except being part of the WTO. For example, some countries are not democratic, such as Yemen or the Democratic Republic of Congo. Also, some huge economic discrepancies exist between members. For example, the WTO includes the two countries with the highest gross domestic product (GDP), the United States and China, as well as the country with the lowest GDP, Haiti. Therefore, large gaps exist in matters of development, due partly from the economic and political differences between member states. The type of requirements that we have here lead to choosing countries with a similar amount of development. In addition, choosing countries that are well integrated to the free trade system and the global economy in general makes the comparison even more appropriate. Therefore, the case studies will focus on two members of the G7, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development and the WTO: Canada and Japan. By virtue of being part of the G7, Canada and Japan are both considered as part of the world's most industrialized countries. Even if geographic and demographic differences exist between them, they have high production capabilities, are well integrated into the global trade system, and therefore can be compared in economic terms. By virtue of both countries being strongly integrated to free trade and gaining from it, it is assumable that they both have strong incentives to be part of the WTO and follow its rules. However, it begs the question of whether every industry within a given country will benefit from following those rules.

The timeline will begin in November 2006, as it is during this month that the Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program (RESOP) started in Canada and Ontario especially, marking the beginning of Canada's attempt to produce renewable energy en masse thanks to individual or small-scale production. The timeline will end in August 2014, when Canada informed the WTO that its recommendations were going to be implemented.

Liberalism versus Neo-mercantilism

The main principle upon which the WTO or GATT reside can be found in the liberal theoretical paradigm. Liberal thinkers in favour of free trade have made two general arguments, whether they were economists, political scientists, or both.

Some have argued that free trade was favourable because of its political advantages. Using German philosopher Immanuel Kant's ideas, Russet and Oneal argued that international peace was more likely to happen if countries were democratic, interdependent (mostly economically), and members of international organizations (Oneal and Russet 1999, 4). Therefore, even if the WTO does not meet the democratic requirement for all its members, as stated earlier, it is trying to ensure economic interdependence between countries under the supranational organization that it is. The main assumption of economic liberalism is that international economic relations are to be harmonious in most cases. In the last 1970s, Robert Gilpin posited that Adam Smith and liberals in general assume that trade can result in a positive-sum game, meaning that there are absolute gains. Also a liberal assumption is the idea that not only the general world economy benefits from trade but also that nations themselves will all gain from exchanging with each other. Hence, liberals argue that states should not have any role to play in the economy and, therefore, should not interfere with it (1975, 27).

Several economic arguments exist in favour of liberalism, all leading to a higher economic growth. First and most importantly, comparative advantage theory traces back to the British political economist David Ricardo. This theory argues that by specializing in their best sector or at least in the sector in which they are the "less worse," countries can practice trade and therefore increase the amount of general production. A second argument could concern consumers who would benefit from having a bigger market in two ways: by having a greater variety of products and goods, and by having lower prices (from increased competition). Third, it can be argued that countries make foreign exchange gains when practicing free trade because they obtain foreign currency reserves.

It is important to remember that economic liberalism assumes that economic cooperation is possible and easily achieved between countries. However, some authors and researchers argue that cooperation is, if not impossible, hard to achieve. Therefore, some political scientists and economists have argued in favour of protectionism. This term will be defined in this essay as the economic principle of impeding free trade in order to advance a nation's economic fortunes in comparison to other countries. This can take the form of voluntary export restraints, quotas, government subsidies, health standards, non-tariff barriers, or product-content requirements. However, this essay will mainly focus on product-content requirements, quotas, and some type of subsidy in the case study that will follow.

As stated in the introduction, protectionism finds its roots in the mercantilist paradigm. As explained by Robert Gilpin, mercantilists assume that international economic relations are to be "conflictual," as they base their paradigm on realist theories, which assume anarchy in the international system (no hierarchy in international relations or world government). Therefore, their view of international relations is a zero-sum game, meaning that one's win is another's loss. Consequently, the general mercantilist argument is that states have to maximize national interest and look at the shifts in the distribution of power. Even in today's globalized economy, this means that mercantilist states will sometimes find it more preferable to protect their national interest over free trade, by protecting a particular industry. National interests and goals are not to be judged as positive or negative because mercantilists argue that it is determined by factors internal to the state (1975, 28).

Newer theories of mercantilism have also emerged, notably under the neo-mercantilist paradigm. Neo-mercantilism generally assumes models of strategic trade policy, which implies reactive behaviour from countries, in order to get ahead of other countries in economic terms (as mercantilists, they see the economy as a zero-sum game). The winner of the 2008 Nobel Prize in Economics, Paul Krugman, in his book "Empirical Studies of Strategic Trade Policy" argues that most goods

under free trade come from external economies and oligopolistic industries, meaning that consumers and buyers will have higher prices that they would have with locally produced goods because of the lack of competition. He therefore proposes that countries benefit from creating tariffs and barriers to external economies (1994, 2). All of this still assumes that the objective of any state's economic measures is to improve its own well being (Stegemann 1989, 80).

Case study: Ontario's Renewable Energy Sector and Its Will for Protectionism

The case study concerns a dispute between Japan and Canada. Canada (and especially Ontario) was accused of favouring its local industry over foreign industry, and therefore violating non-discrimination rules of the WTO.

Japan is one of the world's leading manufacturers in terms of solar panel production (Earth Policy Institute, 2013). Globally, it had the third highest photovoltaic production in 2012, behind only China and Taiwan. In accusing Canada before the WTO, Japan can therefore be seen as trying to maintain a dominant position in the solar panel market. This case is also relevant because it includes Ontario. It is by far the province with the highest GDP in Canada, therefore largely contributing to Canada's GDP and thus to its trading capacity. For example, Ontario's expenditure-based GDP in 2013 was $695 billion, while Canada's total GDP was approximately $1.9 trillion (Statistics Canada, 2014).

The Canadian Province of Ontario developed over the years several types of tariff programs that can be defined as "a guaranteed price established for anyone who wants to sell renewable electricity to the grid, and a guarantee that they will have access to the grid to do so" (Weis and Peters, 2008). Accordingly, the case study will focus on the Feed-in-Tariffs (FIT) Program developed in 2009 by the Ontario government. It had several objectives. First, as it was part of the *Canadian Green Energy Act*, formally introduced as the *Green Energy and Green Economy Act*. It aimed to improve the environmental condition in Ontario and in Canada in general, as its name states. It also

shows the government's willingness to improve the economic situation of the province. However, the environmental and economic arguments do not explain in totality why this program was implemented.

A program like the FIT already existed beforehand, as the Renewable Energy Standard Offer Program (RESOP), signed in 2006. The question here is this why did the FIT Program have a larger impact than the RESOP? The answer lies in the price the government was willing to pay for each kilowatt (kW) produced by individuals. Indeed, people were enticed to invest in renewable energy production because of the rise of the price between the RESOP and the FIT Program. For example, the price for electricity produced by solar photovoltaic panels before 2009 was 42 cents (Canadian dollars) per 10 kW, while the price under the FIT was 80.2 cents per 10 kW (Stokes 2013, 492). According to Stokes, this led not only to small-scale installations but also to large-scale projects, something that would not have been encouraged by the RESOP, knowing that the price return was the same no matter the size of the project. By creating those price differences, the Ontario government was aiming to entice the people to invest in renewable energy and thus reach its environmental goal.

It did entice businesses, as the annual installed PV capacity in Canada bumped up from 6.95 MW in 2008, to 61.85 MW in 2009, meaning a capacity about 9 times higher in a single year (International Energy Agency 2009, 8). However, the FIT Program included domestic requirements. As stated in Stokes' article, products creating electricity through wind force had to be composed of at least 50 percent of domestically produced (within Ontario) components, while solar panels had to include 60 percent domestic products (giving reasonable time to producers after implementation of the measure) (2013, pp. 495). Therefore, it is clear that the government was trying to improve the economic situation of the province by trying to attract investors who would put their money into renewable domestic energy production. This would have in turn created jobs, especially when knowing that large-scale projects had more incentives to be pushed forward now that the FIT Program had been put in motion.

Another reason for which the Ontario Government might have pushed for this bill is simply political. As then Ontario Premier Dalton McGuinty led the provincial Liberal Party, he and his government had an incentive in favouring environmental laws in order to appeal to leftist voters. Also, one of the main groups that pushed for the FIT Program, the Green Energy Act Alliance, was composed of people coming from various levels of social standing, such as farmers, First Nations, and environmental NGOs, giving the Ontario premier broader electoral success as the number of people supporting him would expand across the political spectrum (Stokes 2013, 494).

Having explained why and how Ontario, and Canada in general, would have gained from such law, it is now important to show why those measures, in appearance positive for Canada's growth and development are not in accordance with several of the WTO rules.

Protectionism and the FIT Program

As said earlier, the WTO is driven by two main principles, the most-favoured national treatment and the national treatment rules. We will now look at how the FIT Program did not abide by those principles.

The logic behind the FIT Program was effectively a protectionist one. In trying to achieve its own economic and environmental goals, the Ontario Government chose to protect its renewable energy industry by having domestic content requirements and by buying people's electric production at very favourable prices. Canada, by virtue of being part of the WTO, is obliged to assume liberalism and free trade as its primary objective and paradigm within international economic relations. However, it protected its renewable energy industry, arguing that this was their best way to attain its economic, ecological, and political goals. On what grounds, then, did Japan accuse Canada?

Japan's first allegations against Canada were based on the Article 2.1 of the Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) and on the Article III.4 of the GATT (referred to by the Article 2.1 of the TRIMs). The latter states, "the products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws, regulations and requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use" (WTO (d), 6). This goes back to one of the founding principles of the WTO: the National Treatment rule. What this means is that it obliges countries to treat foreign goods the same way they treat their domestic products, whether it is through taxation or subsidies. National Treatment rules therefore consider the FIT Program as a violation, since having domestic products is more advantageous than acquiring products fabricated abroad.

The second point upon which Japan based its attack is Article III.1 of the GATT, which stipulates that "the contracting parties recognize that internal taxes and other internal charges, and laws, regulations and requirements affecting the internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation, distribution or use of products, and internal quantitative regulations requiring the mixture, processing or use of products in specified amounts or proportions, should not be applied to imported or domestic products so as to afford protection to domestic production." By becoming members of the WTO, countries promise not to differentiate taxation between domestic or foreign products with the objective of favouring domestic products. The issue here is that the FIT program does exactly what the Article III.1 prohibits. People get favourable rates for the government to buy their electric production (when produced with locally created machines), incentivizing people to invest in domestically produced machines. Canada does not even hide its intention; governments themselves said that it was mainly to promote local production that the FIT Program was passed.

The last article used by Japan to accuse Ontario and Canada is the Article 3.1(b) of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement). "Except as provided in the Agreement on Agriculture, the following subsidies, within the meaning of Article 1, shall be prohibited: subsidies contingent, whether solely or as one of several other conditions, upon the use of domestic over imported goods" (WTO (c) 2014, 231).

What is prohibited here is the existence of an industry only because domestic goods are used over imported goods. However, it seems irrational for Japan to have attacked Canada on this ground because a renewable energy industry obviously already existed, knowing that the RESOP Program had been put into work since 2006.

Protectionism had served Canada's renewable energy industry and interests on the short time during which the law and measures had been implemented in Ontario, but this had to stop due to the WTO panel's findings on this dispute. In the end, the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the WTO argued that indeed, Canada had to make changes to its FIT Program. On June 20, 2013, Canada informed the DSB that it would implement the panel's recommendations (WTO (a); (e) 2014). And it did, over a reasonable period of time, manage to modify the program. First, as an interim measure, before completely modifying the law, the Ontario Power Authority (OPA) decided to reduce the domestic requirement, though not completely. The OPA waited until July 25, 2014 to announce its intention of fully disregarding the domestic requirement rules. Reviewing prices was also on the table and were to be implemented on January 1, 2015, according to the OPA and Minister of Energy's announcement (Power Authority, 2014) Even if the implementation of the WTO's recommendations is not completed by the planned deadline, Canada and Japan have already informed the DSB of Agreed Procedures (WTO (a), 2014).

In sum, it can be argued from this case that the present state of the Ontario renewably energy industry results from the WTO ruling. Indeed, this case has shown that without the enforcement of the WTO rules, protectionism had helped Ontario's solar panel industry and that the situation would be much better for this industry today if not for the institutional structures required (namely the two main principles), in order to practice free trade. Therefore, free trade in itself is not the reason for which Ontario's renewable energy industry was hampered, but those rules required to make free trade function are the reasons.

Conclusion

Liberals argue for free trade through the assumption that it will benefit countries on the whole, but whether it benefits every sector within a country is unclear. In this case, the benefit of protecting the renewable energy industry in Canada and Ontario had materialized, meaning that it was indeed useful to protect this particular industry even if Canada is usually a proponent of free trade. In consequence, free trade can effectively hinder an industrial sector, even if improving a nation's and the world's welfare on the whole. The study of Ontario's renewable energy industry and how it was undermined is a case in point. The case used in this essay shows that, indeed, free trade, and especially the obligations under which free trade operates, can actually hinder a nation's industry and strategic interests. On a more general matter, by preventing Canada from using protectionist measures through WTO rules, reaching its environmental and economic goals became much harder. What this means is that even Canadian ecological goals were and are harder to reach after the implementation of the WTO's recommendations. Hence, global ecological objectives are now harder to reach. Could free trade actually hinder and inhibit global progress in reaching ecological and environmental goals?

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Originally from Aix-en-Provence, France, Hugo moved to Toronto before attending university in Montreal. He is currently finishing up his second year at Concordia with a Major in Political Science and a Minor in Sociology. His personal interests have always guided him towards Political Science and, especially, International Relations. Throughout his studies at Concordia, Hugo has always appreciated taking courses that mix both politics and economics within an international context. He hopes to work in a field that combines his interests in these subjects in the future.

As an essay submitted for his International Political Economy course, Hugo's paper demonstrates his concern with free trade in the international economy. Hugo considers free trade to be one of today's major concerns in society.

Bryn Jennings

Revolution Girl-Style Now: Feminized Protest in the Riot Grrrl Movement

"BECAUSE us girls crave records and books and fanzines that speak to US that WE feel included in and can understand in our own ways … BECAUSE we know that life is much more than physical survival and are patently aware that the punk rock "you can do anything" idea is crucial to the coming angry grrrl rock revolution which seeks to save the psychic and cultural lives of girls and women everywhere, according to their own terms, not ours … BECAUSE I believe with my wholeheartmindbody that girls constitute a revolutionary soul force that can, and will change the world for real."

Excerpt from Riot Grrrl Manifesto,
Kathleen Hanna, 1991

Riot Grrrl emerged in 1991 from the punk scenes of Olympia, Washington and Washington D.C. (Downes 2012, 139). Centred around informal networks of punk concerts and consciousness-raising meetings, it quickly spread across Europe and the Americas, existing as an active movement from 1991 to 1996 (Zobl 2004, 448; Riordan 2001, 288). The movement is difficult to define, largely because it was short-lived and seemed to burn out as quickly as it exploded into the cultural consciousness of the early 1990s. Yet its music and politics have continued to inspire feminists, with young women using the Riot Grrrl moniker to this a day. The movement created a political space through which young women challenged gendered oppression that they faced in the punk scene and in society at large. They aimed to create safe spaces for women within both of these spheres, while advancing an intersectional feminist discourse through creative expression. Riot Grrrls emphasized community support and solidarity, inclusiveness, collaboration, and self-acceptance (Riordan 2001, 287). They also sought to reclaim and redefine girlhood, femininity, and female sexuality. These messages were communicated through music and zines, which created a strikingly cohesive collective vision among the spatially diffuse, grassroots movement.

This essay will examine Riot Grrrl through two competing theories of social movements – collective behaviour theory, which focuses on the role of conflicting ideologies, and resource mobilization theory, which links movement form and success to the utilization of available resources, both material and non-material (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 12-15). Through this lens, this essay will address the questions of how and why Riot Grrrl emerged, and whether the movement was successful in its aims. The objective of this analysis is to illuminate the potential of feminized protest forms, which are largely overlooked in discussions of grassroots organization and countercultural production. Riot Grrrl recognized this potential, with an explicitly stated mission to speak to and for young women who were alienated by the patriarchal culture they faced in both Western mainstream society and the supposedly radical, anti-establishment world of punk rock. The movement demanded that the feminine be seen as a complex viewpoint worthy of serious

consideration within the political sphere. The success of the movement within a short period of time and its continued place in the feminist lexicon demonstrates the power of alternative protest forms that speak from specific socio-political viewpoints, the potential of informal grassroots organizing, and the need for more serious academic consideration of feminized political spaces.

Riot Grrrl: A Brief History

Riot Grrrl was a grassroots social movement that emerged from the early 1990s punk scene in response to the white, male dominance of the hard-core scene. The first two Riot Grrrl chapters were established in Washington D.C. and Olympia, Washington, while the Olympia-based bands, Bikini Kill and Bratmobile, were on tour in the summer of 1991 (Marcus 2010, chapter 3). Once these chapters were established, others quickly proliferated throughout the U.S., Canada, Europe and South America (Zobl 2004, 448). Riot Grrrls cultivated a distinct collective identity through chapter meetings, which served as consciousness-raising groups for this new generation of feminists, as well as through music and zine production. A zine, or fanzine, is a hand-made magazine commonly used in the punk scene to share information about bands and other topics (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 136). Zines tend to have a distinct Do-It-Yourself (DIY) aesthetic. Riot Grrrls appropriated the form, using it to build community and raise the feminist consciousness of young women in the scene, while maintaining their place within the punk vernacular. The music and zines produced by Riot Grrrls often addressed deeply personal and "taboo" subjects, such as rape, abuse, abortion, and eating disorders in direct ways, transplanting these personal issues into a larger political context (Schilt 2003, 7). They demanded "Revolution Girl-Style Now," a slogan Bikini Kill used in their live shows and as the title to their debut self-released cassette tape, which came to encapsulate the spirit of the movement, expressing the links Riot Grrrls proposed between femininity, rebellion and radical politics.

The Riot Grrrl identity was rooted in the traditions of both punk and feminism, each informing the other (Downes 2012, 211). However, they also levelled critiques against each of these forms, feeling that neither adequately addressed the issues they faced (Schilt 2003, 6; Riordan 2001, 280). In the early days of punk, which first emerged in the U.K. in the 1970s, the subculture served as a site of experimentation and challenge to the status quo (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 137-38). Within the early punk scenes of the U.K. and New York City, women were a central presence. However, with the rise of hard-core in the 1980s, particularly in the American West Coast scene, punk became an increasingly male space. The aggressive energy of hard-core punk made many women feel unsafe and unwel-come and relegated them to a marginal role in the music scene (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 137-38; Downes 2012, 205-09). Riot Grrrls sought to reclaim the radical, anti-establishment roots of punk rock, while infusing feminist politics into their music and zines, disrupting hierarchal relationships between audience and performer, and challenging the established spatial order at punk shows (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 140; Zobl 2004, 446). While this push-back against male dominance in punk first began in the American Pacific Northwest with bands like Bikini Kill, Bratmobile and Heavens to Betsy, the British band Huggy Bear soon became a central figure of the movement, calling for "Boy/Girl Revolution" in their hit song *Her Jazz* (Marcus 2010, 262). Huggy Bear and Bikini Kill would go on to release a split LP, *Yeah Yeah Yeah Yeah*, in 1993 and tour the U.K. together, which was chronicled in Lucy Thanes' 1993 short documentary *It Changed My Life: Bikini Kill in the UK*.

Riot Grrrl was also embedded within the third-wave femi-nist movement. Third-wave feminism is a term used to situate the feminism of the 1990s within the continuum of the ongo-ing feminist movement. The concept of "waves" of feminism emerged in the 1970s, as a way to link the mobilization of women's rights activists to the suffragettes of the nineteenth century (Bailey 1997, 19-20). Thus the nineteenth century fem-inist movement came to be referred to as the first-wave and the feminists of the 1970s became the second-wave. When renewed interest in feminist activism emerged in the 1990s young wom-en adopted the third-wave terminology to demonstrate that they were both building from the work of their foremothers and creating something new. Riot Grrrl was a significant component of the third-wave movement, but is not representative of the movement as a whole. Riot Grrrl exists as a particular niche of the feminist movement, much like the position the punk scene holds within music culture.

Riot Grrrl as Social Movement: A Theoretical Analysis

The interactionist school of collective behaviour theory claims that social movements emerge when opposing value systems come into conflict (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 13). The conflict creates a sense that established norms are no longer applicable to the needs of the newly developing group, incentivizing nonconformity. If this feeling spreads it can evolve into a social movement. This process involves symbolic production and identity construction, which creates unity and cohesion among movement participants. Rochon argues that through this process of producing new social values, social movements bring focus to social problems and as such are agents of cultural change (in Della Porta & Diani 2006, 13).

The process of ideological conflict, which collective be-haviour theory proposes, can help us understand why Riot Grrrl emerged when it did. The founders of the movement were young female punks and artists who felt that their experiences were neither represented nor taken seriously by fellow punks and a patriarchal culture that subordinates the feminine. Their punk aesthetic and brash politics were recognizable symbols of nonconformity, but Riot Grrrl also developed its own aes-thetic and ideological expressions to challenge hierarchies and confront inequalities within the punk scene. Downes states that, "Riot Grrrl refused to denigrate the feminine and instead created a visual and sonic spectrum of politicized girl signifiers" (2012, 210). Markers of girlhood, such as baby doll dresses and plastic hairclips, were subverted to challenge the conflation of "girl" and "docility;" zines incorporated curly, cursive letters into their DIY aesthetic to imbue their radical politics with fem-ininity; and Riot Grrrls wrote words like "slut" and "whore"

on their bodies to confront the male gaze and restrictive pre-scriptions of female sexuality (Schilt 2003, 8; Riordan 2001, 280).

As the movement established itself and evolved, it began to address systems of oppression outside of the microcosm of punk. Patriarchal capitalism, gender norms, and the mainstream media became new sites of ideological conflict (Schilt 2003, 8-9; Riordan 2001, 287-288). They drew links between the sexism, harassment, and violence they faced in the punk scene to the larger socio-political forces that subjugate women and their experiences. Their music and zines challenged patriarchal capitalist structures through both content and aesthetic presentation (Riordan 2001, 288). Their work attempted to deconstruct socially constructed concepts of femininity, most notably through the appropriation and politicization of the concept of "girl" (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 141; Rosenberg & Garofalo 1998, 809). "Girl" was divorced from its implications of passivity and submissiveness, and was instead conceptualized as a unique political viewpoint. There was power in the markers of girlhood, an assertiveness that had been removed from women through puberty and teenhood, which the Riot Grrrls sought to recapture (Rosenberg & Garofalo 1998, 809-810). Schilt argues that, "They wanted to start a 'girl riot' against a society they felt offered no validation of women's experiences" (2003, 6).

The reclamation and redefinition of "girl" in the face of ideological conflict with a patriarchal, capitalist society drove the interrelated processes of symbolic production and identity construction within the Riot Grrrl scene. Although on a relatively small scale, the Riot Grrrls were able to find great success in these processes. The movement drew on a rich tradition of repertoires to shape and express its message. It was placed firmly in the tradition of punk, engaging in challenges to the status quo through DIY interventions (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 136). It appropriated the fanzine format of the 1970s punk scene to create an aestheticized and easily producible medium for the dissemination of their message (Schilt 2003, 6). As mentioned above, the aesthetic itself became part of the political message of Riot Grrrl zines, communicating their grassroots, partici-

patory, non-hierarchical ideals (Riordan 2001, 288). Furthermore, Zobl argues that Riot Grrrl owes a debt to previous waves of feminism, which left a legacy of engagement with art, music, and performance as a form of activism (2004, 446).

Riot Grrrl also engaged in innovation, through body writing and mutual learning. Mutual learning was a key feature of zines, chapter meetings, and conferences, encouraging Riot Grrrls to learn new skills in a collective setting in an attempt to "liberate themselves from intimidating and restrictive (male) notions of control and expertise" (Zobl 2004, 446). These activities created a community for young women who had previously felt isolated and that their issues were not taken seriously.

Riot Grrrls found success in the spheres of identity construction and symbolic production, which allowed them to become agents of cultural change. Their politics and signifiers resonated with many young women, leading to the rapid proliferation of Riot Grrrl chapters throughout the world. Although Riot Grrrl as a definable movement only existed for a span of five years, it was influential during its existence and its impacts continue to be felt. This is especially true in the past few years, which have seen an immense resurgence of interest in the movement, including media coverage reflecting on its legacy, a book documenting the movement's history (*Girls to the Front* by Sarah Marcus), the establishment of a special archive of Riot Grrrl zines and ephemera at New York University's Fales Library, and a documentary chronicling the life and work of Bikini Kill front woman, Kathleen Hanna, a central figure in the Riot Grrrl movement (*The Punk Singer*) (Angell 2010). This suggests that Riot Grrrl is not done making its impact on our cultural landscape, and thus it may be too early to judge the full scope of its success in this sphere.

Collective behaviour theory has considerable utility for explaining the emergence and growth of the Riot Grrrl movement in response to conflicting relations within the punk scene and patriarchal society more broadly. However, collective behaviour theory tends to overlook the process through which individual feelings become transformed into collective action, which is central to the emergence of Riot Grrrl (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 12). Especially through their zines, Riot Grrrls were able

to produce a sense of both individualism and community, merging a personal, confessional tone with the catharsis of shared experiences (Zobl 2004, 451). Adherents explicitly rejected hierarchy in all forms, allowing the label of Riot Grrrl to be open to anyone it resonated with. There were no leaders or membership rules; any girl could go to a meeting, write a zine or form a band, and be a Riot Grrrl (Zobl 2004, 445). Community and inclusiveness were the keys to activism and identity. Collective behaviour theory may help clarify why Riot Grrrl emerged, but it does not help us understand how the feelings of gender oppression and marginalization among movement participants translated into tangible actions.

Resource mobilization theory is a competing theory that more explicitly considers these aspects of social movement formation. The theory argues that social movements emerge in response to rational considerations of available resources by movement entrepreneurs (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 14). In contrast to collective behaviour theory, resource mobilization theory focuses on questions that examine how, rather than why, social movements form (Tarrow 2011, 24). The theory posits that social movements take into account both material and nonmaterial resources available to them, and that the balance of these resources helps determine the formation of the movement and the actions that they take (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 15). The mobilization potential of a movement is the result of the both the grievances held by the movement and the way participants frame these grievances in relation to the resources available. As a result of these factors, resource mobilization theorists see the role of leaders in a social movement, or "movement entrepreneurs," as essential to the process of mobilization and the potential success of the movement (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 14).

The success of Riot Grrrl, with limited resources and overt rejection of a leadership structure, calls into question the central assumptions of resource mobilization theory. Resource mobilization theory considers social movements to be rational collective actors. Yet Riot Grrrl spread organically: the ethos of the movement spoke to many young women who felt a deep need for the kind of community it provided. These women saw urgent problems within their subculture and society as a whole, and Riot Grrrl provided a channel through which to respond. Despite the media's attempts to identify a spokeswoman or leader in the movement, Riot Grrrls actively rejected hierarchical leadership structures (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 148). Additionally, Riot Grrrls went to great lengths to avoid simplistic, cohesive definitions of their movement in an effort to make it accessible to all girls (Riordan 2001, 280).

However, Riot Grrrl had very limited material resources, relying almost exclusively on the mobilization of young women within the movement. Resource mobilization theory argues that the balance between material and nonmaterial resources shapes the form of action a movement engages in, and the form Riot Girl took seems to be in line with this assertion (Della Porta & Diani 2006, 15). Riot Grrrl did not organize mass protest movements; its radical politics was primarily disseminated through music shows and photocopied, handmade zines. This limited the potential reach of the movement. In an attempt to counteract these limitations, Riot Grrrl Press was established as a centralized, movement-controlled channel to disseminate zines and field inquiries about Riot Grrrl (Marcus 2010, 231-233). However, it operated on a purely volunteer basis and relied on access to free photocopiers through the girls' workplaces (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 142). The movement's mobilization potential was greatly reduced by these factors. Therefore, resource mobilization theory may help explain the relatively small scale of the movement's successes and its failure to sustain action over the long-term.

However, resource-based accounts do not provide a full explanation for the form and action of Riot Grrrl mobilization. Although the lack of material resources was undoubtedly a consideration of the movement's form, the DIY aesthetic and non-hierarchical informal structure of the movement were also deliberate political decisions embedded within their larger worldview. Furthermore, conflicts within the scene and negative media attention placed strain on continued action and played a role in the dissolution of the movement (Marcus 2010, 164-167, chapters 11 & 13; Schilt 2003, 9). The media in particular undermined Riot Grrrl activism, engaging in the dual pro-

cesses of trivialization and exoticization (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 150). In some coverage, Riot Grrrl was presented as little more than a fashion statement, erasing the radical politics at the core of their activism. Other media coverage contended that these young women were misinformed and out of touch with reality, portraying them as extremists beyond the scope of reasonable consideration (Dunn & Farnsworth 2012, 150). As such, linking the failures of Riot Grrrl as a movement primarily to resource concerns overlooks a number of key considerations. Ultimately, resource mobilization theory is too deterministic to fully account for Riot Grrrl's successes and failures in the 1990s and lacks a mechanism to explain the continued relevance of the movement's signifiers to contemporary feminism. Riot Grrrl's form as a movement was the result of both resource constraints and movement ideology.

Conclusion

Riot Grrrl spoke from and to a very specific political viewpoint, encapsulating the needs of its demographic through signifiers that have continued to hold relevance to this day. It is exactly this specificity that allowed the movement to capture such an authenticity of voice, creating mobilization despite their limited resources and resonance long past its dissolution. As such, the movement demonstrates the value of specificity within the landscape of social movements and grassroots organization. Through Riot Grrrl, young female punks were able to respond in their own terms to challenges specific to their experience. While the movement remains a template for this demographic, its value as an alternative mobilization framework can be applied more widely to niche groups that seek to organize around their own particular socio-political viewpoint. Furthermore, Riot Grrrl demonstrates the need for niche movements to be able to control their own voice and evolution, which involves creating greater space and respect for collective political autonomy in the mainstream culture.

The success of the movement has important implications to the theoretical study of grassroots activism. Riot Grrrl demonstrates the radical politics that can underpin grassroots deci-

sion-making and create signifiers that challenge mainstream ideas of marketing, mobilization and success. Such decision-making structures transcend the resource considerations of resource mobilization theory, while rendering the cultural production processes of collective action theory more concrete. This suggests the need for a new approach to the study of grassroots organizations, with few material resources and decentralized, non-hierarchical approaches to decision-making. Riot Grrrl demonstrates the importance of engaging with these forms by displaying the political agency that can be exercised – and the cultural change that can be achieved – through feminist countercultural action.

Ultimately, Riot Grrrls spoke directly to the undervaluing of the female voice and perspective within the political sphere. They sought to disrupt the link between the political and the masculine through feminized punk rock and cultural production. This included reconsiderations of the concepts of expertise and authoritative voice, which have so often marginalized women and minorities. While they were successful in creating new channels of feminist activism, their objective holds significance for broader socio-political consideration: we need new frameworks – and the reworking of existing ones – that better account for political voices that fall outside of the white, male perspective. Riot Grrrl exists as just one example of feminist challenge to the patriarchal political sphere, but there is much to be gained through the embrace of alternative, grassroots, and niche political structures in society, as well as in academic practice.

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After purchasing her first Bikini Bill CD in 1999, Bryn's whole life changed. Even though she missed Riot Grrrl—an underground feminist-punk movement that began in the nineties—it was a huge influence during her teen years. In fact, the movement helped her realize the punk rock feminist woman that she is today. While taking a course in Social Movements and Protest Politics in 2014, Bryn took a chance and wrote about the punk movement for her final essay. It was definitely one the most enjoyable writing experiences of her university experience, and she is thrilled to be published in this year's edition of *Political Affairs*.

Zach Su

关系

The Role of Guanxi (关系) in Singaporean Foreign Direct Investment in China

As China opened itself up to foreign direct investment (FDI) from 1979 onwards, overseas Chinese firms and their business networks have played key roles in contributing FDI inflows into China. Until the mid-1990s, approximately 70 to 80 percent of all FDI in China stemmed from overseas Chinese firms who are referred to by David Zweig as "the major global force" behind China's economic development (2002, 13). Singapore's contingent of ethnic Chinese investors is no exception, as Singapore is shown to have the fifth highest amount of cumulative realized FDI in China between 1979 and 2000. This is remarkable given its relatively small economy and geographic size when compared to Taiwan, Japan, and especially the U.S. (Yeung 2004, 50; Bolt 2000, 136).

As overseas Chinese investments have come to assume such a visible portion of China's FDI inflows, much attention has been placed on the cultivation of *guanxi*—informal, trust-based relations—as a crucial advantage possessed by overseas Chinese investors in allowing them to successfully establish and maintain investment on the mainland. However, in a 2009 speech then-Minister Mentor Lee Kuan Yew, widely regarded as the founding father of modern Singapore, addressed the differences between the country's majority ethnic Chinese population and their counterparts in mainland China (SG Press Centre 2009). Despite the shared language and culture between the two sets of people, he asserted that, "We (Singaporeans) are different in our work methods and mental make-up. We are Westernized in our systems and working style. We do not depend on *guanxi* or relationships" (SGPC 2009). Singapore's FDI success in China thus presents a puzzling case as Singaporean-Chinese are on one hand shown to share linguistic and cultural similarities with mainland Chinese, while on the other are portrayed to be accustomed to a different institutional environment than that of China. How then have Singaporean investors continued to be so successful in establishing FDI ventures in China despite these differences?

Despite Lee Kuan Yew's argument to the contrary, I argue that *guanxi* continues to play an important role in Singaporean FDI in China. Specifically, Singaporean-Chinese investors have adapted to the Chinese setting of weak formal institutions and

a decentralized investment regime by employing *guanxi*. While these investors hold certain undeniable cultural advantages in cultivating *guanxi*, they have also had to learn its specific usage in the Mainland Chinese context. Indeed, I will show that the usage of *guanxi* by Singaporean entrepreneurs has been learned, rather than culturally given. When conceptualized as both a cultural norm and an institutional mechanism, it becomes apparent that *guanxi* is not simply a cultural practice embedded exclusively in ethnic Chinese communities but also a malleable set of practices that alters in specific institutional environments.

This paper will first explore *guanxi* as a concept, seeking to define it as both a cultural practice and as an informal networking mechanism within China's weak institutional and legal environment. The next section will show how China's weak legal institutions and decentralized economy provide for an environment in which *guanxi* networks are highly significant to the establishment and success of FDI in China. I will then highlight how the literature has shown overseas Chinese investors to be especially adept in cultivating *guanxi* on the mainland, and I will explore the role that culture has played in privileging Singaporean-Chinese in regards to investing in China. Subsequently, I will argue that *guanxi* continues to play a key role in the success of Singaporean FDI ventures in China, because Singaporean investors have adapted their business practices according to the Chinese institutional environment.

Defining *Guanxi*

Guanxi roughly translates as "connections" but more specifically refers to the concept of drawing on social connections to secure favours (Luo 2007, 2). A *guanxi* network is comprised of ties of long-term reciprocity, linking people who are of equal or unequal wealth and power (Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy 1996, 23). This reciprocity is in turn shown to be implicit and only socially binding with no formal institutional legitimacy or expression (Luo 2007, 2; Wang 2001, 88-89). In an attempt to better structure our understanding of *guanxi*, it would be useful to conceptualize it as having four key traits. First, the relation-

ships are informal and exist outside the official domain. Second, they are characterized as relationships in which participants interact with each other not as role occupants, but as individuals. Third, reciprocity is a salient feature, which involves the long or short-run repayment of a variety of favours, ranging from the provision of resources to opportunities and support. Finally, trust is key to *guanxi*, especially given the absence of a formal institutional guarantee, and is thus often cultivated through long-term interactions (Wang 2001, 88-89).

In order to gain a more nuanced understanding of *guanxi*, it is imperative to further view it as both a Chinese cultural practice and a social response to an institutional setting. Cultural interpretations view its consensual, trust-oriented nature and its emphasis of the family as having roots in the Confucian value system, hence lending the "sense of Chineseness" to *guanxi* as a form of social networking (Dahles 2005, 47). A key recurring theme to be observed as we study Singapore's FDI ventures into China are the connections possessed by overseas Chinese to their ancestral towns, cities and regions. Indeed, shared locality or dialect is highlighted as a key basis for *guanxi* establishment and is a distinct cultural connection drawn by overseas Chinese investors, mainland Chinese economic actors, and even by the Chinese government itself in an effort to stimulate ethnic Chinese investment (Luo 2007, 5; Dahles 2005, 47).

The other side of *guanxi* is a response to the institutional environment in which it exists. In this sense, it can be seen as a "coping mechanism" that is a substitute for the norms and processes of formal institutions which are otherwise weak, especially in China (Gold et al. 2002, 180). *Guanxi* has a complementary relationship with formal institutions, as informal personal connections are used by companies investing in China where the legal system falls short (Wang 2001, 92). However, in an environment of weak formal institutions, it not only stands as a source of protection for business operations but also as a source of information for negotiations. Additionally, *guanxi* serves as a way to gain access to "favourable solutions to investment-related disputes" (2001, 93). *Guanxi* is thus also a form of compensation for the fragility of formal institutions as it can be

used to take advantage of weaknesses in the law, and secure opportunities for "extra-lucrative investment deals" (2001, 101).

The Overseas Chinese Advantage

It is useful at this point to highlight the purported advantages that overseas Chinese investors coming from Taiwan, Hong Kong, and several other countries in Southeast Asia have had in establishing *guanxi* and successfully investing in China thus far. Overseas Chinese investors possess a cultural advantage because their understanding of the Chinese language and their socialization in the norms of *guanxi* lends them a strong sense of familiarity to the art of networking in China. Moreover, overseas Chinese investors often enjoy concrete human connections to their ancestral homes in China and can refer to these ties as a basis for establishing contacts (Wang 2001, 155).

The role played by the ethnic ties of overseas Chinese investors is made apparent when considering the importance of information-acquisition and learning costs in FDI on the part of the investor. The costs of acquiring reliable information on foreign markets can often be large for the potential investor. However, possessing a familiarity of the foreign market, especially through linguistic or concrete human connections, allows such investors access to local knowledge of the market and to seek out economic actors whom they can trust without the added costs of sending personnel abroad beforehand to study opportunities (Lu 2012, 68).

These ethnic and linguistic ties are especially advantageous for Singaporean-Chinese investors in establishing *guanxi* in China, particularly in provinces such as Guangdong and Fujian, in which many Singaporean-Chinese can trace their ancestral roots, and not coincidentally have also established FDI ventures (Lu and Zhu 1995, 58). In their study of Singaporean investment in Hainan, Henry Wai-Chung Yeung and Kris Olds show the linguistic and cultural familiarity of Singaporean-Hainanese as a distinct advantage in "reducing commercial barriers" to cultivate the personalized *guanxi* relationships, ensuring preferential treatment (Yeung and Olds 2000, 240). Thus, Singa-

porean investors in this sense seem to possess the advantage of a shared Chinese culture, and a connection to their ancestral hometown that all overseas Chinese ostensibly possess. Dahles however, develops on Singapore's cultural advantage by highlighting the "dual identity" of Singaporean-Chinese investors as they are able to play up their Chinese identity when dealing with mainland Chinese businesspeople, while their dissimilarities with mainland Chinese make them "attractive business partners" and "cultural brokers" who are able to arbitrate differences between the cultures of the East and the West (2004, 20).

Overseas Chinese firms are also shown to have an advantage in possessing business practices that are well suited to the institutional environment of China. Diasporic Chinese capitalism is characterized as having relatively low state support, a tendency to rely on trust-based networks rather than legal contracts, and to be composed mainly of family firms in which there is no separation of ownership and control (Lever-Tracy, Ip and Tracy 1996, 21). Political scientist Wang Hongying shows that the family-owned structure of Hong Kong and Taiwanese firms results in a decision-making process which is secretive and fast, in turn giving them the ability to take on seemingly risky investment projects (2001, 156). Hence, ethnic Chinese companies are shown to have the advantages of understanding and navigating China's institutional environment and being able to "know the Chinese situation best and have the best instincts for adapting" to this setting (2001, 136-137). I argue, however, that the case of Singaporean-Chinese investment in China differs from other ethnic Chinese investment. This is predominantly due to its employment of government-linked companies (GLCs) in its investment in China, as opposed to the family firms typical of diasporic Chinesecapitalism and the lack of a natural familiarity on the part of Singaporean investors operating in an institutional environment like China.

China: Weak State, Strong Networks

This paper's discussion of *guanxi* has thus far alluded to the weak institutional environment of the Chinese context. Before

tackling the research question of this paper, it would first be useful to identify what exactly is meant by this claim and how *guanxi* is accorded a significant role in transactions between would-be Singaporean investors and Chinese economic actors. Two traits of the Chinese institutional context should be highlighted here: firstly, the absence of effective state institutions, especially seen in China's weak legal system, and secondly, the decentralized nature of the Chinese FDI regime.

When analyzing the absence of effective state institutions governing foreign investment inflows in China, a key component is the weak Chinese legal system that cannot enforce government policies and regulations despite China's authoritarian outlook. Wang claims that the formal institutional framework of FDI in China only looks good on paper, but is remarkably weak in practice (2001, 13). This claim stems firstly from the continued prevalence of the imperial legal system which accords importance to secrecy and the preference of informal mechanisms in enforcing social control, despite the superficial introduction of legal codes and organs borrowed from Western and Japanese legal systems (2001, 50-51). The Chinese government is ambivalent to legal and legislative conceptions because it sees the law as an instrument of the state to maintain the Chinese Communist Party's monopoly on power. As a result, the rule of law is shown to lack both autonomy and "internal logic" as frequent changes of laws undertaken by the central government ultimately pose obstacles to the institutionalization of laws and the legal system (2001, 51). This absence of a meaningful legal institutional framework in China is further seen in its "lack of a well-specified structure of property rights and supporting institutions" (Yeung 2004, 44). Furthermore, the Chinese state is also lacks the capacity to effectively uphold its legal system as its laws are created, interpreted and enforced by a set of poorly coordinated government organs (Wang 2001, 52). China's problematic weak legal system is further compounded by the low quantity and quality of legal workers in the country. Wang highlights that the ratio of Chinese individuals to lawyers, 13,000:1, drastically differs from the ratio of American individuals to lawyers, which stands at 300:1 (2001, 52). The lack of professionalism in the Chinese legal system is also

highlighted by Wang as a significant trait of the Chinese institutional context, as the rise of corruption among legal workers has meant that growing numbers of officials in charge of administering and enforcing the law use their positions to pursue self-interest (2001, 52-53).

The Chinese institutional environment, especially highlighted by China's legal system, results in *guanxi* assuming a crucial role in allowing foreign investors to successfully establish FDI ventures in China. Referring back to the conceptualization of *guanxi* as a coping mechanism to substitute for formal norms and processes, especially in contexts where formal institutions are weak, China's institutional environment represents a setting in which *guanxi* networks thrive and become highly important for successful FDI ventures. This opinion is shared by Zweig who posits that given China's legal system, "large amounts of capital, information and trade follow transnational, personal relationships" (2002, 13). This view that *guanxi* assumes an important role in the political economy is also corroborated by political economist Lu Jiantao who, in framing such relations in the Chinese context as personal trust instead of system trust, notes that *guanxi* allows investors access to resources, convenience, and profits due to the relatively undeveloped legal system (2012, 432). Hence, the institutional environment of China, characterized especially by its weak legal system, accords *guanxi* a heightened importance in the success of FDI in China as investors utilize it as a coping mechanism in lieu of China's weak formal institutions. Furthermore, *guanxi* stands as an asset to gain access to resources and opportunities that come about as a result of the personal relationships cultivated.

The second key trait of China's institutional context is the decentralized nature of the governance of FDI, in which local government and a variety of local actors assume a large degree of decision making authority regarding FDI inflows into their jurisdictions, at the expense of central authority. China's reliance on FDI in its economic development, especially in a setting where the bulk of all enterprises were owned by various levels of government, ultimately forced the state to decentralize authority over FDI to the lower levels of state bureaucracy (Zweig 2002, 36). As a result, large amounts of capital came to be possessed by local governments and local communities (2002, 36). Local governments are portrayed as "hungry" for the establishment of joint-ventures (JVs) and played their part in exerting pressure on the Chinese government to decentralize the decision-making authority over JVs. The subsequent "JV fever" that ensued, in which various local governments throughout the country competed for administrative approvals for JVs in their localities, resulted in an overburdening of China's central bureaucracies (2002, 152). The decreased ability of the central state to control the Chinese investment regime should be highlighted when emphasizing decentralization and the increased agency of local government and economic actors. Decentralization ultimately produced the decreased administrative capacity of the central state to control China's foreign trade and investment because local actors utilized the state's own institutions to undermine central control and JVs themselves became "core institutions" in which both domestic and foreign firms pursued self-interests, undermining state controls in the process (Zweig 2002, 37; 136; 153).

The decentralization of China's foreign investment regime ultimately worked towards creating an institutional context in which *guanxi* plays an important role in the transactions between foreign investors, and the empowered local Chinese governments and entrepreneurs. Resulting from decentralization, the rise of local elites and cadre entrepreneurs created "spaces of maneuvering" in which the role of *guanxi* in securing assistance and support from local actors is very important (Yeung 2004, 44). The tendency of local governments to ally with foreign investors instead of the central state, and the rush towards to establishing linkages with global actors as part of the "JV fever" is also allows foreign actors to "surreptitiously" gain access to China's domestic market via networks with local Chinese actors (Zweig 2002, 37). Furthermore, because local governments dominate local enterprise by controlling access to workers, production inputs, investment decisions, and by appointing managers of township and village enterprises, obtaining assistance and support from local governments is critical to the success of an FDI venture into China and ultimately requires "an adeptness in the art of *guanxi*" (Yeung 2004, 44).

Thus, a key aspect of decentralization that necessitates *guanxi* in the Chinese institutional context is the dominance of local government and local actors. By controlling such a large part of their respective local investment contexts, and in establishing foreign linkages in the "spaces of maneuvering" outside of the state structure, such local actors ultimately create an environment in which *guanxi* networks become ubiquitous. These networks not only come to be widely deployed, but also increasingly necessary for potential foreign investors in dealing with highly empowered local governments.

Institutional Challenges Faced by Singaporean Investors and their Response

In contrast to China's decentralized FDI institutions, the Singaporean state has continually had a strong role in its FDI regime and in leading investment ventures into China and elsewhere. In forging its own path to development, the Singaporean state took on heavy responsibility for the provision of public infrastructure through major state-owned enterprises and in creating institutional structures designed to make Singapore more attractive to foreign investment (Yeung 2004, 45). Beginning in 1993, the Singaporean government engaged in an effort to regionalize Singaporean enterprises, resulting in the expansion of Singaporean FDI ventures into China and throughout East and Southeast Asia. As part of this effort, government linked companies (GLCs), often connected to state-owned enterprises crucial to Singapore's own economic development, became the primary actors in undertaking FDI ventures overseas (Yeung 2004, 45). The strong role of the state in the formulation of its own FDI regime in turn results in an institutional environment in which GLCs are used to "well-defined, transparent and straightforward" procedures (2004, 53). Furthermore, Singaporean GLCs are embedded in a political economy in which "the national agenda intersects with urban and local interests" (Yeung 2004, 53). Hence, stark contrasts can be drawn between the Singaporean institutional environment and that of China, as Singapore's well-defined procedures and an economy in which state interests are synchronized with local interests differs from the weak legal system of China, and its decentralized investment regime in which local actors take on significant roles in determining FDI inflows and undermining central state controls.

As Singaporean GLCs have the tendency to transfer their business mentalities and practices to the host country, in turn disregarding the host country's power structures and institutional systems, Singaporean investors face a distinct challenge (Yeung 2004, 53). With respect to China, Singaporean GLCs are confronted with a "drastically different business system" in which state control is channeled through local governments and their business associates, rather than the central government (2004, 58). Additionally, Singaporean investments differ from those of other ethnic Chinese as the dominance of GLCs and government statutory boards in Singaporean FDI contrasts sharply from the family business-oriented investments of other overseas Chinese investors. While the family businesses of other overseas Chinese operate flexibly in China's unstructured environment, the Singaporean GLCs have the tendency to move through official channels in accordance with standard operating procedures (Bolt 2000, 138; 147). Singapore's authoritarian, paternalistic, and English-speaking context has produced a "bureaucratic and cautious style" among its businesspeople and GLCs, thus creating challenges for Singaporean entrepreneurship and investment in the Chinese institutional environment (2000, 148).

At first glance, Singaporean investors may be seen to have largely been unable to adapt themselves to the different Chinese institutional setting, and especially in regards to establishing *guanxi* with a variety of Chinese actors. Wang argues that not all ethnic Chinese companies are the same, as Singaporeans are "less skillful in the development of informal personal networks" (2001, 137). An interviewee is quoted as saying, "Singaporeans are very dependent on their government. That is why Lee Kuan Yew has to bring business to China" (Wang 2001, 137).

The supposed incompatibility between Singaporean state-led FDI and China is exemplified by the high-profile failure of the Singapore-Suzhou investment project undertaken in 1994, which came to "symbolize the stark differences between Singa-

pore and China" (Bolt 2000, 141). The project, which involved a national-level agreement between Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew and Chinese vice-premier Li Lan Qing, aimed to develop an industrial park in Suzhou comprised of a commercial, high-tech, and large-scale industry hub (2000, 139). Both countries heldthe project in very high regard; Singapore viewed the project as the building of "Singapore II" in China, and then-Chinese President Jiang Zhemin called it a "priority of priorities" (2000, 140). However, the industrial park lost an accumulated $90 million for Singaporean investors, and was having difficulties repaying its loans by 2000, prompting the Singapore consortium to reduce its share in the project from 65 to 35 percent in 2001 (2000, 141). The failure of the project is ultimately attributed to the presence of competition from a locally-run rival Suzhou park, and most significantly to the "different work habits" of the Singaporean and Chinese actors, in which the Singaporean side is shown to have overestimated the leverage of the central Chinese government over the local Suzhou government in disallowing or reining in competition from local industry (2000, 140-141). Hence, by examining the high-profile, high-stakes failure of the Singapore-Suzhou project, we see an instance of Singaporean state-led investments not meeting the challenges of adjusting to China's decentralized FDI regime and the centre-local politics that play out within this framework, which ultimately resulted in the failure of the project.

However, while not all Singaporean investors have successfully managed the different institutional settings that China presents, some investors have undergone self-transformations in grasping onto the heightened importance of *guanxi* in the unstructured Chinese setting. While the Singapore-Suzhou project is a clear example of the differences seemingly inherent among Singaporean investors and their Chinese counterparts, it should be highlighted that it is but one example which occurred in 1994, just one year after the commencement of Singapore's effort to regionalize its economy. To rely solely on the failure of this project to provide us with a view of Singaporean investment in China, and their ability to adapt to the Chinese context would mean relying on an arguably antiquated example which captures only a snapshot of early-era Singapor-

ean FDI in China. Not all scholars seem to view Singaporean investors in such a rigid, inflexible light, as some scholars show Singaporean companies as able to successfully adapt to the different Chinese institutional environment. Specifically, Henry Wai-Chung Yeung posits that GLCs are dynamic organizations capable of undergoing self-transformation to participate in different business systems. In the case of the Chinese context, some Singaporean GLCs have adopted strategies that aim to establish good *guanxi* relations in order to enhance local Chinese partnerships and gain strong political leverage (Yeung 2004, 58). Singaporean GLCs are shown to localise their investments in China by establishing *guanxi* to acknowledge the vested interests of local Chinese partners, who in turn support projects through the provision of their local networks and connections (2004, 55). Interestingly, the Singapore government appears to lead *guanxi*-formation in China by utilizing its high-level contacts with Chinese officials, and also by using its networks of boards and GLCs to encourage investment in China. Various Singaporean government agencies such as the National Trade Union Congress and even the Singapore Tourism Board have established relations with Chinese agencies such as the All-China Federation of Labor (Bolt 2000, 134). Heidi Dahles points out how the *guanxi*-based networks of the ethnic Chinese in Singapore have expanded from their once exclusively family-oriented definition of *guanxi* to include relations with government agencies. The Singaporean state's role in creating networks both in its domestic setting, as well as in investment abroad, is ultimately shown to foster the cultivation of Chinese diasporic *guanxi* relations (Dahles 2005, 54).

The findings of these scholars undermine the claim that Singaporean investors are unable to adapt to the Chinese setting and are seemingly oblivious to the importance of *guanxi* in the Chinese investment environment. The recurring theme in these findings has instead been the acceptance and effective deployment of *guanxi* practices by Singaporean investors in their respective attempts to adapt to the Chinese context. Despite the different institutional settings in both countries, *guanxi* continues to play an important role in Singaporean FDI in China because Singaporean investors are to a large extent capable

Conclusion: Guanxi as a Transitive Concept

This paper argues that Singaporean entrepreneurs have adapted to mainland China's distinct institutional setting through the specific use of *guanxi* and the establishment of informal networks with a variety of Chinese economic actors. The case of Singapore has thus far been presented as having two distinct sets of advantages and disadvantages in establishing *guanxi* in China. On the one hand, it possesses the cultural advantages of having a majority ethnic Chinese population, and the linguistic and concrete human connections many Singaporean-Chinese have vis-à-vis China. On the other hand, Singapore lacks the advantages of having a similar institutional setting as that of China and thus lacks investors who are automatically savvy in the ways of navigating such a business environment. Because Singapore possesses both advantages and disadvantages in establishing informal connections with China I assert that *guanxi* should be conceptualized as both a cultural construct and the response to an institutional setting. However, it should be highlighted that even culturally Chinese Singaporean investors face challenges in regards to fully appreciating the supposedly intuitive Chinese practice of *guanxi*. In short, it is not enough that Singaporean-Chinese can speak the same language and share similar cultural sensibilities with Chinese people. Though this is undoubtedly helpful, an understanding of the Chinese institutional environment is ultimately required as well.

With the framing of *guanxi* as a response to the Chinese institutional environment in mind, and the importance this definition had in the case of Singaporean FDI in China, I present the conceptualization of *guanxi* as more than cultural construct seemingly frozen in time and permanently exclusive to ethnic Chinese. Instead, it is a form of informal social networking which evolves and redefines itself according to the way in which it is engaged by a multiplicity of participants. *Guanxi* has already expanded from its traditional structures of family and kinship ties to include a variety of personal relations outside of the family structure, such as membership in professional organizations, employment in the same company, or bonds formed among university students (Dahles 2005, 55-56). The Singaporean case has even shown the Singaporean state's involvement in utilizing its contacts in China to pave the way for FDI, thus calling into question the notion that *guanxi* exists only outside of the official domain.

Scholars such as Wang have recognized the transitive nature of *guanxi*'s definition, and assert that it is "entirely accessible to non-Chinese" (2001, 109). Mayfair Yang echoes this belief in rejecting a cultural essentialist approach to conceptualizing *guanxi*, instead suggesting to view it as a historically situated set of practices which entails different meanings in different historical and political contexts (2002, 468-469). By this token, I believe that definitions of *guanxi* must take into account both cultural and institutional aspects in order to fully capture the way it is practiced and to avoid framing it as an exclusively cultural Chinese practice. To neglect either aspect would bring about a discrepancy between its practice and also the way it is portrayed in academic literature. Instead, by defining *guanxi* both culturally and institutionally, and as a practice that evolves according to its changing contexts, could serve to benefit not only future academic contributions to the study of *guanxi*, but also future investors from various parts of the world who seek to establish foreign direct investment in China. The cultural similarities that Singaporean-Chinese, and the overseas Chinese at large, share with mainland Chinese gives them an advantage in forming *guanxi* today. However, as China continues to conduct business with an increasingly diverse set of actors from around the world, and as its own culture and institutions evolve as part of this process, the way in which we conceive of guanxi may develop yet further in the years to come.

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Zach Su

Zachariah recently finished his undergrad at Concordia and is looking forward to starting his Masters in Political Science at McGill University. His research interests include democratization, development and Southeast Asian politics, as well as migrant workers' rights and how the domestic politics of migrant-receiving countries and broader international politics intersect.

While taking a course in Chinese Politics during his undergrad, he was intrigued by China's internationalization process in the past thirty years. As an individual who openly identifies with the culture and can speak the language—yet is not Chinese by nationality—he began to wonder what China's internationalization meant to him, which he explores in his essay for the JPA.

Mike Taylor

Chechen Roulette: Subnational Authoritarianism in the North Caucasus

Early in the morning of December 4, 2014, the familiar sound of automatic gunfire rang out through the streets of downtown Grozny, the capital of Chechnya. The attack was the latest and by far the most significant in a string of violent manoeuvres orchestrated by insurgents. Leading up to the December 4, 2014, attack there had been a suicide bombing on September 16, 2013, on a police station and another on October 5, 2014, on a group of police officers on Grozny's City Day (Vatcha-gaev 2014). The December 4 attack involved several militants who took control of two buildings and killed 14 police officers (Kramer 2014). The insurgents claimed to be a part of the militant group Caucasus Emirate, which has been at odds with the Chechen authorities for several years (Ibid).

The attacks indicate that the insurgency in Chechnya, and by extension, the whole of the North Caucasus is capable of

undertaking militant operations. Though militant operations have decreased in recent years, Chechnya is still perceived to be synonymous with violence. As such, the security situation warrants investigation in light of its continued instability in an increasingly interconnected world. To further complicate the situation, Chechen President Ramzan Kadyrov persistently denies the existence of insurgents despite the continuation of their attacks (Vatchagaev, 2014). Why does Ramzan Kadyrov continue to deny the existence of the insurgents despite their attacks, and how does this affect Chechnya's security issues? Given this context of executive denial, what is the relationship between Chechen political institutions and security forces, and how does this relationship affect stability in Chechnya? I argue that the security forces are directly controlled by the president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov, as a mechanism for prolonging his regime and controlling Chechen society. I subsequently posit that the actions of security forces garner disdain for Kadyrov's authority, making his forces a target of the insurgency. The insurgency appears to be weak at the moment, yet militants have the confidence to stage attacks. Kadyrov's control of Chechen security forces contributes to relative short-term stability. Despite infrequent high profile acts of terror, Chechnya is not the war zone it once was. This appears to be due to Kadyrov's consolidation of power and his mobilization of security forces. In the long-term, however, I forecast that the relationship may set the stage for renewed instability in Chechnya and the North Caucasus. To help clarify why Kadyrov denies the existence of insurgents, I will explore how the insurgency has the potential to further develop and have a major destabilizing effect on Kadyrov's Chechnya.

In the first section, I define key concepts relevant to the research. I then conduct a review of the literature concerning the security situation. In the literature review, I also confront the puzzle of why Kadyrov denies the existence of the insurgency. Finally, the paper elucidates the security environment by focusing on Kadyrov's role as an authoritarian leader.

Important Terms Defined

Caucasus Emirate: This term refers to the principle insurgent organization within Chechnya, a small republic in the Russian Federation. Gordon M. Hahn notes that "[w]ith the dissolution of the [Chechen Republic of Ichkeriya] by its then President Dokku . . . Umarov in October 2007 and his creation of the Caucasus Emirate (CE) in its place, the Salafization and jihadization processes were made official" (Hahn 2012, 1). Hence the Caucasus Emirate is a jihadist organization that embraces Salafi (ultra-orthodox) Islam which claims its domain as the entirety of the North Caucasus (Hahn 2012, 9). In essence, it seeks to establish an Islamic state. Umarov is said to have been "neutralized" by Russian authorities in early 2014, yet, as the December 4 attacks may indicate, the organization apparently remains active (Blua, 2014, Fuller 2014).

Chechenization: The "policy involves co-opting... Chechen leaders and ultimately transferring the conflict from Russian to Chechen hands" (Matejova 2013, 1). The term refers to the political-security situation that has been bestowed upon Chechnya by Russia as a means of reducing the burden of direct governance over the republic. Ethnic tensions between Chechens and Russians have been exacerbated by war (Stepanov 2000, 308). Stated differently, it appears that Russia has decided that granting Chechnya more autonomy is preferable to direct control over a territory in which the population may be averse to direct rule from Moscow.

Kadyrovtsy: A group initially made up of members of Akhmed Kadyrov's Presidential guard (led by Kadyrov's son Ramzan from an early age) who were notorious for murder, rape and other human rights abuses during Akhmed Kadyrov's reign as president (Hahn 2007, 34). As Russian security forces were incrementally removed from Chechnya, they were incorporated into Chechnya's republican Interior Ministry: "[t]he decree [issued in 2006 by Vladimir Putin withdrawing Russian forces from Chechnya] is crucial for Ramzan Kadyrov. After the soldiers have withdrawn from Chechnya, only the local Interi-

or Ministry and South and North battalions, loyal to Kadyrov, will be left to guard the region" (Muradov 2006).

Akhmed Kadyrov: He was the father of the current president of Chechnya, Ramzan Kadyrov. The former Chechen mufti (Islamic leader) and rebel sided with the Russians during the second Chechen war and who was appointed President of the Chechen Republic as Moscow began the Chechenization process (Williams 2012, 83). The elder Kadyrov was assassinated in May 2004 (Hughes 2005, 284).

Power Vertical (Vertical of Power): This term is found throughout the literature on the politics of modern Russia and refers to a "hierarchical model of regional and urban governance" (Gel'man and Ryzhenkov 2011, 450). The power vertical generally describes the governance style of the Russian Federation.

What the Literature Says about the Chechen Security Situation

Hazardous Research

Despite the risks of reporting and conducting independent research in Chechnya, there are correspondents who relay information to the outside world. Radio Free Europe/ Radio Liberty (RFE/RL) has a network of freelance journalists in the republic. Dr. Mairbek Vatchagaev, President of *l'Association d'études caucasiennes*, has a network of sources in Chechnya and the rest of the Caucasus region. I contacted both RFE/RL and Dr. Vatchagaev for the purpose of establishing the presence and credibility of their sources on the ground. The online publication Caucasian Knot covers many human rights developments in Chechnya. Their Web site states that "… correspondents operate out of 20 regions of the North-Caucasian Federal District, South Federal District [of Russia] and South Caucasus" (2009). The current political climate in Chechnya (and Russia) may be considered prone to enforcing heavy censorship. To maintain

the integrity of the sources of this paper, I received written confirmation that uncensored reports frequently emerge from Chechnya.

The literature below demonstrates possibilities vis-à-vis the logic behind infrequent attacks on Chechen security forces and why Kadyrov may deny the existence of the insurgency. It also clarifies Kadyrov's relationship with security forces, which is necessary to understanding the Chechen security situation.

Rationale of the Regime and a Phantom Threat

Ramzan Kadyrov, President of Chechnya is at the centre of the relationship between political institutions and security forces. In Chechnya, he needs no introduction. His "ruling is almost authoritarian in style and involves disappearances, torture and various other human rights abuses" (Matvejova 2013, 14). According to the literature, the principal adversary of Chechen security forces appears to be the Caucasus Emirate. As the preeminent antagonist of Kadyrov's Chechnya, the existence of Caucasus Emirate helps justify Kadyrov's strong-armed regime. Gordon M. Hahn contends that the "[Caucasus Emirate] is attempting to create a revolutionary situation through the establishment of a credible, alternative claim on the sovereign right to rule in the North Caucasus and elsewhere in Russia" (2012, 12). The objective to create pluralism of both legality and authority inherently poses a serious threat to Ramzan Kadyrov's current regime. The December 4, 2014, attack on Grozny and previous attacks in Chechnya indicate that terrorist actions continue to take place in the new Chechnya. Yet there remains an atmosphere of denial regarding the volume and capacity of insurgency in official circles. Sergey Markedonov elucidates this point when he notes that

> [i]n 2009, the counter-terrorist operation (CTO) regime in Chechnya was cancelled, but in 2010 there was not only a quantitative but also a qualitative rise in the attacks in this republic (like the attack on Tsentoroy the native village of Ramzan Kadyrov, as well as that of the Chechen parliament in Grozny)" (2012, 99).

Highlighting the unwillingness to accept that a terrorist threat does exist in Chechnya, Mairbek Vatchagaev writes that "[e]ven though Ramzan Kadyrov has, for the past ten years, been trying to convince everybody, including himself, that there are no militants in Chechnya, the news about the latest clashes between government forces and militants was widely reported by the media" (Vatchagaev 2014). Kadyrov's modus operandi regarding the Caucasus Emirate is conducted in an outré fashion. Although the existence of this threat helps justify the presence of Chechen security forces and the manner in which they operate, Kadyrov maintains that there is no menace. Whether this is done deliberately to encourage economic growth by presenting a new and safer Chechnya or for other esoteric reasons remains unclear. The fact of the matter is that the Caucasus Emirate and sympathizers pose a threat to Kadyrov's Chechnya. Perhaps, as Vatchagaev suggests, Kadyrov really is trying to impress the delusion that there are no militants in Chechnya to simply satisfy himself.

The jihadist threat that Kadyrov denies exists may be the most important factor justifying his presidency. This raises another possibility as to why the Caucasus Emirate may be targeting Kadyrov's forces. He may be intentionally insulting the Caucasus Emirate by publicly stating that it does not exist. Lack of recognition shows Kadyrov as the legitimate authority in Chechnya and is a slight to the Caucasus Emirate. Repudiating the existence of the Caucasus Emirate may also be an attempt to please Moscow. There is a paucity of literature vis-à-vis the puzzle of Kadyrov's reasoning for dismissing the rebel threat. However, Steven Metz writes that in general, an insurgency may subvert rulers or economic development and so the "tendency then is to deny or underestimate the threat, to *believe* that killing or capturing only a few of the most obvious rebel leaders will solve the problem when in fact the problem—the heart of the insurgency—lies deeper" (Metz, 2003, 25, emphasis mine). However, I do not think that Metz's explanation applies to the case of Kadyrov. I agree that the insurgency hinders Chechen government and economic development. But I do not think that Kadyrov believes that the problem is solved by killing a few insurgents and denying the very threat that supports his

rule. He is a former militia leader experienced in dealing with dissent. It is unlikely that he is actually trying to fool himself as Vatchagaev remarked above. Later in this paper, I will show that Kadyrov mobilizes his security forces to engage all forms of threats to his regime. First, it is necessary to observe his level of control in the Republic of Chechnya in order to better understand the security context.

Commandant Kadyrov?

The level of control that Kadyrov holds over security forces is inconclusive in some of the literature. Hahn writes that "Kadyrov *appears* to control not only his own forces but the [Interior Ministry] MVD and *perhaps* its Internal Troops in Chechnya, both of which have made incursions into Ingushetia sometimes coordinated with Ingushetia's MVD and sometimes not" (Hahn 2012, 58-59, [emphasis mine]). Hahn suggests that Kadyrov does exercise at least a significant degree of authority over security forces. Hahn also notes that the constitution of the Russian Federation stipulates that MVD forces should be under federal control, yet this proviso seems to be largely ignored (2012, 58). Chechen security forces then seem to be subordinate to Kadyrov and not to Moscow. Control over security personnel also appears to have been ceded to Chechen sovereign authority with the complicity of high ranking Russian officials. Miriam Matvejova indicates that "Kadyrov's power has partially expanded beyond Moscow's reach, as he has become 'an independent force, with strong tension between him and the Russian military'" (Cornell and Star in Matvejova 2013, 20). Matvejova writes that a year after Hahn claimed that Kadyrov was independent, there is little doubt that Chechen security forces are entirely under his control. Well before both of those writers expressed their points of view, Kimberly Marten claimed that that Moscow was powerless in Chechnya:

> Moscow has effectively granted sovereignty over the Republic of Chechnya to its appointed leader, Ramzan Kadyrov. Despite frequent claims in some media sources that Kadyrov's days are numbered, and despite Kadyrov's public confrontations with Alexander Khloponin, head of the new North Caucasus federal district, Moscow has no real levers left to use against him (2010, 1).

Some of the above literature is to a certain degree hesitant to state with absolute certainty that Kadyrov exercises absolute total control over Chechen security forces. However, the evidence indicates that Moscow may have to go to great lengths to wrest authority over the forces from Kadyrov. It could very well be that the only way to disassociate Kadyrov from the security establishment would be through an armed conflict. Under the assumption that Moscow has no intention to enter into a third Chechen war, it seems that Kadyrov will continue to exercise absolute authority over the security forces.

As to Kadyrov's relationship with specific security forces, the literature tends to remain relatively vague. This may be due to incomplete reports, and this trend is exemplified with statements that leave a gap regarding the number of *kadyrovtsy* who have been incorporated into security forces. The literature has also omitted which organizations the *kadyrovtsy* have moved on to as the militia was incorporated into official security services. On this, John Russell writes:

> [it] is suspected that former rebels in the *kadyrovtsy*, currently estimated to number at least 15,000 men, now significantly outnumber consistently pro-Russian elements— hardly a sound basis for a stable future. In October 2005, [former Chechen president] Alu Alkhanov admitted that 7,000 former *boyeviki* (fighters) made up almost half of the forces of law and order in Chechnya, and the numbers have swollen since. The series of amnesties promulgated by the Russians, initially aimed at protecting Russian servicemen from facing war crimes' tribunals, are now effectively being handled by Kadyrov himself, thus making loyalty to him, rather than to Russia, the main criterion for a pardon (2008, 670).

Russell has not indicated to which organizations the former *kadyrovtsy* and other former rebels were incorporated. However, he reveals another key element regarding the relationship between Kadyrov and his security forces. If Russell is correct in his assertions regarding the connections between Kadyrov and security forces, an intriguing possibility is raised. It appears that many servicemen are former members of his presidential guard and foster a significant loyalty to Kadyrov (Russell 2001, 208; 670). Security forces are not loyal to the Russian state or

the Republic of Chechnya. Further, and perhaps of more importance is Kadyrov's method of filling posts within the security organizations. He expands personal loyalty as he expands the security forces by creating indebtedness to him through the pardoning of former rebels and rebels flipping to the republican government's side.

In contrast to Russell, Marten gives an account of the chronological incorporation of Ramzan Kadyrov's militia into regional security organizations. The Presidential Guard, the *Kadyrovtsy*, began entering the MVD (Interior Ministry) at an early stage: "Even before his father's assassination, Kadyrov's men began to be appointed as commanding officers in the regional OMON special forces of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs […]" (2010, 2). Furthermore, Marten has suggests that by 2006, ethnic Chechen forces had taken control of day-to-day operations (although still overseen by Moscow) while most Russian Ministry of Defence and MVD troops were ordered out of Chechnya (2010, 2). By 2006, the magnitude of Kadyrov's control appeared to be consolidating even though he only held the position of Prime Minister at that time. In May of 2006, "just a few months after the Putin decree [placing all troops in Chechnya under regional command], Ramzan's militia was legally integrated into the regional MVD following [a] gunfight with then-president Alu Alkhanov's guards (Marten 2012, 116). Although this indicates a strong relationship between Kadyrov and the Chechen MVD by 2006, the chechenization of the political-security situation was not yet complete. In November 2009, Ramzan Kadyrov received the rank of major general in the MVD, strengthening and solidifying his control over the MVD personnel in the Chechen republic (Marten 2012, 118). By 2009, any federal troops left on Chechen soil were utterly subordinate to the directives of the regional FSB (successor of the KGB), comprised of Kadyrov's appointees (Marten 2012, 117).

Hail to the Chief

The literature on the relationship between Ramzan Kadyrov and security forces leaves me with three conclusions. Firstly, that security forces are incredibly loyal to Ramzan Kadyrov.

This loyalty is secured through appointments, through pardons to jihadist turncoats who have embraced Kadyrov as their leader and through Kadyrov's perceived power. Secondly, it may be concluded that the Kadyrovtsy moved on to official positions within Chechen security apparatus, particularly the MVD. This enables the Kadyrovtsy to operate under the law. Thirdly, it appears that Kadyrov exercises complete control over security forces within Chechen borders. His position as President of Chechnya and major general in the MVD cemented this authority. Russian authority in Chechnya appears to be *de jure*, whereas Kadyrov's authority is *de facto*.

The thesis presented in this paper posits that there is a relationship between political institutions and security forces. Political institutions exist *per se* in Chechnya, but are wholly dominated by Kadyrov. Kadyrov's domination of institutions appears to be the result of sociological structures particular to the North Caucasus. Chechnya was traditionally divided into clans called *teip*. Jonathan Littell indicated the *Benoi*, the *teip* to which Kadyrov belongs, fill up his entourage and dominate the government (Prague Watchdog, 2009). This may indicate that the government is run along the lines of a relative-based clan structure, with Kadyrov as the chieftain. A "vertical of power," that is, a horizontal power structure, has been established with Ramzan Kadyrov at the apex (Russell 2011, 1075). The clan-based vertical of power, in addition to overt nepotism, indicates a patrimonial system of governance in Chechnya. Kadyrov directs the running of all Chechen affairs single-handedly, delegating phantom power to friends and relatives, but making important decisions himself. Russell also indicated a complete lack of political opposition, which has enabled Kadyrov to exercise his will on the republic. Russell notes that "[t]he list of the leading representatives of [opposition] elites thus sidelined (and in some cases physically eliminated) is impressive" (2011, 1074).

Kadyrov has managed to purge the opposition and stack all key positions within the administration of Chechnya with loyal cronies. This may lead to the conclusion that the words *political institution* in reference to Chechnya are synonymous with the name *Ramzan Kadyrov*. Hence, in analyzing the relationship

between political institutions and security forces in Chechnya, in one is actually analyzing the relationship between Ramzan Kadyrov and security forces. If, as the literature suggested, Kadyrov works closely with his security forces, it is unlikely that he believes that there is no threat in Chechnya. In fact, the literature below will indicate Kadyrov's obsession with threats to his power.

Prolonging and Strengthening the Regime

The process of chechenization may be considered complete at the time of the writing of this paper (February 2015). The literature has indicated that in practice, Chechnya under Kadyrov is a sovereign republic and only remains a part of Russia in law. Considering the vast amount of wealth and power that has been accumulated by Kadyrov, it would seem that maintaining the status quo of his vertical of power is in his best interest. Chechnya is heavily subsidized by the Russian state with some reports indicating that up to 90% of the republic's budget came from Moscow in 2011 (Zubarevich 2011). Chechenization, as mentioned above, is a policy of transferring responsibility of Chechnya from Russia over to Chechen leaders (Matejova 2013, 1). The relative economic stability resulting from subsidization appears to have facilitated the process. It seems that so long as Kadyrov can maintain stability (or at least the perception of stability), he need not fear any interference from Moscow (which in any case could likely result in a Chechen revolt instead of a compliant Kadyrov demitting). Even though Kadyrov has laid claim to the negligible Chechen oil industry and has to account for almost 8 billion rubles that have been improperly spent, he has been able to maintain his grip on power (Smid 2013). This seems in part due to the relatively stable security situation in which Chechnya finds itself and the role Kadyrov plays in maintaining that stability. It is therefore in Kadyrov's best interest to quell dissent using his security forces in order to maintain his affluent and animated lifestyle (for example, for his 35th birthday party, he flew Hillary Swank and Jean-Claude Van Damme into Grozny to celebrate) (Osborn 2011). Even though Vatchagaev mentions in the literature that Kadyrov denies the

existence of militants, he must reduce the number of terrorist actions and maintain a docile civil society in Chechnya (2014). He must keep the population in line to maintain his presidential appointment.

Terrorizing the Terrorists (and their Families)

Kadyrov mobilizes his security forces to terrorize jihadist militants. My analysis of media and non-governmental organization reports suggests that Kadyrov's forces burn houses of families of suspected militants. As far back as 2008, the trend was already a clear calling card of the regime and its security forces:

> In the arson cases, each attack has followed the same pattern. The families have been awakened by men in uniforms and black ski masks who have herded residents outside and then torched their homes. Many of the attacks have been accompanied by stern declarations that the homes were being destroyed as punishment [because of a family member's participation in the insurgency] (Chivers, 2008).

On December 6, 2014, Kadyrov publicly ordered that the homes of the militants responsible for the December 4 attacks be "razed down to the basement" (RFE/RL 2014). Although Ramzan Kadyrov officially declared the principle of "collective responsibility" for militants' actions on December 5, 2014, it appears that this practice has previously been used in retribution for attacks (Ibragimov and Ivanov 2014). This is only a brief glimpse of how Kadyrov uses his security forces to prolong his regime's existence. By deterring fighters and potential jihadists from participating in attacks in this way, he has managed to bring some stability to the region, generally speaking. According to the FSB, incidents of terror-related activity in the North Caucasus have abated year-on-year and Kadyrov is credited with lustrating militants and expelling them from Chechnya (Eremenko and Tetreault-Farber 2014).

The use of security forces by Kadyrov to prolong the existence of his regime is not limited to taking actions against the families of suspected militants. They are indeed used in counter-terror operations. In November of 2014, Ramzan Kadyrov

announced the elimination of four 'bandits' near the border with Ingushetia after a firefight with Chechen police (Vatchagaev 2014). This provides for excellent propaganda showing the strength of Chechen security forces and their capacity to engage and eliminate jihadists.

Chechen security forces have also been known to pursue their interests outside of the country's borders. It is unclear whether this is Kadyrov testing expansionary waters or simply a clear-cut case of pursuit of Caucasus Emirate jihadists who are taking refuge from Kadyrov's forces. As Brian D. Taylor notes, "... the Kadyrovtsy sometimes ventured into Dagestan or Ingushetia, and Kadyrov offered to provide "help and support" to Zyazikov in Ingushetia, adding that Ingushetia is a small republic and that he could impose order "without a problem"" (2011, 268). This shows that whether or not it is Kadyrov's intention to expand his regime, he has enough sovereign power to engage in security operations outside of his designated territory. It demonstrates at the very least the lengths to which he is willing to go in order to solidify his grip on power by eliminating the threat of militants opposed to his regime.

In addition to brazen raids on suspected militants, the security forces also appear to be involved in intelligence gathering, and reports of torture in this area appear in frequent reports from human rights groups and journalists. In November 2014, Caucasian Knot, an independent online publication, indicated that several individuals were detained in an intelligence-gathering operation (2004). That Kadyrov uses his security forces to collect intelligence is another demonstration of the relationship between the two entities. By medium of violent intelligence gathering, counterterrorist operations can be conducted. In turn, the counterterrorist operations contribute to the securitization of the Kadyrov regime.

By conducting state terror against insurgents' families, tracking down insurgents (inside and outside of Chechnya) and gathering intelligence, the security forces of Chechnya provide Ramzan Kadyrov the capacity to prolong his regime. This is one of the key tenets of the relationship between government institutions (i.e. Kadyrov) and Chechen security forces. If Kadyrov gave a decree declaring collective responsibility for the insur-

gency, I find it highly doubtful that he sincerely believes that there is no insurgency.

Security Forces as a Mechanism of Societal Control

A reason was given for the December 4, 2014, attack in Grozny. Media outlets were informed that the militants were carrying out the attacks under the direction of Amir Khazmat, leader of the Chechen insurgency wing (Fuller 2014). The attack was retribution for the treatment of women by Ramzan Kadyrov's security forces (Ibid.). Russian human rights group Memorial accused law-enforcement officers of shooting paintballs at women not dressed in accordance with Kadyrov's interpretation of Islam (Ferris-Rotman 2010). Mobilizing his security forces to attack women may create insurgent resentment, yet Kadyrov has not appeared disturbed by this prospect. Social engineering appears to be of great importance him.

In addition to enforcing an emerging state ideology of Kadyrovian Islamism, Kadyrov is suspected of mobilizing his security forces to sabotage journalists and human rights activists who undermine his regime. One of the most prominent examples is the case of Natalia Estemirova. Estemirova, an outspoken critic of Ramzan Kadyrov, was found murdered in Ingushetia in July of 2009 after having been kidnapped from her home in Grozny. Memorial, the human rights group for whom Estemirova worked, blamed Kadyrov and his security forces for her extrajudicial killing (REF/RL 2009). There are (inconclusive) indications that Anna Politkovskaya, another outspoken critic of Kadyrov's, was murdered in Moscow by Chechen security forces. The murder occurred on president Vladimir Putin's birthday and two days before Kadyrov's birthday in 2006 (Pohl 2007, 38). Kadyrov had already made a threat on her life during an interview (Ibid 34).

It could hardly be expected that Estemirova's or Politkovskaya's assassinations be attributed to Kadyrov or his security forces in a court of law in the foreseeable future. It is also uncertain whether the killings of these two journalists and other actions against those who have spoken out against the regime have been conclusively committed by Kadyrov's security services.

However, the evidence does suggest that such actions are not beyond Kadyrov's capacities.

Kadyrov uses security forces to exercise his will to an astounding degree. A recent episode from the Chechen town of Germenchuk highlights this concept. After the disappearance of Kadyrov's cell phone from an event in the town, Kadyrov had over a thousand townspeople (including children) questioned in the search for his mobile (Balmforth 2014). This may seem a lighter form of tyranny than the aforementioned trends and incidents but it demonstrates that Kadyrov is willing to use his security forces for trivial matters. Expending state resources in a search for a personal phone at the inconvenience of over a thousand people underscores that security forces in Chechnya can be used to do anything asked of them by Kadyrov.

Kadyrov also utilizes his forces to impose his idea of what public behaviour should be within his dominion. Enforcement of ideology often seems to include an unreasonable level of violence as demonstrated by Ferris-Rotman, Pohl and RFE/RL. This behaviour is in a legal grey area as it falls outside of Russian law, yet a Chechen republican institution commits it. The institution is outside of the reach of Russian law, yet remains by law a territory of the Russian Federation (Muradov 2006). Kadyrov operates with impunity, and his security services have a carte blanche to mould the society that he would create.

Short-Term Stability, Long-Term Woes:
What's Next for Chechnya?

Marten indicates that short-term stability in Chechnya is destined to fail as insurgents simply migrated to neighbouring republics and regions (2010, 1-5). She also noted that Kadyrov is a violent and unpredictable ruler who may turn against Moscow should a higher bidder be willing to pay him (Ibid). Although this point of view is reasonable, it assesses the situation from the context of the relationship between Moscow and Chechnya. The relationship between political institutions and security forces in the domestic context finds short-term stability, but instability in the long run, for different reasons. There is increasing evidence that violence left Chechnya for other

regions of the Caucasus since Kadyrov came to power indicating a relative level of political stability at present (O'Loughlin et al 2011, 4).

Kadyrov's rule brings a certain degree of stability to Chechnya. Yet the December 4, 2014, attacks on Grozny demonstrate that the insurgency and resentment against Kadyrov and his security forces are far from over, as Kadyrov would have his public believe. It is unlikely that maltreatment of women is the insurgents' only grievance, but the fact that it was given as a reason for the attack directly implicates the relationship between Kadyrov and his security forces. Should the increasing tyranny of the security forces at the behest of Kadyrov drive more insurgents into the forest, Chechnya could once again find itself in a state of utter civil strife. Full-blown conflict with a strong insurgency would be politically disastrous for Kadyrov as the stability that he has brought to the region in recent years 'legitimizes' his authority. A situation could emerge from this in which Kadyrov finds himself at odds with not only the Caucasus Emirate but also with Moscow as a direct result of his relationship with the Chechen security forces. Many Chechen Jihadists are currently operating in Syria and Iraq with the Daesh gaining valuable military experience, connections, and, in some cases, further radicalization (Vatchagaev 2014). These individuals will pose a serious threat to Kadyrov's regime upon their return from the Middle East.

Another reason that Kadyrov's relationship with his security forces is destined to bring instability to Chechnya is the personalized hierarchical power structure exemplified within its ranks. Chechenization gives Chechnya almost complete sovereignty from Moscow. Should Kadyrov perish, a power vacuum may be left behind. Moscow's ability to intervene may be marginalized because of Chechnya's *de facto* sovereignty. The ability of the Russian government to impose a leader upon Chechnya has been whittled away because chechenization has reached a point of no return. There have been attempts on Kadyrov's life in the past (Sputnik 2009). Should another one be successful, the power vacuum in the wake of the power vertical would leave behind thousands of armed men with no obvious successor to

Kadyrov. As noted above, Kadyrov's security forces are unambiguously loyal to *him*. This loyalty, attributed to a man and not the state (either Russian or Chechen), could result in civil war quite easily as factions may emerge out of a post-Kadyrov security force.

The relative stability that Chechnya has experienced since Ramzan Kadyrov has come to power will only last as long as Kadyrov does, largely because of the way that security forces operate under him. In the absence of the security forces submitting to his will and assisting him in institutionalizing repression, Chechnya would not be as stable as it is today. Indeed, Kadyrov has established himself as the lynchpin of this relationship.

Conclusion
Gambling with Kadyrov

The importance in this research is multifaceted. Firs, the relationship may help determine the direction in which Chechnya is heading politically in the near- and long-term. The formerly secessionist region may also be maintaining the geographical integrity of the Russian Federation. Factions in the Russian republics of Dagestan, Tatarstan, Tuva, Bashkortostan and Ingushetia have demonstrated a desire to secede from the Russian Federation over the last twenty years (Stepanov 2000, 305-332). A future independent Chechnya may in effect precipitate a countywide secession crisis if separatist movements are emboldened by Chechen insurgent success. Second, there are global implications. In the context of current worldwide economic and social interconnectedness, what happens in Chechnya may have consequences reaching far beyond its borders. The Islamic fundamentalist threat that is present in Chechnya may contribute to the global jihadist movement. With its proximity to Daesh insurgents in Iraq and Syria, Chechen Islamic jihadists have the ability to gain training, experience, sympathizers and funds to launch coordinated attacks throughout the Middle East, Chechnya, the rest of Russia and elsewhere (Vatchagaev 2014). Third, the security situation in Chechnya has economic consequences for Russia because security operations, weapons

procurement, and training all require Russian funding. The puzzle of Kadyrov's denial of the existence of the insurgency in the face of the evidence of terrorism remains unanswered. I disagree with assertions that Kadyrov is trying to convince himself that there is no insurgency. He is too involved with security forces to be so naïve. I am also not convinced that Kadyrov thinks that killing a few insurgents takes care of the insurgency problem. He seems to perceive that the problem goes well beyond a few individuals. His policy of collective responsibility indicates that he is willing to go well beyond the elimination of a few insurgents by sending 'messages' to families and communities (e.g. burning homes). I believe that the answer to the puzzle is to be found in the psyche of Ramzan Kadyrov.

Under Kadyrov, Grozny has become an ultra-modern hub in the Caucasus with new Russian élan (Emelyanova, 2011). Liz Fuller writes that,

> […] Kadyrov coordinated and presided over a mass-scale program to rebuild infrastructure destroyed during the wars of 1994-96 and 1999-2000, transforming Grozny from the wasteland of half- or totally destroyed buildings that shocked even Putin into a functioning city (2015).

Ostensibly, Kadyrov's reign has modernized a region that only a decade ago was utterly devastated after two bloody conflicts. It appears however, that a price must be paid for this new Chechnya. Chechens must adhere to the dictates of one man. Life is prescribed in the new Chechnya. Kadyrov is a strong-armed leader who exercises complete control over security forces. His security forces keep society in check; they harass terrorists (yet maintain there is not insurgency), dissenters and people not dressed to Kadyrov's preferences. What comes next for Kadyrov's corner of the world is uncertain, but it appears that instability and chaos may follow his departure from power. Russia's gamble with Kadyrov the authoritarian is a high stakes game in which the bets are not hedged.

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The essay demonstrates Mike's curiosity regarding the recent Chechen War and why the present situation in Chechnya is so under-reported. Mike believes that understanding the current political-security situation in Chechnya is particularly important vis-à-vis the future of the Russian Federation's stability.

Levon Petrossian

Mahan and Corbett Go To War: Strategy and the Imperial Japanese Navy

Introduction

In the nuclear age, it has become easy to forget about conventional elements of military strategy. Yet countless conflicts during the Cold War and beyond have shown us that the use of force, short of major power war, is still a viable option for states. If there is any other future expectation of a conventional war within the shadow of nuclear weapons, conventional strategy based on air, land, or naval forces (or all three) re-enters the equation. It is with the latter of the three, naval strategy, that this paper is concerned with. There has been a renewed focus on the issue with the resurgence of maritime disputes around China and the nation's reassessment of its navy. Increasing naval expenditures have led some experts to speculate whether China is on a crash course towards conflict with its neighbours and whether its developing "blue water" (ocean-going, long-range) capabilities could potentially challenge control of the sea lanes on which the U.S. – the incumbent naval force

– heavily relies (Hanks 1985, 83).[1] Historically, naval power has been a crucial component for a nation's dominance at the global level. The Portuguese, the Dutch, the British, and then the Americans have all built their global hegemony on the decks of their ships.[2] However, little has been written about how their choices on maritime matters affected their propensity to engage in military conflict. In an attempt to make a link between naval strategy and war, this paper examines the ways in which a state's choice of naval strategy – the large scale command of the sea strategy advanced by Alfred Thayer Mahan, or a small-scale strategy of sea denial based on the theories of Sir Julian Corbett – increases or decreases the likelihood of the use of force. [3] [4]

I will examine whether the aggressive nature of the Mahanian strategy renders it more prone to conflict than its Corbettian counterpart, and I will test these propositions with a longitudinal analysis of the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) from its foundation after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to the declaration of war against the United States of America with the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.[5] The evidence section will be divided into strategic years, separated by the IJN's back and forth between a Mahanian and Corbettian strategy depending on the prevailing naval planners' theories and strategic considerations of the time. Once the strategy for the section has been designated, I will examine the presence and extent of either the Mahanian or the Corbettian variables, then highlight the uses of force (mostly expeditions and wars) or – when available – the decisions not to use force, and will conclude each section by analyzing how much of a factor the strategy was in the decision to use or not to use force.

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[1] See, for example, Erickson 2008; Garofano 2008; and Yoshihara and Holmes 2010.
[2] See Modelski and Thompson 1988.
[3] I will henceforth refer to these strategies as Mahanian and Corbettian. I acknowledge that "Corbettian" is not a common term in the strategy lexicon, but for the lack of a viable alternative, it will continue to be used.
[4] At this point I would like to make the reader aware that, to the extent of my knowledge, there are no existing theories that causally link naval strategy to the onset of war, and the theoretical connections made in this paper are my own, as are any logical inconsistencies that might arise from them.
[5] While there will be some discussion with regards to strategy over the course of the Pacific War (1941-45), it is inconsequential to the analysis strictly of the dependent variable, the use of force.

My preliminary findings indicate that the IJN resorted to force almost regardless of the strategy it was implementing at any given time. This leads to two main claims: (1) that both strategies are equally prone to war within their given circumstances, and (2) that Imperial Japan was prone to war from the outset and simply adjusted its strategy accordingly. The lesson from the first part of the argument is that the literature desperately needs more test cases to draw a bigger picture of naval strategy. For the second part, the lesson is that Japan's domestic political forces or the nature of the international system were more important in dictating when and where the IJN engaged in conflict.

Naval Strategy And The Use Of Force

Before embarking on the analysis, the topic of the paper – naval strategy – merits a discussion of its own. When Rear Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan set out to write about his thoughts on maritime matters in *The Influence of Sea Power Upon History*, he realized that those who wrote of it prior to him limited themselves "to the duty of simple chronicles of naval occurrences," making little to no connection between history and the topic of strategy (Mahan 2004, 2). As such, his goal was to see how sea power influenced the course of history. However, there is no shortage of critics who reject the idea of purely "naval" strategy as a concept. Military strategist Edward Luttwak, who served as a consultant to many defense-related departments in the U.S., argues that the only scenario in which any one form of military power can be considered a strategy is when "it is decisive in itself," as was the case for British sea power (2001, 172). All other deliberations on the topic are too focused on technical, tactical, or operational issues, such as battleships versus aircraft carriers, or submarines versus surface vessels. Furthermore, the decision to go with one over the other is a matter of grand strategy because it is determined by what type of conflicts a state expects (Luttwak 2001, 171).

The consistent categorization of naval strategy simply as part of grand strategy is the main reason why there is no systematic analysis of how war prone various strategies really are. As

argued by Fleet Admiral William F. Halsey: "A fleet is like a hand of cards at poker or bridge. You don't see it as aces and kings and deuces. You see it as a hand, a unit. You see a fleet as a unit, not carriers, battleships and destroyers. You don't play individual cards, you play the hand" (Barnett 2007, 28). What Halsey may have been trying to explain is that naval strategy is a legitimate subset of grand strategy, as it operates not on the technical specificities suggested by Luttwak but as a unit where one section depends on another, thus requiring meticulous planning of its own. I concentrate on the type of naval strategy (Mahanian or Corbettian) based on authorized official naval war plans insofar as they are constructed apart from or alongside purely ground warfare plans, and not bound by it (Lee 2008, 146). [6]

To account for the probability and frequency of war, the dependent variable for this analysis is the likelihood of the use of force as measured by the frequency of "declarations of war […] blockades, clashes, [or] occupation of territory" in any given time period (Jones et al. 1996, 171). As such, the use of force varies from numerous small clashes, an extended occupation or naval blockade, or full-scale war on the upper threshold to the absence of any of these indicators or on the conscious refusal to use force on the lower threshold. Additionally, the length of the use of force (from the beginning of force to the signing of a treaty or cease-fire, for example) is inconsequential to the theoretical test.

Mahan and the Command of the Sea

I propose that a state that adopts a Mahanian strategy predicated on the command of the sea is more likely to use force because it is constantly seeking the decisive battle to establish its superiority. If the Navy's "true end is to preponderate over the enemy […] and so control the sea," Mahan had written in his seminal text, "then the enemy's ships and fleets are the true objects to be assailed on all occasions" (2007, 129) Once this control has been established, the Mahanian navy can then protect its own commerce and move its soldiers freely, while denying the same freedoms to its enemy or enemies (Rubel 2012, 22). Since most seafaring countries would want to have this freedom of movement, the "clash of interests" inevitably led countries to war, for the only way to reach the desired command was to defeat the prevailing power (Mahan 2007, 3). A Mahanian strategy also entails that a nation's navy is operating on an "offense is the best defense mentality;" they are forward deployed, fully mobile, and ready for an engagement at all times (Barnett 2007, 28).

How the selection of a Mahanian naval strategy affects the variance in the use of force depends on several factors. One of them is the geographic scope of the strategy (IV1). Simply put, the wider the area covered by the strategy, the more likely it is that the state will encounter an enemy. The geographic scope of the strategy is an ambiguous concept which relies heavily on the rationale of war planners and on the prioritizing of certain strategic locations over others.

The second aspect to consider is the polarity of the region in which the Mahanian navy operates (IV2). The region in question may vary slightly depending on the geographic scope established in the first variable (though it is not heavily influenced by it), and will include states that have a strategic stake in said region. Then, the polarity is measured by the distribution of military power based on a composite index of defence personnel and expenditure (Lee 2008, 160). Following the logic of uncertainty in classical realism, in a multipolar region, the state employing a Mahanian strategy does not only account for its own power and that of its primary enemy but also the power and intentions of its allies and its enemy's allies. Furthermore, the state is never entirely sure on what side the other states stand since their allegiances may constantly change (Morgenthau 1948, 152). Consequently, a multipolar environment plagued by uncertainty induces caution at the decision-making

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[6] Lee coded *military strategy* based on two rules. First, he used "official war plans formally authorized by the military and political leadership," excluding "strategic concepts devised for educational purposes and proposals that did not officially take effect, since they rarely shape a state's assessment of military opportunity when decisions of war and peace are made." Second, he focused "on the primary dimension of the official war plan," which prioritized nuclear or ground forces over naval or air forces. Only when the former two were insignificant would the latter two be highlighted (Lee 2008, 146).

level and, therefore, makes it highly unlikely that a Mahanian navy will "get locked into a zero-sum game that can be resolved only by conflict" (Gilpin 1981, 88). By contrast, a bipolar region makes the use of force more likely by creating an ideal scenario for a zero-sum conflict (Gilpin 1981, 89). [7]

There is, however, an intervening variable in that calculation: the naval strength of a third-party in a multipolar region, which is measured by the same indicator as in IV2, but focuses on a nation's individual share of the distribution of power rather than the distribution amongst all powers (IVV3). Also considered are the nation's qualitative advancements in the domain of naval warfare. Additionally, this intervening variable takes regional differences into account. For example, while France may have an important share of the distribution of military power, it has no effect upon the Asia-Pacific, similar to how China's power has no effect upon the Atlantic. The argument is that a strong regional maritime third party will exponentially decrease the chances that a Mahanian navy engages in a decisive battle, for fear that even a victory with minimal cost will inevitably turn the victor into a target for attack. This differs from the hypothesis that third-parties shape opportunism, whereby a potential aggressor might be deterred by the expectation of a third state's intervention, regardless of the type of military power (i.e., land, naval, or air). By extension, a strong, continental power would theoretically have no additional effect upon the variance caused by multipolarity itself (Blainey 1988, 58-67).

[7] This can be achieved through the bipolarization of multipolarity due to alliances or through the rise of a second power to challenge unipolarity. While Gilpin argues that the bipolarization of a multipolar system is "extremely dangerous," it is not a crucial component of this study; the important aspect is the simple fact that the region is bipolar (1981, 89).

Corbett and Asymmetry

The logical competing argument to a Mahanian approach to naval strategy is the theory espoused by British naval historian Sir Julian Corbett. Corbett viewed maritime matters as an extension of larger goals, and its importance was in relation to the army. In direct confrontation with Mahan, he argues that it is an error to think that command of the sea is passed from vanquished to victor. In fact, Corbett does not even view the sea as a permanently controllable area: "the normal position is not a commanded sea, but an uncommanded sea" (1999, 230). His approach does not seek a decisive battle, or any large-scale battle for that matter. This makes a state more war prone by lowering the threshold for the use of force. Whereas the Mahanian strategy is deterred when conditions for the decisive battle are not favourable, a Corbettian navy's concern rests with small-scale or asymmetric operations: (1) blocking sea lines of communication (SLOCs), (2) temporarily securing strategic points to support land units, (3) commerce raiding, and (4) coastal defense. These operations allow the navy to attack enemy fleets with hit-and-run tactics, to engage any enemy within range of land fortifications, or to bypass the enemy altogether (Corbett 1999, 167; 171). [8]

The first variable in a Corbettian theory of war focuses on the enemy, and whether its naval forces are concentrated or dispersed (IV4). Since the Corbettian navy seeks asymmetrical advantages to make up for its disadvantage in size, a heavily concentrated fleet – especially docked in a fortified port – will deter the recourse to force by a Corbett strategy. On the other hand, a dispersed fleet (and one that does not practice convoy tactics) leaves itself open to aggression, and therefore increases the likelihood of the use of force. This becomes more important as the enemy's fleets disperse over a larger area.

[8] Mahan considered most of these tactics, especially the French version of commerce raiding (*guerre de course*), a waste of time (2007, 62).

The second variable is concentrated around the immediate vicinity of the state employing the Corbettian strategy. The variable takes into account how much of a coastline needs to be protected, and exactly how much firepower is available to do so (IV5). This accounts for any artillery equipment designed specifically to counter surface ships, and helicopters/airplanes designed for anti-submarine warfare (ASW). Land defenses have a twofold effect in increasing the likelihood of the use of force. Firstly, they enable a Corbettian navy to confidently engage enemies near its coast. Secondly, they enable it to pursue enemies further than they otherwise

would have done, given that basic coastal defense is being provided by the land defenses.

While this last variable, geography, is in itself a constant, it is the purposeful use of intrinsic geographic features as a part of strategy that is the subject of analysis (IV6).The causal logic is that the conscious designation of geography as a defensive advantage will make the use of force more likely because it factors into the calculation for victory. Conversely, a state that does not see its geographic defensive advantages will be more wary of initiating any conflict for fear that it does not have the required ability to achieve its objectives. While it may seem like an obvious choice to contemplate geography in any strategic planning, its details in the water are more intricate than on land (where geography is a heavily measured variable). The concern with these geographic features can be considered as part of a navy's "green water" strategy, which focuses on coastal waters, ports, and harbors, in contrast to the oceanic setting of a "blue water" strategy (U.S. Navy 2010, 8).

Japan Opens Its Doors

Throughout Japan's history, there has been little incentive to develop an overpowering navy, even as an island-nation. This made Japan a puzzle for those who claimed that a nation surrounded by sea would inevitably rely on sea power (Modelski and Thompson 1988, 310). Japan's traditional regional competitors, China and Korea, were never strong in that area either, and the last time a foreign force had attempted an amphibious landing on Japan was the Mongol Empire in the 13th century (Evans and Peattie 1997, 1-2). Furthermore, Japan's geographical features – topped by the defensive waters of the Inland Sea – allowed for natural protection against small-scale navies and pirates. However, when Commodore Matthew Perry's fleet arrived at Japan's shores in 1853 and threatened to lay siege the capital, Edo, the Tokugawa Shogunate realized that their nation was highly vulnerable to Western naval threats. Even without any officials experienced in naval affairs, the Tokugawa scrambled to build some defenses on their coast and created the battery-island of Odaiba to deter Perry's aggression. This failed, however, as Japan eventually agreed to open up its doors after 250 years of isolation. With the end of isolation came the beginning of a focused attention on maritime matters. In the late 1850s, the Dutch helped the Japanese open a naval academy in Nagasaki, and gave them their first steamship. Additionally, the French aided in the construction of Japan's first navy yard in Yokosuka in 1865. Through wheeling and dealing, by the mid-1860s, Japan had its first semblance of a navy with eight Western warships at its disposal, but with no strategy in mind (Evans and Peattie 1997, 4-5).

Shusei kokubō (static defense):
Army first and navy second, 1868-95 – Corbett

Following the Meiji Restoration in 1868 [9] and the centralization of the Imperial Navy in 1869 (though hardly distinguished from the Army until at least 1872), the floor was open for a debate about what kind of strategy the navy would work

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[9] The Meiji Restoration was a coup that signalled the end of the Edo Period in Japan and the Tokugawa shogunate's feudal rule by restoring the Emperor. It lifted Japan from its 250-year isolation from the rest of the world, accelerated industrialization, and planted the seeds for Japan's imperial ambitions. More importantly for this paper, however, the Meiji Restoration allowed Japan to centralize its military forces; prior to 1868 they had been dispersed throughout the entire country, serving under various local *daimyo* (lords). For a detailed account of the Meiji Restoration and its broader political ramifications, see Jansen 2000, 333-70.

towards. Several considerations by the Japanese during this time led to my designation of their strategy as a Corbettian one. Firstly, Japan was still marred by domestic unrest and needed a strong army to quell it. Secondly, its priorities were "the Japanese people, state, and homeland" which limited its geographic scope (the Mahanian variable, even though the strategy was Corbettian) to its immediate vicinity. Based on these deliberations, the IJN's strategy was *shusei kokubō* (static defense), which focused on coastal artillery and naval forces that operated in "green water" (Evans and Peattie 1997, 7-8). Moreover, its second strategic concept, *rikushu kaijū* ("one in which the army comes first and the navy second") essentially gave all defensive authority to the army, leaving the navy as a branch rather than an independent service (Ikeda 1967, 119).

Between 1868 and 1895, Japan's naval policy was also being influenced by the Jeune Ecole, France's bourgeoning commerce raiding concept,[10] leading to an infatuation with torpedo boats. Not only were these small, faster warships ideal for a guerre de course, but they were also suitable for Japan's broken up waters and immense coastline (IV6). Second, some of the battery islands (such as Odaiba or Sarushima) built near the end of the Edo Period were fortified – along with other areas – and turned into naval bases and strategic ports, thereby increasing Japan's homeland coastal defense systems (IV5) (Evans and Peattie 1997, 30).[11]

Korean Peninsula 1873

Even though the *shusei kokubō* strategy was Corbettian, one of the earliest opportunities for the use of force – the intended invasion of Korea in 1873 – was abandoned due to the concern for third-party intervention. When the plan was being considered, Ōkubo Toshimichi, one of the leading figures of the Meiji Restoration, argued that an invasion of the Korean peninsula

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[10] On the *Jeune Ecole and guerre de course*, see Ropp 1987, 159-67.

[11] Sasebo, Kure, Maizuru, and Yokosuka were turned into naval bases, while Takeshiki and Ominato (the only location near Hokkaid) were turned into strategic ports (Evans and Peattie 1997, 30).

might be successful, but it would tie down the Japanese forces and give Russia the opportunity "to move south and pounce" (Blainey 1988, 60). Therefore, the decision to forgo the invasion of Korea was not a result of Japan's Corbettian strategy.

Taiwan 1874

Shortly thereafter, the Japanese used the murder of fifty-four Okinawan fishermen by Taiwanese aborigines (the Mudan Incident of 1871) as an excuse to launch an expedition to the island in 1874 (Jansen 2000, 423). Saigō Tsugumichi – who would later become a very important bureaucrat in the Navy Ministry – led a force of 3,600 against the islanders, achieving victory at the Battle of Stone Gate in late May. The Japanese did not stay and colonize Taiwan yet, but the positive outcomes of the expedition were important: it demonstrated the weakness of the Qing garrison on the island (IV1, as Taiwan was under Chinese jurisdiction) and it allowed the seamless transition of the Ryūkyū Islands under Japanese control (Davidson 1903, 145-6; Jansen 2000, 423-4; Evans and Peattie 1997, 20). Even though the navy was used in a transport and supportive role in this expedition, the Corbettian strategy allowed the IJN to undertake this limited-gains mission with relative ease.

First Sino-Japanese War 1894-95

The most important confrontation of this section, the First Sino-Japanese War, was the result of years of tension between Japan and the Qing Empire of China over the Korean Peninsula. In the mid-1880s, where war was only avoided through diplomatic skill, China strengthened its navy with foreign assistance. The Beiyang fleet – their strongest and most concentrated naval force (IV4) out of four fleets, with the German-built ironclad battleships *Dingyuan* and *Zhenyuan* – was believed to surpass anything the Japanese could conceive at the same time (Evans and Peattie 1997, 19). Yet, thanks to a visit to Nagasaki before the war, then-Captain Tōgō Heihachirō was able to note the "slovenly condition of the ship [the *Dingyuan*] and the undisciplined appearance of its crew" (Evans and Peattie 1997, 20).

Even though Japan's navy had been modernizing, the concentration of land forces on the Asian mainland are what made the Korean Peninsula a key strategic location (and the Chinese ports in Port Arthur, Liaodong Peninsula and Weihaiwei, Shandong Peninsula). Therefore, by defeating the Beiyang Fleet, the IJN would not only damage the Qing's naval power but also its re-supplying ability, essentially locking their land forces into a fight to the death. This allowed the Japanese to send additional troops with ease through the Korean peninsula. In terms of the dependent variable in question, based on the Corbettian hypothesis, the Japanese Combined Fleet should not have initiated battle with the Beiyang Fleet with their unmatched battleships (IV4). Moreover, since most of the fighting was expected to occur around the Korean Peninsula, Japan's land defenses and intrinsic geographic features played no part in the decision (IV5). Yet, the naval command had calculated – and, in hindsight, correctly – that the Qing's advantages were "more apparent than real" (Evans and Peattie 1997, 38). It did not take long for the Combined Fleet led by Commander-in-Chief Itō Sukeyuki to seek out the Beiyang Fleet and engage it in the Battle of the Yalu River on September 17, 1874, before war was formally declared (Evans and Peattie 1997, 41). By sunset, most of the Beiyang Fleet had been sunk or had fled for repairs – and the only two significant ships remaining were the *Dingyuan* and *Zhenyuan*. After initially failing to pursue the retreating forces and leaving to support land operations, the Japanese Combined Fleet encircled them at Weihaiwei harbor, sinking one of the great battleships and taking over the other (1997, 44, 46). The Battle of the Yalu River put the Chinese into a downward spiral toward defeat, culminating in the Treaty of Shimonoseki which transferred territory and economic privileges to Japan. However, interference by the "Triple Intervention" (Germany, Russia, and France) took away Japan's hold on the Liaodong Peninsula, which altered the course of Japanese strategic thought after 1895 (Jansen 2000, 432-3).

Taiwan 1895

The ceding of Taiwan to Japan in the Treaty of Shimonoseki led to a final Japanese confrontation for the century between Japan and the short-lived Republic of Formosa. In May 1895, only a month after the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, seven thousand Japanese troops landed on the island, beginning a five-month long campaign marred by guerrilla warfare and disease, ending with over 14,000 casualties on both the Japanese and Formosan side (who were aided by ex-Qing Empire regulars). Even though the conflict was settled in October 1895, Japanese troops had to deal with insurgents for years to follow. While the invasion is relatively minor in the grand scheme, it cemented Japan's rule over Taiwan until the end of World War II (Takekoshi 1907, 84-5, 91).

Yamamoto Gombei and the "Six-Six Fleet,"[12] 1895-1905 – Corbett And Mahan

The section following the First Sino-Japanese War through the Russo-Japanese War is more ambiguous in terms of strategy. Failing to side with either Mahan or Corbett, I will provide evidence for both strategies' variables in hopes of concluding that only one of them could have prompted Japan to initiate the Russo-Japanese War. To understand the strategic thought of the decade, it must be noted that Japan was humiliated by the Triple Intervention and the loss of the Liaodong Peninsula (with the commercial port of Dairen), as well as Russia's leasing of Port Arthur for 25 years. Japan's goal would be to keep the Russian fleets divided. If the fleet in Chinhae (now Jinhae-gu) was allowed to coordinate with the fleet in Vladivostok and the one in the Yellow Sea, Japan's homeland would immediately be threatened. Therefore, the geographic scope of Japan's naval strategy was Northeast Asia (IV1) (Evans and Peattie 1997, 52-3). At the outset, before even preparing for Russia, the Japanese government had to arrange for the British not to take advantage

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[12] The "Six-Six Fleet" refers to six battleships and six armored cruisers, which enabled Japan to become the world's fourth strongest naval power in 1897 (Evans and Peattie 1997, 60).

of a Russo-Japanese confrontation to attack the victor. Based on the distribution of military power (Table 1 in the Appendix), the U.S. (8.5% global military power, IVV3), Britain (14.3% global military power, IVV3), and Russia had a stake in East Asia alongside Japan. Therefore, the Japanese orchestrated the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902 – which guaranteed British balancing in the event of a fourth power joining Russia – and alongside America's isolationist policy, successfully rendered the region to essentially become a bipolar region, shifting from its previous multipolar distribution (IV2) (Jansen 2000, 439). [13]

In developing the strategic doctrine for this period – which showed elements of Mahan and Corbett – Yamamoto Gombei was instrumental for both the theoretical and political advances by the IJN. In implementing the shipbuilding plan in 1896-97, Yamamoto had argued that the goal was to gain command of the seas around Japan (Evans and Peattie 1997, 64). To achieve this goal, Russia was the obvious enemy. In the army's "Operation Plan for War against Russia" of December 1903, the Japanese considered Korea the first step in order to establish a base on the Asian mainland, through which they could resupply and send additional troops. To be able to land on the Korean Peninsula, however, the IJN would have to launch a surprise attack on one of the dispersed Russian fleets in Port Arthur (IV4) (Fuller 1954, 149-51).[14] The armies in Korea would then block the railroad, isolating the Russian fleet and army at Port Arthur, and then repeat the process with the Russian forces on the Liaodong Peninsula (Lee 2008, 148-9). At this point, the Mahanian strategy would argue that the fleet in Port Arthur had to be decisively defeated , but reports from the Navy Staff indicated that they could afford to simply constrain them, essentially concluding the Korean campaign "without depending on a decision at sea" (O'Lavin 2009, 7; Toyama 1985, 237-8). It cannot be stressed enough how important it was to keep the Russian fleets separated from one another. By the end of 1903, Russia's Far East Fleet outnumbered all of Japan's ships, and should the Baltic Fleet have joined the region, "the prospect for

a Japanese naval catastrophe might be very real" (Evans and Peattie 1997, 86). At the least, one can hypothesize that if the Japanese were not certain of their ability to divide the Russian naval forces, they would not have initiated the Russo-Japanese War (IV4).

Russo-Japanese War 1904-05

The conflict began in February 1904 with near-simultaneous surprise attacks on the fleets at Port Arthur and Vladivostok. While the forces in the former area were bottled up rather efficiently , the Vladivostok fleet became more of a concern, as they began raiding Japanese commerce and blocking sea lanes; the Russians were more tenacious than expected. Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō's tactical failures, however, allowed the main body of the Port Arthur fleet to remain relatively intact (albeit contained), and the IJN now had to consider the eventual arrival of the Baltic Fleet that was sent in desperation to save Russia from annihilation (Evans and Peattie 1997, 105-107). For a brief moment, the battle seemed to be turning into a Mahanian decisive engagement, whereby a victory for the three Russian Fleets would destroy the majority of Japan's naval power and arguably put an end to its imperial ambitions. Fortunately for the Japanese, their enemies were highly demoralized and the Port Arthur fleet never left harbour again, leaving the Baltic Fleet on its own (thus still a mix between Corbett and Mahan for the IJN, IV4). With the Japanese Army mopping up the remaining land forces at Port Arthur and the Vladivostok squadron finally running out of luck in August 1904, the Baltic Fleet would find itself alone in the decisive battle at Tsushima in May of 1905. With superior speed, firepower, and fleet homogeneity, Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō's ships sank virtually the entirety of the remaining Russian ships (Evans and Peattie 1997, 116). The victory and the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth had important consequences for the IJN's strategic thought for the remainder of its existence. It not only gave the Japanese a foothold on the Asian mainland with Port Arthur, the Liaodong Peninsula, and Russian interests in South Manchuria, but it also brought forth the concepts of Mahan and the decisive fleet engagement more

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[13] Moreover, as mentioned earlier, an alliance-induced bipolarity is the most war-prone of all systems.

[14] The other fleets were in the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea.

than ever before (Jansen 2000, 440; Evans and Peattie 1997, 129). "Faith in the decisive battle," argued military expert H. P. Wilmott, "became dogma in the Japanese Navy" (quoted in Evans and Peattie 1997, 132). This turn to Mahan, however, would inevitably lead the Japanese Empire on a crash course towards confrontation with the increasingly powerful United States.

Seikaiken (Command Of The Seas) and Kantai Kessen (Decisive Battle Doctrine): Satō Tetsutarō and Oceanic Defense, 1905-41 – Mahan[15]

If the IJN's post-1905 strategy can be narrowed down to one person, that person would be Satō Tetsutarō, famously dubbed "Japan's Mahan" (Holmes 2008, 150). Satō's logic was the same as Yamamoto Gombei's from the previous section: that a forward-deployed navy would make Japan more secure than one that operated in its own waters (Tsunoda 1969, 149-50). This oceanic defense had several implications for the geographic scope of the strategy. Prior to 1905, Japan's concern with its defence was the home islands and Taiwan. After the Russo-Japanese War, however, the Japanese Empire now included continental interests in Asia, as well as a turn towards the Pacific. The geographic scope, therefore, was the entire Asia-Pacific, in addition to continental East Asia (IV1). With the wider area to account for, the region was bound to be multipolar. When Satō first initiated the concept, both the U.S. (9.6%) and Russia (25.8%; even after its defeat) were gaining ground in the distribution of military power. Additionally, the British (13.3%) still had a vested interest in the area (IV2). More worrisome were America's and Britain's "big ship" capabilities, which stood at forty-one ships and ninety-eight ships respectively, compared to Japan's twenty-six. Russia – even with its growing continental power – still only had fourteen significant ships

(IVV3) (Evans and Peattie 1997, 147).[16]

While Japan had to tread carefully, it did not stop the navy from developing its strategy. Especially with regards to their "hypothetical enemy" (the Americans), Satō argued that the awesome disparity in naval strength did not mean that Japan could never challenge the United States at sea if the necessity arose (Evans and Peattie 1997, 141-2). Through their positions in the naval college, Satō, along with Akiyama Saneyuki and Suzuki Kantarō (two other leading Japanese naval theorists), influenced the next generation of important naval commanders, which included Yamamoto Isoroku, Nagano Osami, and Yonai Mitsumasa (admirals during the Pacific War). The infatuation with the "big ship, big gun" concept gave way to a uniquely Japanese understanding of the Mahanian concept of the decisive battle, *kantai kessen*. This doctrine justified increasing naval acquisitions (Holmes 2008, 151-2).

Between 1911 and 1923, Japan (and the U.S.) embarked on a capital ship-constructing naval arms race, culminating in fourteen ships for the IJN and seventeen ships for the U.S. Navy (Evans and Peattie 1997, 153). However, Japan's bid for naval parity was thwarted by the Washington Disarmament Conferences of 1921-22, where the other global powers decided on a 5:5:3 ratio for the U.S., Britain, and Japan respectively, arguing that Japan did not have as much maritime area to cover as the other two did. Ironically, even by limiting the IJN's capacity to acquire new ships, the U.S. and Britain had reduced the polarity of the Western Pacific to some extent by accepting to cease the construction of naval bases north of Singapore (for Britain) and west of Hawaii (for the U.S.). In other words, the disadvantages brought forth by a smaller navy were mitigated by the inability of the Western powers to expand their maritime reach, which may have enabled Japan to enforce its monopoly in the region, eventually (IV1; Modelski and Thompson 1988, 312-3).

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[15] Following the same logic for the omission of the Boxer Rebellion of 1900, this section will not discuss the invasion of Manchuria and the onset of the Second Sino-Japanese War for it was a significantly continental use of force.

[16] Considering the figures for 1910. Figures are for battleships, armored cruisers, and battle cruisers. See Evans and Peattie 1997, 147, especially Table 5.1.

After 1923, the IJN did not alter its intended Mahanian concept, but it had to make concessions in terms of the size and number of its ships. During the treaty era (1923-1936), the focus was on quality over quantity, evident in the Japanese principle of *ka o motte shū o sei-su* ("using a few to conquer many"). It was also during this era that submarine construction became very important to counter the quantitative advantage of the Americans. Aircraft carriers and superbattleships (*Yamato* and *Musashi*) became the foremost Mahanian capital ships (Evans and Peattie 1997, 206, 214).

As the Pacific War loomed closer, Japanese planning concentrated more specifically on the U.S. Navy than the Royal Navy in East Asian waters, making the region – at least in the IJN's eyes – a contest between itself and America (IV2). Japan had a list of potential enemies but it seemed more certain that the confrontation with the U.S. Navy was inevitable instead of possible (Evans and Peattie 1997, 466-7). A considerably detailed operation was finally planned out – credited to Yamamoto Isoroku – for a pre-emptive strike on the U.S. Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor, who would then be dragged out and defeated in the Philippines Sea. The entire operation was part of a bigger plan to create a perimeter extending from Burma through the Philippines and north to the Kamchatka Peninsula, which expanded the scope of the IJN's strategy even further (IV1; Oi 2004, 4; Modelski and Thompson 1988, 313). This idea, although initiated eventually, was heavily criticized by Vice Admiral Inoue Shigeyoshi, who argued that the naval command failed to see the difference between the U.S. and Japan in the geopolitical sense. The U.S. could potentially take over Japan as it is an island accessible by all sides; Japan could never take over the U.S., especially since it cannot even access its entire Atlantic Coast, let alone its capital. A potential U.S.-Japan conflict was going to be a chess game in which the U.S. could checkmate Japan, but not vice versa. In hindsight of course, Inoue was right, as the only time the Japanese were remotely close to American territory was with the initial attack on Pearl Harbor (Seno 1974, 30-1).

World War I

The first recourse to force in this time period, however minimal, was Japan's participation in naval activities during World War I, mostly confined to the China Sea, the South Pacific, and the Indian Ocean. One of the more successful engagements was the joint Anglo-Japanese siege of the former German base at Tsingtao (now Qingdao) on the Shandong Peninsula. The sole strategic advantage for Japan in the entire East Asian Theater was the occupation of the German islands of Micronesia, which allowed the IJN to expand the territorial limits of the Empire (IV1). Only after repeated Allied requests did Japan send a small squadron to the Mediterranean in 1917. Here, again, the strategic incentives were minimal, but it did provide Japanese naval officers with some anti-submarine warfare experience (and they were rather successful considering the drop in German attacks in 1917), but this experience would seem to have faded away by the time the Pacific War came along in 1941 (Modelski and Thompson 1988, 312; Evans and Peattie 1997, 168-9). Japan's participation in World War I, therefore, does not substantially correlate with the Mahanian strategy, aside the possible expansion of the geographic scope of post-1917 considerations.

Pacific War 1941-45

While a fully detailed analysis of the Pacific War is best left for a separate paper, its importance in the link between war proneness and naval strategy is substantial. Between November 26 and December 7, 1941, the IJN was positioning itself for the most important strike of its history. The sheer scope of the operation – all the simultaneous strikes that would accompany the one on Pearl Harbor, from Thailand to the Philippines, from Palau to the Marianas and to Guam – was unrivalled in the history of naval combat (Evans and Peattie 1997, 479). With the initial strike being successful in the eyes of the IJN, the Japanese moved quickly to expand their perimeter. This left the IJN with a vast area to defend, and not enough ships

to do so. Additionally, the concept of the Mahanian decisive battle was *after* the attack on Pearl Harbor. There was little discussion of what the effect of a surviving fleet would be on the power disparity between the rest of the U.S. Navy and the IJN. The fleet at Pearl Harbor was, after all, still less than half of the entire navy. Nevertheless, the Southeast Asian campaign in 1942 was undertaken remarkably quickly, and had the IJN believing that the strategy was sound. It was only after the U.S. Navy began moving westward and thwarting Japan's plans for strategic locations of defense that the entire plan started to fall apart. Beginning with the battle of Coral Sea, then Midway, the months-long Solomon Islands campaign, and then Leyte Gulf, the IJN was turned towards the defensive, and Satō's "Oceanic Defense" was failing (Modelski and Thompson 1988, 313-4; Evans and Peattie 1997, 482, 489-90). The strategy, which relied on an attrition of U.S. naval forces until the decisive battle, did not account for the Americans bypassing most of the defensible locations favourable to the Japanese (IV5), termed "island-hopping" (Asada 2006, 22). In the end, Japan's choice of strategy was its downfall. The navy was reluctant to commit the bulk of its forces to other battles and continuously waited for favourable conditions for the decisive battle. These choices allowed the Americans to adjust accordingly and slowly defeat the Japanese through attrition. By 1943, the IJN had virtually lost the war, and after the surrender in August of 1945, it was disbanded along with the Navy Ministry (Evans and Peattie 1997, 491; Modelski and Thompson 1988, 315).

Conclusion and Implications

Based on this analysis, it would be safe to say that, in general, both the Mahanian and the Corbettian strategies have correlated decently with the IJN's use of force from the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to its defeat at the hands of the Americans in 1945. The difference rests with the scale of the confrontations: Corbett can be associated with frequent use of force on a small-scale (expeditions, invasions, limited-gain attacks) while Mahan is prone to large-scale conflicts. Yet, the First-Sino Japanese War was within a Corbettian context, while the

Russo-Japanese War occurred in a mix of both, and the line between the two strategies is blurred when we consider the rejection of the idea to invade Korea in 1873 on the grounds of third-party intervention from Russia. As such, the link between naval strategy and the use of force remains inconclusive. Another aspect that would have merited more attention is the choice of the enemy's strategy. As evidenced by the U.S. Pacific campaign, it is easy to avoid defeat in a decisive fleet engagement by simply not showing up for the engagement. The fact that the IJN wasted its chances to inflict small losses on the U.S. Navy by constantly seeking the large battle was crucial to the IJN's defeat.

Furthermore, two of the Corbettian variables – land power and intrinsic geographic features – were not significant in any of the strategic calculations besides those in the 1870s-1880s. Preliminary explanations for this rest in Japan's unique geopolitical situation (as it relies heavily on external resources and must always move away from its coastal area to attain them) and the IJN's relatively risk-acceptant nature (the extent of the consideration for naval power disparity in the decision to use force rested with the enemy's concentration/disparity [IV4], rather than a fleet-by-fleet comparison). A potential remedy to this theoretical difficulty would be to test two different states with two different strategies under similar circumstances. The concern with naval strategy is an important one for the future. Surely, naval tactics may have changed in the nuclear age. We have reverted "to the age-old notion of regional wars fought for limited objectives," even if those regional wars are part of an increasingly globalized world where "regional" may not be strictly limited (Hanks 1985, 2). Our understanding of capital ships has also changed. While carriers (or their equivalent as capital ships throughout history) were used in the decisive battles themselves, they now represent the figurative "command of the sea" by maintaining the security environment. Instead, smaller ships would be expected to fight the limited battles for temporary sea control (Corbett) (Rubel 2012, 30). With regards to the contemporary relevance of this study, growing naval power in a state such as China would likely entail a large geographic scope of operation, which may include the contes-

tation of islands and other outlying regions. By understanding the correlation between naval strategy and the use of force, we can make better predictions about how China would act with a powerful navy at its disposal and how its regional neighbors would, in turn, respond.

Appendix

TABLE *1 Distribution of Military Power, 1860-1941* [17] *Figures are in percentage terms.*

Table 1	Distribution of Military Power, 1860-1941							
Year	USA	Britain	France	Germany	Austria	Italy	Russia	Japan
1860	4	19	24.5	6.2	11.2	8.9	26.1	0.2
1865	28.8	13.3	17.3	5.8	8.4	7	19.5	n/a
1870	4.9	11.5	27.2	19.6	8.2	6.2	22.2	0.2
1875	5.5	13.4	19.9	15.8	9.9	6.6	27.3	1.6
1880	4.9	12.5	22.3	15.2	8.9	6.4	28.3	1.5
1885	3.9	17.2	21.4	15.2	9	8.5	23.3	1.6
1890	4.7	13	20.4	19	9.2	8.6	22.8	2.3
1895	4.5	13.9	18.3	17.3	8.4	7.8	23.6	6.2
1900	8	24.7	14.5	14.4	6.6	5.6	21.8	4.5
1904	8.5	14.3	13.8	14.9	7	5.7	23	12.8
1910	9.6	13.3	15	16.8	7.2	6.2	25.8	6.1
1914	3.4	17.1	16.4	21	15.5	4	18.9	3.7
1925	13.9	15.7	14.8	4.6	n/a	8.7	33.1	9.2
1930	11.5	11.3	13.2	3.9	n/a	9.5	42.2	8.3
1935	6.6	6.6	10.1	12.8	n/a	17.3	40.8	5.8
1939	3.9	15.7	5.6	38.4	n/a	5	22	9.3
1941	10.3	15.9	1.5	44	n/a	0.5	17.1	10.7

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[17] Lee 2008, 161; Van Evera 1999, 169–79, 182–3.

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The following essay generally stems from his immense interest in war and strategy—particularly naval warfare. According to Levon, a large body of work has been written about how strategy affects the likelihood of war, but has always focused on land warfare. Little has been written about how the same dynamics work in a maritime context.

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Daniel Rhodes

The Sino-Danish Relationship: An Unusual Bilateral Connection

In 2008, China and Denmark signed a trade and technology transfer agreement called the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Starting in 2012, the two countries would take the first steps towards realizing the technology transfer aspects of this partnership with the construction of the "Innovation Centre Denmark in Shanghai" (Bertelsen, Xiangyun & Søndergaard, 2013, 73-74). Two years later, the two countries took the first steps towards establishing an agreement that would facilitate the transfer of urban water management technology. Denmark is a small European country, and represents a fraction of Chinese trade, and yet the state leaders of both countries have made it a point to visit one another regularly. Danish Queen Margrethe II was the first Western monarch ever to visit China. President Xi has sat down for talks both with the Queen and the Danish Prime Minister in both China and Denmark. This paper explores why China and Denmark have strong diplomatic ties despite incongruence in size and international influence, as well the vast geographical distance between them.

While it is true that Denmark and China have long been economically intertwined trade-partners, there is more at stake for these two nations. Denmark needs China's help to solve its mineral problems and it needs capital investment (Newman, 2001, 12.1-12.2). China has long benefitted from Denmark's foreign direct investment and now similarly stands to reap potential rewards for investing in Denmark's Greenland projects (Wright, 2014, 52-53). These two goals become compounded by Denmark's need for greater autonomy in the European Union and by China's need for a friendly bridge-state with which it can negotiate when ties within the European Union are strained or severed.

This paper begins with a history of the relationship between the two countries. A study of how China and Denmark see each other as actors in a historical context sheds light on their presently strong ties. If each state shares a common idea that they are allied to each other, then they will become friendlier towards one another during bilateral trade negotiations, due to this shared perception of a historically strong relationship. The second criterion requires an examination of their contemporary relationship. Frequency and type of state visits—since the opening up of China in 1979, until the present—is one indicator of how important the Sino-Danish relationship is to the two countries. Moreover, I will examine national trade deals between the two countries, actions within the U.N. and other important organizations that affect one another, and reactions to unfavourable or favourable actions within that context. Following that, I will present a comparison of the bilateral relationship between China and Denmark on the one hand, and Sweden, Norway, and Finland on the other. If China has a strong relationship with all these nations, then the China-Denmark relationship could simply be part of a trend. Instead it will be evident that the China-Denmark relationship is particularly strong, above the other Nordic nations. Finally, the paper shows how economic ties between the two countries have been forged and what each stands to gain from continued healthy bilateral relations. This will be supported by specifying the national interests of the two countries, and showing how continued strong relations with one another will advance these interests in both the short and long term.

Historic Relationship

Denmark first opened diplomatic relations with China in 1674 (Østergaard 2011, 48). Denmark and Sweden became the only Nordic European nations to do so, as Norway and Finland were preoccupied with domestic concerns. Denmark and Sweden sent numerous missionaries and merchants to China from 1674 until the first Opium War from 1839 to 1842 (Siika 1983, 102). Sweden operated much like the British did and sent similar types of trade merchants to China to fight for sole-trade rights and monopoly, whereas Denmark began to trade with regions of China that had been left alone (1983, 101-102). Neither Norway nor Finland directly engaged in Far East trade during this time period; these countries received materials from that region second-hand from the other, more active European nations (1983, 102). However, all four Nordic countries aggressively asserted policies of religious conversion in China during this period: the four Scandinavian nations believed that bringing faith to the faithless was a necessary and holy goal (Østergaard 2011, 48; Siika 1983, 102). Denmark, Norway, Finland, and Sweden continually sent missionaries to China up until 1945, with their numbers still in the hundreds at that time (Siika 1983[1]).

China was not a stable country during the period of 1839 to 1949. Amid the trauma of two Opium Wars, the fall of the Qing Dynasty, the creation of the Republic of China, warlords, Japanese aggression and World War II (immediately followed by the Chinese Civil War), the Western powers made considerable economic gains through trade with China. These gains generally favoured the West. Despite these obstacles, Siika contends that Swedish and Danish businesses were able to grow in that environment and develop relatively strong economic ties with China (1983, 102). It is Siika's contention that the decision of

[14] Page number not available.

the four Nordic states to unanimously announce the legitimacy of the Communist Party of China in 1949-1950 was unsurprising in light of their economic motives to do so (1983, 102). Similarly, a week prior, the U.K. had done the same; however, for the U.K., the scale of economic relations was much larger. The four Nordic nations all intended to show their immediate support for China. In the context of global politics however, they were obligated to wait and allow a larger nation to act first (1983, 103). In any case, throughout the period of 1674 to 1949, the Danish and Swedish merchant operations were never as large as the more powerful Western imperialists in China (1983, 104). When Mao Zedong announced that China had stood up, it is likely that the two Nordic nations were able to continue economic relations with China in part because of their lack of economic or military aggression towards the Asian nation. Lange suggests that Danish neutrality aided in their ability to grow their businesses within China (1971, 71-72). Conversely, though the U.K. had participated in direct opposition to China during the two Opium Wars, the U.K.'s large economic stake in the country allowed the former to re-initiate relations, despite its role in China's century of humiliation. Denmark and Sweden had simply been economic trading partners with China. With this in mind I suggest that they were not as adversely affected by the political backlash that was directed towards the major imperialist Western powers.

Before we can move on to Denmark and China's contemporary relationship, we must examine Denmark's standing within the European Union (E.U.) and how that standing affects the Sino-Danish bilateral relationship. As a member of the E.U., Denmark has obligations to the organization. However, unlike most E.U. members, Denmark is a minimalist participant, with several key opt-outs in their membership mandate. This allows Denmark some maneuverability when it comes to dealing with non-European states.

Denmark's Unique Position in Europe

Denmark holds a special position within the E.U. It was the first of the five Nordic countries to join the European Com-

munity back in 1973 (Laursen 1993, 115). However, when the European Community began to develop closer ties and expand its decision-making ability, Denmark was left behind. In 1992, when European nations decided whether to sign the Maastricht Treaty, Denmark's population—in a referendum—rejected the signing of this treaty. This set Denmark apart from all the other Nordic states, such as Sweden, which chose full participation in the European Union (1993, 135). In contrast, Denmark remains a minor participant in the Union (and even today has maintained the opt-outs and its reduced participation) (1993, 131).

Still, in what would soon become the European Union, Denmark's political co-operation began with the snowball effect of that nation's rejection of the initial Maastricht Treaty. The referendum decision was a direct cause to the four opt-outs that Denmark added into its eventually approval. The four opts are the following: it does not participate in the common defense policies of the E.U.; it does not participate in the single currency or economic policy obligations related to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union; it has no obligations in regards to citizenship within the Union; and, finally, it cannot transfer sovereignty in the area of justice or police affairs, but may co-operate in intergovernmental issues (Laursen, 1993, 130). For the purpose of this paper, the two important opt-outs to consider are the opt-outs of common defense and the single currency (with the relevant economic policy obligations).

The Danish opted out from the common defense policy, which has more recently been named the Common Foreign Security Policy (CFSP). The Danish government sees value in the CFSP but is wary of the long-term implications of such an entity (Dongsheng, 2001). Thus, the Danish government is not willing to contribute towards enlarging the E.U.'s ability to project or acquire military power. The Danes view the CFSP as the "embryonic" stage of the creation of a federal European super state, and believe that such a development would severely impede Danish interests and Danish foreign policy (Larsen, 2000, 45-46). From this perspective, the Danes view the CFSP as a threat to their economic security and autonomy. Overall, they believe that such an "enlargement process does not serve peace" (2000, 45). As one of the founding members of NATO, Denmark may

feel that the CFSP represents a move away from the strategic alliance with the U.S. Denmark's foreign policy has continuously been one in which U.S., Europe, and now China are balanced against each other in a way that enables Denmark to continue its trade with all three entities, regardless of circumstance. Denmark's unique position in the E.U. relates to why China chose it as an important European trading partner. Denmark's E.U. opt-outs have put the nation in an exceptional position within the organization—as well as on the international stage—regarding negotiations with non-E.U. nations. Most members are restricted by all of the union's rules, norms, and policies, while Denmark's opt-outs have left it in an opportune position whereby some E.U. policies do not apply. This "opt-out reality" has had significant impact on Denmark's ability to maintain strong political ties with the Chinese government. Denmark has managed to not allow "EU-China relations and Denmark's potential role therein to become an important part of the domestic political discourse." (Michalski, 2013, 891). This ability to maintain political opinions distinct from the E.U. on the matter of policy towards China is especially relevant. Denmark's independent course has allowed it to act as a bridge between China and the E.U. when tensions rise between the two international entities..

An example of Denmark in the role of the peacemaker—or "bridging" state—occurred in 2002, when Denmark hosted the successful EU-China summit in Copenhagen. Led by the Danish Prime Minister Fogh Rasmussen, the summit's goal was twofold: discuss solutions to the arms embargo against China, and normalize EU-China multilateral relations. Denmark walked a careful line between European and American interests, while at the same time trying to avoid angering China in the process (Michalski, 2013, 892-893). Denmark has had decades to work on the balancing act between the three major powers and has become adept at remaining neutral whilst still trading with all three. Sweden and Norway are very much embedded in the E.U.'s general policy. Finland has traditionally been more concerned with EU-Russian affairs, and so Finnish foreign policy is much more prioritized with balancing itself against Russia and the affairs in the Ukraine. Therefore, China is not a deep

Finnish concern. In contrast, Denmark occupies an essential position outside the E.U. norm in the foreign-policy realm.

The Danish Business Class

The Danish business class is somewhat politically isolated from its government and is quite autonomous. Although national foreign policy that prevents trade with another country would affect the Danish business class, domestic constraints and public opinion tend (for the most part) to be irrelevant. This reality is primarily due to the business class maintaining a wait-and-see policy with respect to the Danish government. Denmark's businesses and corporations tend to not lobby the Danish government and "[…] like the dog that did not bark, this interest group is mostly 'conspicuous by its absence' from policy formulation." (Østergaard, 2011, 51). Maersk, the largest Danish conglomerate—ranked 142 on the Forbes 2000 list—wants to remain untouched by policy fluctuations at home, while also seeking to avoid siding with either China or the United States, as these two nations are both major trading partners with Maersk (Forbes, 2015; Østergaard, 2011, 51). Other Danish companies are smaller and tend to follow the lead of their larger brethren. Keeping this unusual relationship between Danish business and domestic policy makers in mind, even when the Danish government has supported sanctions against China, Danish businesses have tended to remain largely unaffected by said sanctions. Due to Denmark's economic opt-out, it is not bound by many of the EU economic policies. Even though the Danes may support a specific sanction against China with a vote inside the EU, they are not always fully affected by the results.

Maersk itself is a key actor in why the Danish business class primarily focuses on China. It is the largest shipping company in the world and handles much of the trade between Europe, the U.S., and China (Fremont, 2007, 10). Therefore, it is within Danish interests to keep the international market as accessible to Maersk as possible. Skak indicates that due to the makeup of Danish businesses, specifically the thousands of small-to-medium sized businesses, it is difficult for Denmark to mobilize in multiple directions or branch out to all BRIC states simul-

taneously (2013, 96). Being the largest Danish corporation by far, it is therefore Maersk's prerogative to decide where Danish business will focus its efforts on the international market.

Modern Relationship

This section will examine the period that begins in 1949—with the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) and the rule of the Communist Party of China (CCP)—and continues until today. Three major blocks of time within this time line must be examined. The first is 1949-1978: China was newly formed as the PRC, and went through a phase of relative isolation, except the development of bilateral relationships with other socialist nations and its attempt at the advancement of the international socialist movements. The second period lasted from 1978-1990: under Deng Xiaoping, when China began to open up to the world and global markets. This period of relations came to an end by the events of June 4, 1989, at Tiananmen Square, which ended bilateral communication and foreign direct investment between China and Denmark. Finally, the period from 1992 to the present-day is important: the communication lines were reopened in 1992 between these two nations, and Denmark positioned itself once again as the bridging state between China and Europe. At first, the relationship was still strained by the events at Tiananmen Square, but this strain was quickly and quietly overcome.

Certain elements of the relationship have never been altered during all three time periods. These elements of continuity, even in the face of crisis—such as the break of communications after the events at Tiananmen Square on June 4, 1989—speak to the overall positive and strong relationship the two countries share. Economic relations have never ceased throughout as Danish businesses have continued to conduct trade with the Chinese. Even in the wake of Tiananmen, Denmark has continued to support China's place in the U.N., as well as affirm, and sometimes reiterate or reaffirm, the one-China principle (Østergaard, 2011, 48). Østergaard maintains that even after an event that causes relations to be strained, "…relations have usually been mended by the two sides quietly finding a com-

promise…" (Østergaard, 2011, 48). This flexibility is a trait that has a great impact on the nature of their relationship. Denmark has a unique position within the E.U. and is not a large state; therefore, its actions do not always make headlines, or reach a wider international audience. This 'under-the-radar' status has allowed Denmark to continue economic relations with China, even in times where other nations were unable to do so due to the political constraints of the times.

In 1949, Mao Zedong took power in Beijing and mainland China, and the Republic of China was exiled to Taiwan. The U.S. recognized the Republic of China and supported its seat in the U.N., as did many other Western nations. However, Denmark, Sweden, Netherlands and the U.K. instead recognized the Chinese Community Party and the newly formed People's Republic of China (PRC). While the nations were looking to protecting their current economic interests, they also foresaw the importance of China in the world's political and economic future. These four nations differ from the other European nations in that they actively support improving human rights by pressuring their trading partners. However, the four are often not willing to sacrifice or restrict trading opportunities to accomplish this goal. This unwillingness may in part be due to the adamant support of free-trade above all else (Fox & Godement, 2009, 5).

In 1971, the U.S. switched its recognition of China from Taiwan to Beijing and the CCP, a move Denmark had been advocating since 1950. This development allowed Denmark and Sweden to begin pushing for the PRC to take a seat in the U.N., and this did in fact occur, shortly after the U.S. switched its recognition policy. In 1971, China had just sided with the U.S. against the Soviet Union, and was now looking for partners in Western Europe to align itself with. Denmark was able to play a pivotal role, and began to position itself as China's bridge to Europe. The Danish Ambassador to China—according to Østergaard (2011)—was well connected in Beijing at the highest levels, as well as quite an active individual actor. In 1974, the ambassador was able to push to get Zhou Enlai and Mao Zedong to accept Danish Prime Minister Poul Hartling as the first Western European state leader to visit them for trade

talks (Østergaard, 2011, 55). Østergaard goes on to explain that the European Community—and European countries in general—had no real policies in regards to China, including those that were trading with them. On the other hand, Denmark had been active in supporting the PRC for nearly twenty years, and had already advocated for a Chinese Ambassador to be sent over with observer status to attend the newly-formed European Community meetings. With this in mind, it is no surprise that when China began its opening-up policy in 1978, the Danish Queen Magrethe II, in 1979, became the first Western monarch to visit, and a new wave of bilateral arrangements between the two countries were forged (Chinese Embassy in Denmark, 2014A).

Due to the special nature of the Sino-Danish bilateral arrangement, when there are events that violate the national interests of either state directly, such events dramatically harm their relationship. On June 4, 1989, China used military force to halt the protests in Tiananmen Square. Shortly thereafter, China was put under sanctions by the European Community and the U.S. It took several years for Western nations to normalize relations with China, and Denmark was one of the last countries to do so (Østergaard, 2011, 57). This is because Denmark is an activist nation in supporting the spread of human rights norms. In 1989, Denmark immediately halted all bilateral communication with China, and supported all multilateral sanctions leveled against it (Østergaard, 2011, 57). In this time period, a debate occurred within the Danish government on how to proceed with policies directed towards China. The overall consensus reached by the Danish government was as follows: uphold the one-China policy and enact a more confrontational approach to China's human rights violations. However, Skakke indicates that upholding the One China policy was an unpopular viewpoint (2007,[2]). Moreover, more documented opposition to upholding that policy exists than does the supposed consensus that Denmark should uphold its support of one-China. As a result, internally, the Danish government left the PRC's legitimacy in ruling China in question during the period of

1989-1992. Relations were normalized in 1992; however, they remained strained for quite some time. Still, even throughout the period of 1989 to 1992, Denmark continued to trade with China. The Danes halted all direct foreign investment programs and investment protocols during those three years, but Danish corporations were allowed to continue working with Chinese business partners. However, it took approximately ten years of careful negotiation to rebuild the Sino-Danish bilateral relationship. When Europe began to put sanctions on China for the arms embargo, it was Denmark that re-opened the door for China with the Copenhagen summit, thus resuming its previously occupied place as mediator and peacemaker between the two sides—a role that Denmark relishes, as it seeks ways to maintain a grasp on its own national autonomy (Michalski 2013, 892-893). In 2009, the Dalai Lama visited Denmark, and this time China took offense. The Dalai Lama was visiting many countries in Europe, and China officially protested many of the visits (Fuchs & Klann 2013, 1). However, in Denmark's case, China put a halt to certain trade deals until Denmark publicly reiterated its support for the One-China policy and stated "that Tibet is an integral part of China" (Michalski 2013, 893). The Sino-Danish bilateral relationship was strained for a total of four months between the end of the Dalai Lama's visit and Denmark's announcements. I propose the following: because China requires a bridge state to Europe, specific offense was taken when Denmark violated China's national interest. Additionally, because Denmark seeks autonomy with the European Union, and being a bridge-state to an important power such as China would certainly grant more independent political movement for Denmark, Denmark will be quick to resolve issues with China in the future if it is Denmark that caused the initial offense.

Sino-Danish Mutual Cooperation

Recently, Denmark and China have undergone several major improvements in their bilateral relations. Starting with the signing of the "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership" in 2008, Denmark-China bilateral economic relations have seen a marked increase in trade volume and financial transfers

each year. In 2012, the bilateral trade between the two nations was estimated to have grown by 15 percent from the previous year (Yannan, 2012). Additionally, when President Hu Jintao travelled to Denmark in 2012, deals amounting to 16 billion yuan were signed (Yannan, 2012). This significant trade jump has been compounded by President Xi's visit to Denmark in October 2014, a year that saw Queen Margrethe II visit China in April. Furthermore, Chinese Premier Li Kequiang visited Denmark to meet Helle Thorning Schmidt, the Danish Prime Minister, in September. It was on this visit that Helle Thorning Schmidt stated "that the Denmark-China relations are standing at the best period in history." (Chinese Embassy in Denmark, 2014B). The timing of these events—and the increase in economic ties and bilateral trade agreements—coincide nicely: an observer could conclude that Denmark is China's entry state to not only the Nordic European states, but also a safe entry point for China to deal with the entire European Union.

Denmark has a growing mineral shortage which is reaching crisis levels, which could be solved with Chinese investor help if Greenland's minerals become accessible. Furthermore, substantial uranium deposits have been discovered in Greenland, an autonomous state inside what is known as The Kingdom of Denmark. This mineral wealth is a factor that both Denmark and China would have an interest in, for the purposes of both defense and energy. It is significant that in 2013, Greenland's autonomous government voted to remove the ban on mining operations, thereby granting access to Greenland's supplies of uranium and minerals. In 2013, the Telegraph reported, "The move will not only allow the mining of uranium deposits, but also of rare earths minerals used in 21st century products from wind turbines to hybrid cars and smart phones and that are currently mostly extracted by China." (The Telegraph, Oct. 25, 2013). According to The Telegraph, the vote was close in the parliament, the motion being passed with a voting record of 15-14. This is just one example of China's economic interest in Denmark. Another is Denmark's largest corporation, Maersk, which is mainly concerned with transportation and international shipping rights. China and the United States both work with Maersk. Maersk is a major partner with the U.S. military

(McGarry 2012), and China works with Maersk on the securing of shipping lines for Chinese export businesses. In 2011, Maersk accounted for 9 percent of all container throughput in Hong Kong (Maersk 2014, 40). And Maersk is currently working with China to reduce carbon emissions amongst its ships, as well as to increase the general logistical efficiency of transporting goods in and out of China, which Maersk believes will reduce pollution in Chinese cities (Maersk 2014). Additionally, commercial companies such as Maersk have handled 90 percent of U.S. military cargo to and from Iraq and Afghanistan since 2001 (McGarry, 2012). Although this only amounts to approximately 2.9 percent of Maersk's overall container shipping business , it is still quite significant (McGarry 2012). Further in 2002, 73 percent of Maersk's weekly containerized transport capacity was between East-Asia, the U.S., and European regions (Fremont 2007, 14). Thus, it is within the Danish national interest to keep trade relations between Europe, Asia and the U.S. as stable as possible.

On the Chinese side of the arrangement, Denmark has a lot to offer. China is constantly looking for new sources of energy, and Greenland's uranium may allow both China and Denmark to seek nuclear powered solutions to their energy needs as a stop-gap measure, or a backup plan in the event of an energy crisis. It would qualify as a stop-gap measure because both Denmark and China—through the use of technology—are searching for more renewable energy sources.

Denmark and the other Northern European nations have taken a leading international role in developing clean technology solutions to energy production. In particular, Denmark is a nation devoted to cleaning up its own pollution and has turned this devotion into part of its foreign policy. It seeks to trade clean technology solutions to China, in return for Chinese investment into Danish prospecting and mining operations in Greenland and Danish operations in the Arctic. There have been serious attempts by Chinese academia to work with Danish businesses in their search for cleaner energy and cleaner production (Bertelsen, Xiangyun & Søndergaard, 2013, 66). Bertelsen, Xiangyun & Søndergaard (2013), have proposed in their recent work that China's current economic model is

neither socio-economically sustainable, nor environmentally sustainable. They propose that China must move its economy to a research and development model over the next few decades, and move to an economy based on science and technology over production and exports (Bertelsen, Xiangyun & Søndergaard 2013, 67-69). In this endeavour, Denmark features heavily as Denmark's businesses are focused on the types of technology that China is most in need of, and Denmark's foreign policy is aligned with the goal of a cleaner, more sustainable China. In the Danish view there is no downside, for Denmark and the other Northern European nations are lead actors in the search for solutions to the climate change issue. If Denmark can help China reduce its carbon emissions, increase China's water-management capability, and decrease China's overall pollution through friendly trade of technology, they will accomplish two goals in one political manoeuvre. In support of this agenda, Denmark opened up the "Innovation Centre Denmark in Shanghai," which functions as a communication hub between Danish and Chinese business and academia respectively. Additionally, a minimum of ten Danish businesses have reported increased funding and international cooperation with Chinese universities at high levels of influence (Bertelsen, Xiangyun & Søndergaard 2013, 73-74).

Between Denmark's need for minerals, China's growing energy and environmental concerns, and their desire to decrease the amount of pollution produced by industry and energy consumption, there is no real downside to their trade agreement. Mutual co-operation exists within the national interest of both states, and it is unlikely that Denmark and China will reduce bilateral trade relations in the future. Quite the opposite seems likely, as, over the past six years (i.e. since 2008), trade between the two countries has grown significantly each year, and with the new agreements signed this year..

The Bridge to Europe

As we have seen, from 1949 to 1974, Denmark was a secondary partner in the arrangement with China. For the most part, the Nordic nations first had to wait and see what Britain would do, and then act in accordance with their own respective interests, after Britain had made a decision (Siike 1983, 106). The Helsinki Peace Congress alienated Finland from China, and the Chinese media gave the event negative coverage (Siike, 1983, 111). Additionally, since the early 1970s, Sweden and Norway have been intent on following a goal of Europeanization (Østergaard 2011;Laursen 1993). Therefore, Denmark stood apart from the other three Nordic countries. Additionally, as a European minimalist, it holds a vital position. On one hand, Denmark needs to maintain a vibrant economy by trading with Europe, the U.S. and China, and also participating in E.U. led trade operations. On the other hand, Denmark's E.U. opt-outs give it maneuverability in its individual trade operations at the cost of not reaping all of the benefits of successful E.U. trade negotiations. Denmark is afraid of losing its autonomy within Europe, with Europe seemingly heading towards more intergovernmental policies that Denmark fears will become so embedded to the extent that they will overshadow domestic policy. Denmark seeks self-determination within Europe, an ideal that China heralds in the U.N. as a primary right for any nation. Skak points out that Denmark has traditionally been an activist nation in regards to human rights and environmental concerns, and is thus inclined to work with China to push this agenda (2013, 96-97). These two nations see within each other a mutually beneficial arrangement. The economic and technological gains mentioned above are important, but Denmark's longing for continued autonomy and independence and China's need for a peacemaker state within the European Union makes these two states a good match for one another.

Given that Denmark works closely with both China and the U.S. in addition to being a minimal participant within the E.U., the nation is perfectly suited to the role of peacemaker. Denmark sees this peacemaker role as the means of keeping safe its autonomy within the European Union. The fear of becoming one small voice in a sea of many is, for Denmark, a real one. It is highly interested in its own autonomy within Europe, and as the European Union's power grows, so must Danish leverage should they wish to maintain their autonomy. If Denmark can act as a peacemaker state between China and the European

Union, this will represent a new form of leverage when dealing with the E.U. Additionally, China desires new and clean technology to improve its environmental issues and air pollution, and Denmark is a leading nation in that area of technology, standing to benefit from increased Chinese investment. This combination of needs presents a clear explanation for the strength of the Sino-Danish relationship over the past sixty-five years. Danish foreign policy seeks the advancement of human rights, continued autonomy for itself, and increased economic ties with as many nations as possible. Meanwhile, China requires a friendly nation within Europe that can act as a negotiator between itself and other European nations, especially in times of political disruption.

Conclusion

In modern political science discussions, a participant could either overlook or downplay the realm of small-state bilateral relationships. Regional concerns such as the China-Vietnam relationship might take precedence, as might major global relationships, such as China-U.S. or U.S.-Russia. Such relationships often weigh heavily on global affairs and in political science debates. Thus, literature on the topic of Sino-Danish relations is, in comparison, quite sparse. In this paper I argued that the Sino-Danish relationship is significant given that Denmark is an unusual member of the European Union with respect to its capacity to opt out of otherwise binding agreements(Larsen, 1999, 466). Furthermore, Denmark and China have common ground: both states prefer long-term goal-setting, and both have a strong sense of national identity. Significantly, Denmark's stringent opt-outs have made this small nation a minor European Union member, yet one that can act as a bridge between China and Europe. It is on this common ground, with the potential mutual benefits, that the Sino-Danish relationship has gained its fortitude. The commonality of philosophy and potential benefits represent the dual reasons their relationship continues to flourish.

The relationship between the two countries is not a perfect friendship. Each state still has its own national interests to look after, and on occasion, these national interests conflict. The two underlying factors which cause the most tension are Denmark's small size in comparison to China, and Denmark's international activism on the issue of human rights. Most European countries also experience the size comparison tension, and some experience the human rights activism tension as well. So what makes this bilateral arrangement different from the ones between China and any other European country? To explore and understand this difference, it is critical to have an awareness of Denmark's position in the European Union.

Denmark and China also share another national interest: the prosperity and well-being of the next generation of their respective populations. While this concern might seem like an obvious national interest, it is surprising how many nations do not always consider the long-term effect of their actions on their own future citizens. Each nation is searching for ways to reduce their impact on the planet, as well as improve their own economy. They also seek to maintain, in Denmark's case, or improve, in China's case, the standard of living for their respective citizens. Can Denmark remain the steady bridge for China into the European markets in the future, while maintaining its concomitant policies with regard to Chinese human rights? For the moment, this bridge appears to have many workers, both Chinese and Danish, building the pillars of its foundation.

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Daniel was born in London, England, and spent many of his formative years there before moving to Canada. Daniel is graduating from Concordia in spring 2015, with a major in Political Science and a minor in Education. His academic interests include human rights, philosophy, and international relations. Daniel is currently completing an internship with Gender Creative Kids Canada and represented Concordia at Model UN New York this past winter.

While taking a course on Global China, Daniel noticed how a small European nation kept coming up while researching topics for a final paper: Denmark. Intrigued by this particularity, he continued his research and decided to explore the China-Denmark Bilateral relation.

This is Daniel's second publication for *Political Affairs* as he was also published in the 2014 edition.

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Sarah is in her last semester at Concordia, specialized in Political Science, English Literature, and Human Rights. She is interested in gender and post-colonial studies and their intersection in politics. She discovered her passion for editing after realizing that it was a medium in which she was not only allowed - but encouraged - to criticize the work of others, a pass-time that she greatly appreciates. In addition to editing she enjoys writing, photography, arguing, and planning trips she can't afford. One of her missions in life is to de-stigmatize the word "feminist." After graduation, Sarah plans on moving to South Korea to teach and focus on her writing, before applying to graduate schools.

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Isaac will complete his B.A. honours in political science in summer 2015. Next year, he will pursue a Master of Arts in Public Policy and Public Administration at Concordia. Isaac was named an Arts and Science Scholar for 2013-2014 and received the J.P. Copeland Memorial Bursary. His interest in editing was sadistically aroused during a demanding English writing course that he pursued early in his degree. Starting the Journal last year seemed like an ideal way of finding out what it's like to be on the other end of the phone. Now he is interested in combining political, economic, and legal studies into his career plans and one day starting his own boutique firm, but he's not interested in boutique dollars.

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Eli is a fourth year undergraduate student of Political Science, with minors in Economics and Theology. He is primarily interested in the creation and interpretation of Canadian law as it concerns systemic issues of inequality and to that effect, is attending law school in 2015. Eli participated in the Journal of Political Affairs both last year and this year in order to help ensure a quality medium for students in the department to have their works published, as well as to infuriate writers.

Matthew Palynchuk

Matthew is currently completing his double major in Philosophy and Political Science. His research interests include contemporary legal and political philosophy, especially distributive justice, disability, and analytical Marxism (sometimes referred to as non-bullshit Marxism). This is his second and last year on the editing board for Political Affairs, where he mostly edits papers with theoretical and historical analysis of political philosophy. In his spare time, Matthew plays music, researches philosophy, and indulges his obsession with coffee.

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Edith is finishing an Honours in Political Science and a minor in Diversity and the Contemporary World at Concordia. She is interested in Human Rights, Sustainability and how NGOs are becoming major actors in those areas. She enjoys volunteering and she has recently developed a passion for knitting. She is currently President of Loyola College Student Association and Amnesty Concordia.

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Alexandra recently graduated from Concordia with a B.A. in Political Science. She enjoys arguing, drinking wine, and has a historical crush on Sir Winston Churchill. An advocate for organ donation and raising awareness for Cystic Fibrosis, Alexandra takes a keen interest in healthcare policies. When she is not working at a Government Relations firm in Ottawa, she is travelling back home to Montreal to be with her 9 year-old puppy, Crosby Taylor.

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Miriam Mokruša

Miriam graduated from Concordia with a major in English Literature and an honours in Liberal Arts and has yet to leave. She is currently completing a certificate in Irish Studies at the School of Canadian Irish Studies after she discovered an interest in Irish literature while studying abroad in Cork, Ireland. When she's not busy catching up with homework or playing with her two crazy dogs, Miriam enjoys playing Gaelic Football, wanderlusting and blogging about Bloomsday.

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Patricia is a third year student in Political Science at Concordia, and holds a B.A. in psychology from McGill. She returned to university because of strong interests in public policy, international relations, and law. Patricia has worked for non-profits in clean energy and continues to do volunteer research work in public health. She has long had an eccentric collection of academic interests including astronomy, war strategy, physics, and social justice issues.

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Daniela is a third year Political Science major and a Law and Society minor at Concordia. Her main field of interest is Canadian Politics, especially debate regarding Quebec's unilateral secession. She is also passionate about constitutional law and the ever increasing power of the Supreme court in today's politics. She enjoys music, singing, playing guitar and correcting poor French grammar. She hopes to follow her mother's footsteps and become a lawyer.

Marc Cordahi

Marc will graduate this summer with a double major from the Department of Political Science and the School of Community and Public Affairs. He is the recipient of the New Millennium Student Contribution Bursary and has served the SCPA as Community Outreach Secretary. In 2014, Marc was a teaching assistant for the Introduction to International Relations course and will be continuing his studies at the graduate level at Concordia, pursuing a Master's in Public Policy and Public Administration. He plans to write his thesis in international political economy. Marc is a member of the Golden Key Honours Society and was published in last year's edition of the Journal.

Vanessa Fleising
Illustrator

Originally from Montreal, Vanessa graduated in Studio Arts at Concordia. Her previous art practice has always focused on Fine Arts and mixed media and so working with Political Affairs this year gave Vanessa the opportunity to explore illustration in a different way. For Vanessa, creating drawings that respond to political texts is a way to illustrate and express ideas in a different light. Vanessa is currently working as a free-lance artist and has had her work published in several catalogues of group art exhibits. You may visit her work online at vanfleising.tumblr.com

Trina Daniel
Graphic Designer

Trina is a graphic designer currently in her final year of completing her BFA in Design at Concordia. As part of her design practice, she strives to find the balance between structure and play, creating work that encourages critical reflection on current social practices. Her work includes experimenting with found materials, as well as finding inspiration in the most unlikely places.